

PSYCHOANALYSIS
ITS MEANING AND PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS

By the same Author

VEGETATIVE NERVOUS SYSTEM
PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALISM
PSYCHOLOGY OF HUNGER

PSYCHOANALYSIS

ITS MEANING AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

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CASELL & CO. LTD.

LONDON
TORONTO

MELBOURNE
SYDNEY

First published 1934

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
EDENEZER SAVILES AND SON, LIMITED, THE
TRINITY PRESS, WORCESTER, AND LONDON
F15.534

INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY
PROFESSOR FREUD

These Chapters constitute an instructive (*Lehrreich*) and valuable introduction to the science of Psychoanalysis which is so difficult to present.

FREUD.

VIENNA 2.4.1933.

PREFACE

THIS volume is based on a series of lectures originally delivered under the auspices of the Department of Philosophy of the University of the Witwatersrand in an attempt to meet a growing demand on the part of the students of the University and others for information on the subject of Psychoanalysis.

My aim was to present to an audience unfamiliar with the subject an accurate statement of the fundamental principles of psychoanalysis without courting popularity by undue simplification. As I was addressing a lay audience, I included little clinical material, preferring rather to illustrate the working of the principles by subjecting to analysis material accessible to everyone, namely some well-known literary works.

Nearly the whole of the manuscript has been read by Professor Freud to whom I am very greatly indebted for many valuable suggestions, and also for supplying an introductory note.

My thanks are due to Professor R. F. A. Hoernle, who was largely responsible for the organization of the lectures at the University; I am also grateful to Dr. Theodor Reik, of Vienna, for reading parts of the manuscript and contributing much helpful advice.

Last, but not least, my thanks are due to my wife, who greatly encouraged me in writing this book and generally in the work of psychoanalysis.

JOHANNESBURG,

June, 1933.

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PART I

THE THEORY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: REALITY AND PLEASURE PRINCIPLES: THE MEANING OF SUFFERING

PERMIT me to make it clear from the beginning that I shall discuss psychoanalysis from a purely Freudian standpoint. I shall not touch upon the outgrowths of the psychoanalytical theories, such as Jung's philosophical excursions into the archaic structure of the personality, Adler's superficial and naïve speculations about the cravings for power, as expressed in his individual psychology, Steckel's abortive attempts to obtain quick results at any price, Frank's analytical cathartic methods, or numerous other schools of so-called deep psychology, all of which are, *en bloc*, wrongly called psychoanalytical. In this matter, I am glad to state, I am acting in accordance with the decision of the British Medical Association of 1927, which demands that only those who are adherents and exponents of the Freudian theories should style themselves psychoanalysts.

Psychoanalysis is known primarily as a branch of medical science. I shall not, however, dwell on the medical aspects. It will be my endeavour to illustrate the fundamental psychoanalytical principles from the material found in art and literature. On account of the confidential character of practical analytical work, one cannot in a small country like South Africa, use case histories for illustrations of the theoretical principles.

On the other hand, the exposition of the theory by means of literary examples has, in itself, a considerable advantage compared with the histories of analysed patients: the discussion is based on data equally accessible to everybody, and one is not expected simply to believe in the incredible stories of the exponent. I say "incredible" without any irony, because scepticism to analytical data is perfectly natural for those who have had no personal experience of being analysed or of analysing others. Even sincere sympathy and theoretical knowledge of psychoanalysis are frequently not sufficient for grasping and appreciating the truth of Freud's discoveries. For that reason the theoretical exposition of psychoanalysis is always a difficult problem. There are, besides, other factors which complicate the task. The difficulties lie, first of all, in the subject itself.

Psychoanalysis is a comparatively young science. On the other hand, it has, during the last fifteen years, developed from a psycho-therapeutic method of treating neuroses into an independent psychological science. As Freud has stated: "While originally the name of a particular method of treatment, psychoanalysis has now become a science of the unconscious mental processes." Starting from a purely empirical basis, Freud gradually developed his own psychological theories (called by him "metapsychology"), which radically changed the conceptions of human nature, character and personality formation, of human urges and strivings, and the general outlook on life.

It must, however, be stated that psychoanalysis did not start with preconceived theories or systems; on the contrary, it may be said that it came into being as an accidental by-product in the laborious quest for the understanding of psycho-neurotic afflictions. In the

early 'nineties Freud, like many others, was fully aware that the existing methods for treating neuroses were illogical and ineffectual. His work with Charcot in Paris convinced him of the importance of psychic factors in the causation and treatment of mental and physical ailments and, so to say, prepared the way for his work with Dr. Breuer.

Breuer was a Viennese general practitioner who successfully treated a case of hysteria by methodical catharsis, which consisted of letting the patient talk during hypnotic sleep. The collaboration with Breuer resulted in the new concepts of hysteria and other psycho-neuroses, and brought into medicine the concepts of psychic injury, repression and abreaction symptom formation (*see* Chapter VIII). The next years witnessed a sort of upheaval, which gave rise to psychoanalysis proper. Freud, working alone, soon abandoned hypnotism in favour of free associations, and in these "subterranean pathways of the human mind" he discovered the important rôle of the unconscious and sex in the normal and abnormal life. This period of psychoanalysis may well be designated as the *Sturm und Drang* period, and as that of severe outer resistance to problems of sex. The medical world was quite willing to accept his other discoveries, but the weak spot of civilized humanity, sex, aroused an avalanche of hostile reactions towards psychoanalysis. Freud was for a number of years accused of being immoral and a degenerate, and the psychoanalytical procedure was regarded as a laboratory of free love. On the other hand, one must agree with Brill, that it is difficult to say whether one should be pleased with the gradual diminution of the sex resistance. Struggle seems to belong to the scheme of natural evolution. For, notwithstanding all opposition, psychoanalysis has continued to progress, and the

few who offered the world immaculately conceived substitutes have not gone very far with them. The average person who comes into close touch with psychoanalysis soon realizes the true conception of sex, and with a little knowledge about its nature learns how to control this powerful force, and to utilize it for the highest accomplishments of life.

The discoveries of Freud gave an entirely new orientation to normal and abnormal psychology. It is not an exaggeration to state that psychoanalysis has rewritten all the mental sciences.

The dominating idea in medicine and psychology of the last century, was the dualistic hypothesis, which conceived the mental and the physical as existing side by side, without mutual interference. The conception was that the individual could be separated into two distinct parts, mind and body. Although it is true that one is often unable to make any specific correlations between physical and mental, one must admit that the dualistic conception of the human machine is doubtful in theory and harmful in practice. It is on account of this sharp division between mental and physical processes that, before Freud, the essence of mental disturbances was not understood by the medical world. Freud has built up a monistic concept of the human individual. In opposition to the academic psychologists, he told us how intimately interwoven were bodily and psychic phenomena, and how all of them were determined by the vast region of the unconscious. By a strange coincidence, at the same period, a physiological school of thought was founded which, from a different angle, helped considerably to build up the monistic outlook. This was the reflexeological school of Pavlov-Bechterew in Russia.

Psychoanalysis threw light not only on neuroses and insanity, but also on normal psychology, mythology, folk-lore. Freud also early turned his attention to art, wit, the psychology of primitive peoples, to problems of mental hygiene, delinquency and criminality, and more recently to problems of religion and civilization.

The psychoanalytical doctrine is not the fixed and defined system that the public imagines it to be. Psychoanalysis is not a closed system, the final word has not yet been said. Freud and his followers constantly emphasize the fact that psychoanalysis only opens to view psychological content of human life which will afford material for research for generations to come. Part of what has been produced is fundamental, other parts represent mere coping stones which may be removed without damage to the main structure. Freud confesses that he does not know which of the added portions will survive. He says: "Only such true believers as expect from science a substitute for a creed they have relinquished, will take it amiss if the investigator develops his views further." Yet it is to be noted that up till now nothing formulated by Freud from the very beginning has had to be rejected. It is more a question of building higher up and widening the existing foundation. In the light of all these considerations, you will appreciate my difficulties in having to convey to the lay reader the essence of psychoanalytical principles.

I do not know, of course, how far my readers are acquainted with psychoanalysis. Everyone is bound to have heard or read something about the subject, for unfortunately psychoanalysis has become very popular.

In America they have even gone so far as to hire and fire employees by analysis. Luckily we have not reached such a state of practical application of Freudian

theories. Popularity, especially of the American type, has always a detrimental influence on the development of science, and has indeed proved very harmful to psychoanalysis. A few catch words, such as "Œdipus," "repression," "inferiority complex" and other terms have been taken over by the public, by the newspapers, films and cheap novelists, and used by them indiscriminately. On the other hand, ardent antagonists publicly declared their opposition to psychoanalysis but, in private, made use of it, diluting and falsifying its conceptual content. Opposition schools came out with unjustified generalizations and superficial systemizations. The public at large, having no opportunity of familiarizing itself with the basic principles, began to look at analysis as a fashion or a substitute for a creed, like Christian Science, New Thought, etc. A patient of mine characterizes this attitude of people to psychoanalysis in an excellent way. In his desire to hurt me (he was in one of his resistive moods) he said: "Doctor So-and-So came from Europe and informed me that Freud is played out. He has been dropped by everybody. In fairness to Freud," the patient continued, "I must say that this doctor has never read a single book on psychoanalysis and knows nothing about the subject." This is a typical attitude of some of the opponents of psychoanalysis.

The causes of such irresponsible criticism and hostility to psychoanalysis lie in the fact that Freud made his discoveries in a field in which everybody considers himself if not an expert, at least justified in expressing an opinion. It is partly for that reason that psychoanalysis has been presented all over the world, including South Africa, from an immature and distorted standpoint. Off-hand opinions on the subject are expressed, not only by laymen, but also by people with psychological

training. I hope that the majority of my readers have an open mind and, have not yet formed any opinion about psychoanalysis. I realize that this may be expecting too much, for it involves admission of ignorance, and few have the courage of such an admission, as it inflicts a wound to one's self-love and pride.

The fierce antagonism in some circles to psychoanalysis is mainly rooted in this instinctual self-love and narcissism of human beings. Permit me to dwell a little longer on this aspect of the opposition to psychoanalysis, as this will, at the same time give me an opportunity of demonstrating a psychoanalytical approach to a solution of a problem.

For centuries science has been subjecting our self-love and pride to severe trials, because science, for which all reality is a matter of experience, takes no account of the illusions and the divinities that are so dear to us. Freud justly compared psychoanalysis with two previous great scientific discoveries: with the Copernican cosmological theory, and with Darwin's theory of evolutionary descent. We know how much it cost human pride and self-love, which placed the earth in the centre of the universe, to have to admit since the Copernican discovery that this earth is only a humble planet subordinate to the sun. Darwin similarly inflicted a narcissistic wound by maintaining that there was a relationship between the animal and human cell, and that the animals could be made like ourselves. Darwin struck a blow at man's evaluation of his body, which he reduced to the level of the animal world. Then came analysis. It has discovered for us the unconscious, alongside which consciousness, the object of our pride, through which we considered ourselves totally different from animals, is but a coarse instrument. Man felt acutely hurt by the fact that his psychic personality should be removed

from the sphere of influence of his consciousness, and by the statement that he is not even a complete master of his own actions. For, psychically, each of us has a proud and a false impression of being a single personality, and of knowing, by means of simple impressions, what is going on inside us. Psychoanalysis has ruthlessly destroyed this illusion of human beings. Psychoanalysis has shown that behaviour, the actions of people, are to a great extent dictated by unconscious motives rather than by will and reason. Such a discovery was humiliating. "Man has seen, in the triumph of analysis, a new injury to his pride and self-love. He has seen escape from him still another chance of aspiring to a special position in the universe. Dethroned, he is naturally angry at the power that has humiliated him once more." (Laforgue).

You may have noticed the ease with which the world has accepted the truth of Einstein's discoveries, although very few knew anything about them. Einstein was unanimously proclaimed a genius. I do not want to doubt the greatness of Einstein's discoveries, but I am sure on one point: people accepted his genius so readily because his discoveries did not actually concern them, while Freud had the misfortune to direct his genius to discoveries which injured the human pride, and in matter of sex also injured human prejudices and hypocrisy. The reaction against such injuries was only natural. So great was the feeling against Freud in the first years of his discoveries, that there can be no doubt that had he lived in the days of the Inquisition he would have suffered the fate of Galileo. Fortunately we no longer have an official inquisition to combat science, but prejudice and ignorance are still very strong. It is for the purpose of fighting the undermining influences of prejudice and ignorance that we psychoanalysts are

seeking for opportunities to discuss psychoanalytical problems.

The primitive man goes to the magician, the witch-doctor, for treatment of every ailment. To the primitive the magical element of treatment is just as natural as a cure by an operation is to the civilized. We may safely accept that the primitive feared the evil spirit causing his disease much more than we the surgical ailment, but as a compensation he had a greater belief in the magician than we in our surgeons. According to his *Weltanschauung* everything in nature was animated and could suddenly turn hostile towards him, and consequently he lived in constant fear, while we acquired (I wonder?) the fearless knowledge of mechanical law of cause and effect, which implies that nothing can harm us which is not compatible with the laws of nature. Our conception is certainly a tremendous achievement compared with the primitive's point of view, but this advantage had to be paid for with the conviction that there are no magicians in this world and no wonder cures—a belief which was difficult to give up.

We find in children the same immense unreasonable fear of the inanimate world. They, like the primitive, have also the unconditional belief and trust in the authorities round them and this confidence removes their fears. We are all children at times and regress to the infantile stage, especially when ill or in distress. We are then dominated by unknown fears, and reach out for magic and wonders so as to gain confidence. In such a state, it is natural to confide in and trust in the first person who claims to possess this power of magic and omnipotence.

This is the basic foundation of fortune-telling, spiritualism, premonitions and superstitious beliefs. The

emotional play of fear and belief is the fundamental principle of every psychological treatment, it is its basic mechanism, whether it is a wild method of treatment by certain rites and rituals, or by an electric stick and a glass of water, or a systematic method of treatment by a qualified psychotherapist. Every psychotherapist uses suggestion and persuasion, and tries in this way to help the neurotic in his search for fearless safety and protection against the unkind world.

A neurotic is an unhappy child; he becomes ill because he finds life unbearable and, as we say, flies from reality into neurosis. He tries to run away from the forbidden desires and strivings, instead of attempting to control them and make use of them. Instead of fighting for his rights, the neurotic develops a false inferiority feeling which intensifies his real troubles and creates new ones, with the result that he fails in life, and illness becomes the only form of his existence. Paradoxically enough the neurotic soon becomes aggressive in order to hide his own weaknesses and inferiority complex, and, through this abnormal, harmful aggressiveness, he is in a short time at war with everybody round him: family, society and humanity as a whole. There are two other dangers for the neurotic. Finding the reality cruel to him, he creates his own fantastic world, and as nobody need to be modest and reserved in fantasies, the neurotic goes farther and farther away from the outside world and people, and develops a narcissistic self-centred attitude to life. This in ordinary language means that the neurotic becomes constantly busy with himself. He constantly broods on the injustices in this world, and is predominantly absorbed in his complaints and sufferings, while a healthy human being forgets about himself, being too absorbed in the demands of daily life.

A neurotic feels embittered against reality, because his neurosis originates from a conflict between his urges, strivings and wishes, which aim at a pleasurable gratification, and the obstacles in life which prevent such an attainment.

Such obstacles are, for example, the demands and restrictions of society, of family and social circles, the accepted code of morals, and the innumerable factors which compose external conditions of life, known as reality. Psychoanalysis expresses these troubles of the neurotic in a formula : a neurosis is a result of a conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality principle.

The pleasure principle is the innate tendency for the mental life of the individual to be shaped and developed according to the amount of pleasure he can get in this world, from external and internal sources. Besides the conscious, there are also unconscious processes which strive towards the gain of pleasure. At the same time, our mental activity unconsciously tries to ward off (in analytical language, "repress") things which might arouse unpleasantness and pain.

Freud gives an illustrative description of pleasure and pain, from the point of view of the amount of excitation and tension of the emotions existing in the individual at a given moment. One cannot stand a psychical tension above a certain degree or limit. One searches then for an outlet for the intensified feelings. If such is not found, one feels unhappy, or, in the case of tension reaching a high degree, one experiences a direct pain. This may be better understood if one realizes that human beings have a tendency to spend their instinctual energy as much as they can, for this spending of energy in their pursuit of gratification of instincts gives them pleasure. . . . But, in life, one cannot always do so. One is therefore compelled to keep oneself in a state of

equilibrium in which not too much energy is spent and not too much is spared. From this state we may vacillate between pleasure—when our urges are gratified and their tension is lowered—and pain, when the same strivings, having been refused a normal outlet, are intensified to an unbearable degree. When, finally, even in this state the instincts find no gratifying outlet, they may unconsciously be transformed into neurotic symptoms and other abnormal channels, such as addiction to drugs, the committing of crimes, or self destruction. A neurotic symptom can therefore be regarded, from this point of view, as an unconscious expression of an unsatisfied, repressed desire, or, in other words, a neurotic symptom is an abnormal outlet for thwarted instinctual energy, repressed wishes, and anxiety and fear associated with such conditions. This is what is meant when it is stated that, to a neurotic, the disease is an escape from his internal conflicts.

The pleasure and reality principles act in a way similar to that of two opponents on a see-saw, each of whom feels discomfort when up in the air (high tension). Each will naturally attempt to keep the see-saw down at his end (low tension). The only solution for the well-being of both will be an approximation to an equilibrium. Similarly, the ideal for the individual is a state midway between the gratification of his desires and the demands of reality.

While the pleasure principle is inborn, the reality principle is an acquired, learned tendency, forced upon us by environment. The pleasure principle may become very dangerous, destructive indeed, and for the sake of self-preservation must be modified by the reality principle. The pleasure principle demands immediate satisfaction of our desires. The reality principle, without giving up the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure,

teaches us to postpone satisfaction, to endure pain on the road to pleasure. It is just on this road that the neurotic loses himself. He loses the capability of lowering the tension of his emotions to a degree which makes life bearable.

But beyond a certain degree of intensity, it seems impossible for people to go on indefinitely fighting and bearing anxiety. There comes a moment when the subject desires peace at any price. He seeks means of obtaining peace in any form, and, having found the method, he clings to it as to a precious weapon for resolving anxiety. Not being able to find healthy gratifications, suffering, moral and physical, becomes the only source of pleasure (This point will be elaborated later on.). It sounds incredible, but it is true, that moral and physical pains are more used in the service of the pleasure principle than could ever have been imagined. In the next chapter I will explain some reasons for it. It is suffering that becomes the great protector. It is suffering that suppresses anxiety. Human beings invent suffering, moral as well as physical; the external world does not provide them with a sufficient amount of it. The possibilities of suffering are infinite, so that conditions, apparently very different from each other, represent the same phenomenon. Human beings in such cases encourage an illness. The acquisition of a venereal disease in young men has often, strange to say, the psychological basis of self-punishment. I knew a young man to whom sexuality became such a burden that he found the only escape from it in a very severe infection of gonorrhœa; he did not take measures to avoid the infection, nor did he take measures to cure it in time and in a proper way. Many accidents have the same psychological basis of seeking for suffering and self-punishment. Some people find

gratification in suffering of a social order. Thus a student will fail in all his examinations, in spite of the brilliant work he has done during the year. He breaks down just before the final examinations before achieving the goal he has aimed at for years. Or he will constantly get himself into trouble with professors or fellow students. In more severe cases he will go on to the committal of criminal deeds, in which the aim is obviously not the commission of the deed, but the attainment of moral suffering. I hope to be able to show you that the question of crime and punishment, looked at from a psychoanalytical point of view, is largely in the service of self-punishment—suffering and expiation.

The symptoms which are produced by the mechanism of self-punishment vary indefinitely. Widely different symptoms may be substituted for and replaced by others. One sees this clearly in the so-called "fate neurosis," wherein the patient regards himself as the victim of external powers, so finding justification for suffering in any circumstances. For example, a person suffers from an illness or a defect. He is cured of this disability. Suddenly he develops a new complaint, has an accident or breaks a limb. Cured of his illnesses he starts life in a peculiar way. He chooses a profession in which all the chances are against him. He marries, but under such conditions as to ensure failure. He is unhappy in his family life and breaks it up, but in such a way as to make the new situation worse. If he has a love affair he always manages to be a loser or a sufferer. In short, any situation, in the end-result, turns against such unfortunate people. If such patients come to be analysed, they attempt to make this also a failure and it demands tremendous skill and tact on the part of the analyst to avoid such a gratification of the patient's

desires. It is difficult to imagine how considerable is the number of people who have to struggle, to a greater or lesser degree, against reactions of this sort. And it occurs to no one, unless he is acquainted with psychoanalysis, to connect these incidents with each other and to see in them an endless repetition of the same situation. To such neurotics suffering becomes the only basis of existence. By suffering they earn the right to live, and the illusionary control of the people around them. Suffering becomes to such people an illusion of liberation from the authorities, parents, or teachers. It is remarkable how such people cling to their sufferings and lose interest in being well and normal. It is further astonishing to see the ways and means they invent to have the right to suffer. As I said, fate is their strongest weapon. It is something which nobody dares to attack.

The neurotics put the whole world in the wrong. The world at large, they maintain, is unjust and cruel, and nothing is left to them but suffering. A direct and simple rationalization, for suffering unconsciously serves as a means of dealing with anxiety and inhibition. It serves further for the purpose of expiation, of a sense of guilt and concomitant need for punishment, and suffering is at the same time a source of pleasure which must be called sexual.

CHAPTER II

THE MENTAL STRUCTURE OF THE PERSONALITY; ID, EGO AND SUPER-EGO: THE SENSE OF GUILT AND NEED FOR PUNISHMENT

AS I have already pointed out, each of us has the false idea of being able to know himself by simple introspection. Psychoanalysis has shown that this is impossible; nothing is more difficult than to follow the advice of Socrates: "Know thyself." There is another fallacy, which consists in the narcissistic assertion that every individual is a single personality. While not denying the importance of certain constitutional factors, psychoanalysis maintains that the individual's environment, in the widest sense of the word, is of paramount importance in the development and formation of the personality. As Laforgue remarked, "concerning the affairs of the psyche, it would, perhaps, be better to say that man is like a plant, on the original stock of which has been grafted his social personality." Accordingly the mental structure of each individual is very complex.

The psychoanalytical school conceives at present three constituents, three elements of the human mind, they are the *Id*, *Ego* and *Super-Ego*.

The *Id* represents the part which seeks and strives for pleasure. The psychic apparatus at birth is composed of the *Id* only. It is characterized by blind, impulsive wishes, instigated by the impulses of hunger, love, and

aggression. The Id is the reservoir of the inborn instincts and instinctive energy. Of these instincts the sexual and aggressive are the most important. The energy which is invested in the sexual instincts is most important, and is called, in psychoanalysis, *Libido*.

The Id is the region where passions reign supreme, and is entirely guided by the pleasure principle. The Id is unmoral (not immoral), illogical; it aims at gratification of its powerful instincts, has no reasoning power; it cannot listen to arguments, because it is totally unconscious. The Id is the place where repressed desires hide themselves from consciousness.

A part of the Id's upper crust undergoes some modifications by virtue of its contact with the outside world through the senses of sight, hearing, etc. This part becomes, under the influence of the outer world, imbued with a sense of reality and morals and serves as the nucleus of the Ego.

When the infant at the breast receives pleasant stimuli, he cannot as yet distinguish whether they come from him or the outer world. There is not yet a sense of the Ego. He learns gradually how to differentiate between the inner and outer world. It must make the strongest impression on him that many sources of excitation become temporarily out of his reach, and reappear as a result of his cries. Thus the baby learns to know of objects as something existing outside his own body and is compelled to adjust himself to this first piece of reality. This adjusted portion of the Id becomes the kernel of the future Ego. A further stimulus to the growth and formation of the Ego, so that it becomes more than a bundle of sensations, is afforded by the frequent, unavoidable, and manifold pains and unpleasant sensations which the child, acting in accordance with the pleasure principle, aims at abolishing or

avoiding. The tendency naturally arises to dissociate from the Ego everything which can give rise to pain, to cast it out, and to create a pure pleasure narcissistic Ego. Everything unpleasant comes from the outside and must be dealt with in such a way as to avoid a conflict.

Permit me to explain to you, in the light of the reflexeological experiments and psychoanalytical experiences, the process of further development and stabilization of the reality principle in the psychic apparatus of the child. I will attempt to illustrate it by means of a simple example. The primitive mastery impulse of the child (to use the orthodox term) manifests itself (among other ways) in the child's tendency to grasp for objects. As the result of a painful experience, such as the burning of its fingers in a candle-flame which is grasped, this expression of an impulse will gradually become inhibited. Later on, the seeing of the candle re-activates the painful experience and this memory is, as a result of a conditioned reflex, what we call objective fear, or objective anxiety. But the inhibition may go farther. Should the child experience several shocks, or should a single shock be excessively severe, then the mere impulse of grasping, or stretching out the hand for an object, will become inhibited in any circumstances. The psyche of the child works in such a way on economical principles. It does not want to be bothered every time with the necessity to differentiate between objects which may burn it and objects which will have no such effect. If it does not grasp at all it is in the safest position. A so-called generalization of inhibitions takes place. This generalization of inhibitions is a cardinal characteristic of the functioning of the mental apparatus. It seems to be in harmony with the principle of nature—"All or nothing."

The generalization of the inhibitions plays an important rôle in the development and stabilization of the neurotic symptoms. I knew a patient who was very sensitive to noises. The slightest noise used to disturb his sleep; to avoid it, he had to cover his face and ears with three or four cushions (This method of protection against noises had, in itself, a significance which I cannot discuss here). The origin of this peculiar obsession was found to be due to a singular experience in an hotel. The room next to his was occupied by a honeymoon couple. For obvious and natural reasons the knowledge of this kept him awake. Now, unfortunately, he had had in early childhood an experience of a similar nature which had undergone repression. The new situation endangered this successful repression. In the same way as the baby inhibited any form of grasping to avoid pain, the patient inhibited any form of listening in: it was not one special noise that disturbed him, as would have been natural, but any noise. It was an obvious bluff, and, to avoid such an impression, he made the fear of noises a reality. The original natural anxiety was soon generalized and stabilized in the psyche of the patient in such a way that any noise was disturbing, although the honeymoon couple had long since left the hotel. The noise phobia remained with the patient for years, and was only eliminated through analysis.

By internalizing and generalizing the inhibitory process, the Ego loses the power of differentiating between what it should and should not fear. This happens in all cases where the repressed desires, repressed unpleasant memories, remain unconscious, when one is not aware of the real object of fear. On a dark night one is afraid of any object. Such a loss of differentiation is a common phenomenon in every-day life.

The Ego is the reasoning part of the individual, and gradually becomes the coherent organization of mental processes. It represents in the individual, consciousness. It strives to be moral and good. It is, in its final development, that part of our psyche of which we are so proud, which we represent by the capital letter I. The Ego is narcissistic, especially in childhood, and it is the neurotic who, as a rule, shows an arrest in the development of the Ego, which for life remains infantile, extremely sensitive and self-centred. While the Id may be regarded as the driving power, the Ego is the driver at the steering wheel. To continue the comparison, one might say that the Id is the whole machinery of the motor-car of which the driver has no idea at the moment of driving; the driver, the Ego, is totally unconscious of the whole complicated work of the machinery—the Id.

In time, a part of the Ego goes through further transformations, and a third part of the personality is formed, which is called the ideal Ego, and more commonly the *Super-Ego*. . . . The Super-Ego is the hyper-moral element, the censor of the individual, and is formed gradually by a process of absorption of all the numerous ethical and moral rules imposed on the child by those in authority, i.e., parents, teachers, etc. Note the difference between the development of the Ego and the Super-Ego. The Ego will develop in every species, human and animal, as it is a result of contact through the senses with the outer world. The Super-Ego will, however, develop only in social beings. Without the concepts of bad or good, permissible and prohibited, in short without a code of morals, there can be no question of a development of the Super-Ego. On the other hand, the higher the civilization, the more complex and the more developed is the Super-Ego.

A child is entirely guided by the pleasure principle, he

wants to do what pleases him. One may, with Freud, reject the suggestion of an original, inborn, as one might say, natural capacity for discriminating between good and evil. Evil is often not at all that which would injure or endanger the Ego; on the contrary, it can also be something which the Ego desires, and which would give it pleasure. Obviously, there is an external influence at work which decides what is good and bad. Under the influence of authorities which decide what is good and what is bad, the child gradually learns to abstain from gratifying some of its desires.

In checking the supposedly bad impulses of the child, parents frequently use methods of coercion and force, by which they aim at frightening and subduing the child. The child then refrains from doing the forbidden things for fear of the external authorities; he is afraid of being punished by them, or, what is still more important, he dreads to lose their love. The dread of losing love is the strongest mechanism, and is also the healthiest in the training of the child, because it gives an early opportunity of self-assertion, and facilitates the process of future identification with the parents. In such circumstances it seems to the child that it does the correct things of its own accord to please its parents. Forced obedience, on the other hand, is detrimental to the child for it inhibits its personality, and, besides, it is unsafe. Force always breeds simultaneously a feeling of revolt.

In the course of time, all the inhibitions and instructions received by the child from the parents are so absorbed that they become internalized in the child's psychic apparatus. They become part and parcel of his character; become his "second nature." He soon knows himself what is "right" or "wrong." He becomes his own judge, his own authority and his own punishing

agent. An internal censorship is established, an internal authority, which commands and guides the human being in all actions and behaviour; this internal authority behaves like the patriarchal father in the family and detects crime, passes judgment on it and punishes it even more severely than the external authority. In other words, the internal authority has all the powers which, in a State, are divided between Parliament, police, courts of justice and jail. The Super-Ego of the neurotic, on account of the weakness of the Ego, becomes a dictator who concentrates in his hands the constitutional, administrative and punitive powers. It shares another characteristic in common with many a person in power. It is also corrupt. There are two other characteristics of the Super-Ego, which deserve our attention. In the first place, it acts mostly unconsciously. It judges and punishes without our conscious knowledge. In the second place, an intention to commit a crime is treated by the Super-Ego as an actual deed. The latter factor plays an important rôle in the development of the sense of guilt. On account of the watchful eye of the internal censor, a sense of guilt arises in a person, not only when he has done something he knows to be bad, but merely when he becomes aware of his intention or desire to do it. When the authority is still external, a state of bad conscience will be mainly provoked by an anxiety and fear of being detected.

Imagine now that the authority has been internalized; from that moment the fear of being detected has ceased to operate; all the difference between doing evil and merely wishing to do it has disappeared, since nothing is hidden from the Super-Ego, not even thoughts. The Super-Ego thus sits in judgment on thoughts and wishes; in short, on all psychic processes, as though they were already actions. The feeling of guilt which has arisen

originally from fear of the external authority, has now become the result of the dread of the internal authority, the Super-Ego. In the first case, it is more correct to use the term remorse, which is a conscious feeling of guilt after an actual deed. A sense of guilt, which is unconscious, is a result of an intention of the Ego to carry out the desires of the Id against the wishes (and contrary to the code of morals) of the Super-Ego. A sense of guilt, in such cases, can be defined as a tension or friction between the Ego and the Super-Ego, on account of the Id. As a result of this tension, the Ego pays the penalty in the form of a neurosis, sense of guilt with self-punishment, self-humiliation, confession and expiation. An outstanding characteristic of all these penalties imposed by the Super-Ego is the suffering entailed.

It must be admitted that the Ego is not absolutely innocent, as is evidenced by the way a neurotic usually presents his case. It also has a finger in the pie, for it is on account of the weakness of the Ego in resisting the demands of the Id and the threats of the Super-Ego that the neurosis develops. Indeed, in neurotics, one usually finds a weak, crippled and infantile Ego, which accepts suffering too readily and easily. Through suffering the condemned and prohibited desires and tendencies find an outlet, and the Ego finds a relief from the feeling of guilt. The Super-Ego of the neurotic does not punish because of the demands of justice; neither does its punishment serve as a deterrent. On the contrary, the Super-Ego's behaviour is very similar to that of a severe justice, which imposes heavy penalties for minor crimes, drives the incipient criminal from society, and then, when he is forced into further crime, punishes him for his new deeds of desperation. The Super-Ego punishes the neurotic in order to satisfy an obsolete

code of conscience, which the infantile Ego has dragged into adult life, and on the basis of this obsolete codex the Super-Ego forbids normal outlet for the Id desires. Or to be more correct, the Super-Ego is prepared to give an outlet under one condition, namely that gratification be combined with suffering. As I have explained, an excessive repression of infantile desires leads to the damping up of an instinct and to an overheated revolutionary atmosphere, out of which the neurotic symptom arises as a reaction, as a breaking through of the repressed. And this breaking through is made possible by the severe punitive system of the Super-Ego. This is what I meant when I said that the Super-Ego is corrupt. It lets the Id gratify its desires if the Ego bribes it with suffering. It is a kind of alliance of the Id and the Super-Ego against the weak and foolish Ego. One may compare the alliance between the Id and the Super-Ego with the relations between two extreme political parties. The party on the right and the party on the left are actually, *de facto*, in secret alliance, in spite of their apparently opposed programmes. They pursue a common goal; revolution and destruction of the State—i.e., the Ego. The tyrannical, hypermoral Super-Ego and the cynical, lustful Id, act in a similar way; given a free hand, they will, between them, destroy the personality.

Suffering as an act of bribery and a means of expiation of a sense of guilt, is a common phenomenon in life. Let us take as an example an over severe educational system, which is based on punishment. The child soon notices that its forbidden deeds are wiped out by the punishment which follows. Thus it soon comes to take its punishment gladly in order to be thereby absolved from the sins committed. It then sins with the thought in the back of its mind, "I shall be punished for it any

way." The more systematically such an educational system is applied, as one sees it in some schools, the more readily a situation will arise in which one gladly commits sin. In this way there arises the truly paradoxical relationship between the child and its elders, namely, that it provokes punishment so that it may sin freely. Thus punishment makes possible the commission of forbidden acts, and this is early realized by the child.

Alexander brings an interesting case history which illustrates the mechanism of punishment as a bribery of the Super-Ego. A very intelligent man in middle life suffered from a severe depression which developed out of an unsuccessful struggle for existence. He came from a well-to-do and socially eminent family, but married into a different social stratum. After this alliance his father and family refused to have anything to do with him. His unsuccessful struggle for existence through many years terminated, on account of neurotically determined inhibition, in a total psychic collapse. He was advised to begin an analysis with a colleague of Alexander's. He found decision difficult. One evening, when the final decision about the analysis was to have been made, he wanted to visit Dr. Alexander in order to talk over once more the pros and cons, but he did not arrive, because he was run over by a motor-car in the neighbourhood of Alexander's house, and was taken to hospital suffering from many severe injuries. It was only on the following day that Alexander heard of the accident. When he discovered him in the third class division of the hospital, he was bandaged like a mummy. He could not move, and all one could see of his face were his eyes, shining with a radiant light. He was in good spirits, free from the oppressive melancholy of the previous days. The contrast between his physical condition and his mental state was particularly striking.

The first words with which he greeted the doctor were : "Now I have paid for everything. Now I will at last tell my father what I think of him." He wanted to dictate a determined letter to his father immediately, demanding his share of his mother's estate. He was full of plans, and was thinking of starting a new life. The economic relationship is very obvious in this case. He desires to replace the analysis by a different form of treatment, that is, by the automobile accident, in order to free himself from the pressure of the sense of guilt. Instead of adjusting the Ego, Id and Super-Ego relations, he simply bribed the Super-Ego by his suffering. A bribe is always risky, as is seen in this case, where he might easily have paid for it with his life.

This peculiar relation of suffering to the actual deed is marked in some dreams. A patient in such cases brings two dreams, the first one always represents some suffering, the other a fulfilment of the forbidden wish. I remember a patient who first dreamt that he fell from a high ladder and broke his legs. The next dream was a practically undisguised fulfilment of an incest wish. In other words, he had to be punished to be able to gratify a forbidden desire. There is another pair of dreams related by Alexander : The first dream, "I am asking someone for a newspaper. The man, whom I do not know, is rude to me and refuses to give me the paper." The second dream : "I am changing money. An unknown man hands over the change ; I take the change but do not give him the money." On the previous day the patient had asked permission of the analyst to read a paper which was lying on the desk. The analyst refused for legitimate reasons. A few days before the patient had paid his monthly account, but he still owed the analyst money. The meaning of the

dreams became obvious: he did not want to pay the balance, but this was against his morals, and could be permitted only after suffering: the unknown man represented in both instances the analyst, who was rude to him and offended him.

I hope that you have followed me in this rather intricate problem, and that I have been able to show you, by these few examples, the difficult task the Ego has in life. It has to make use of the primary healthy narcissism, self-preservation, has to collect the different individual strivings, co-ordinate them, and bring into harmony all antagonistic pleasure strivings, according to the given reality for the good of the biological individual. Then a more pronounced social adaptation has to take place, which is the function of the Super-Ego. Then all the biological and social strivings have to be brought into a more accurate adaptation with the actual and accidental conditions of reality. This is to say, the Ego has to bring them into harmony with the final results of the reality testing.

In the neurotic psyche, this co-operation is disturbed. The different agencies are mutually hostile, the integrity of the personality is lost. The Ego, which in the neurotic has not reached a full maturity, is menaced by three dangers—desires for pleasure, especially sexual and aggressive, emanating from the Id; the severity of the Super-Ego, especially if it becomes hypermoral, and finally, the external reality. The Ego must be constantly on the look-out. It must watch the outer world, and take the most opportune moment for the gratification of the Id's desires. It must understand how to modify the desires of the Id and pacify the Super-Ego.

If a harmony between the three elements of the personality is not achieved, the individual is in danger similar to that of a nation threatened by civil war

(Alexander). Sometimes a revolution leads to a new and more endurable regime, but, as a rule, the outcome of civil war is problematical: it usually ends in a dictatorship, which, in the case of the individual, will mean a victory of the tyrannical Super-Ego, with constant suffering and sacrifice. A civil war may end in disintegration of the nation, which, in our case, will mean destruction of the personality; it may, finally, start a continuous revolt, accompanied by a desperate non-acceptance of the new regime, which, in the human psyche, will mean insanity. The real world is not accepted, and an entirely fantastic one, based on a pleasant, but non-existent past, is built up instead. It is the primary aim of analysis to stop this dangerous warfare. Human beings are not always capable of doing it by themselves, because the main tragedy of life consists in the fact that the internal warfare, within the individual, is carried out in the unconscious. The human being, I would say, feels the bullets in his body, but has no idea where they come from, and is therefore incapable of defending or protecting himself. As I have emphasized several times, the Super-Ego reacts to the unconscious stirrings with a sense of guilt and condemns them in the same way as our conscious conscience condemns certain of our actions.

According to Freud, the psychic faculty designated as the Super-Ego reflects also certain phases of phylogenetic development of human beings from the primitive onwards. The Super-Ego is identical with the totemistic code of the primitive peoples, its chief prohibition being directed against the incest wish and against inimical stirrings against the father. I cannot say how far this is true, because I have never studied the psychology of primitive people. But please do not imagine for a moment, as some anthropologists do, that

the conception of the unconscious sense of guilt is based solely on anthropological evidence. It is the clinical evidence which is decisive for Freud's conception of the Id, Ego and Super-Ego, for his conceptions of the unconscious sense of guilt, and the unconscious need for punishment. In addition to clinical evidence, one finds abundant material in literature as will be seen from the analysis of the works of Wassermann, Dostoevsky and others.

CHAPTER III

INSTINCTS AND THEIR CLASSIFICATION: INFANTILE SEXUALITY: THE PSYCHO-SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSONALITY

CLASSICAL biology divides innate impulses into instincts of self-preservation and of reproduction. The psychologists, as a rule, enumerate a large number of inborn instincts. (McDougal recognizes about fourteen.) Others attempt a classification based on the interplay of stimuli and reactions, and divide instincts into innate avoidances and innate seekings. The reflexologists call them innate inhibitions and innate excitations. Any division of instincts, however, is arbitrary and difficult to maintain in practice.

The psychoanalytical classification of instincts must similarly be regarded only as a working hypothesis which is of help in the study of this complicated problem. An understanding of the present psychoanalytical classification of the primary urges must take into account Freud's conception of the meaning of the word "instinct." According to Freud, this word should be reserved for primal trends only, for those impulses and urges which cannot be resolved further. The psychoanalytical description of an instinct is approximately as follows: It is a constant psychic force attacking the individual from within the organism, having its source in important somatic and organic processes and needs in various organs and parts of the body. These inborn

stimuli are constantly seeking specific forms of gratification, in the form of motor discharge or activity in relation to an object.

The instinct has as its aim the lowering of the tension between the stimulus and the response. High tension of an instinct is experienced as pain and a low tension as pleasure. According to the pleasure principle, the individual strives to lower the tension, and whenever this is impossible, on account of the reality principle, seeks a state of equilibrium, as explained in the first chapter. Complete and healthy gratification can only be achieved through contact with the outside world. The instinctual energy cannot disappear: if not gratified, the energy is transformed and transferred into other channels. This transformation can be a healthy one, in the form of sublimation (from the Latin word *sublimis*, meaning high), or an unhealthy one in the form of neurotic symptoms, perversions and abnormal actions. One must conclude therefore that no action of flight is of any avail against an instinct.

There was, originally, a tendency among psychoanalysts to promote the erotic instincts (from Eros, God of Love) to the position of an all embracing urge of which every other impulse is only a mode or variation. The concept of love and libido has, in consequence, become excessively confused. The original distinction between the self-preservative urges on the one hand, and the sexual urges on the other hand, has been gradually given up, as certain considerations led Freud to take the view that the self-preservative impulses, arising as they did out of self-love, were also fundamentally libidinal or erotic in nature.

At present, Freud accepts the following division of instincts: Life instincts or erotic instincts: and, opposed to these, the primal trends embodied in the instincts of

death and destruction; Eros the god of love, and Thanatos the god of death.

Freud developed his theory of instincts gradually. He took as his starting point Schiller's aphorism that hunger and love make the world go round. Hunger represents those instincts which aim at the preservation of the individual, and love those that aim at the preservation of the species. In other words, he accepted originally the classical biological classification.

Love seeks for objects and it becomes evident in relation to objects: therefore love instincts are also called object instincts. For the energy of the love instincts, or object instincts, and exclusively for them, the term "libido" was introduced.

Then the concept of primary narcissism, or primary self-love, was formulated, the idea that the libido is attached to, or cathected—to use an analytical term—on the ego itself. The ego is the sole object of love. As will be shown later, the first dwelling-place of the libido is indeed the ego, and only later the libido becomes attached to outer objects. The libido turns from the ego in the direction of external objects. Since the ego instincts, or the preservation instincts, had also been found to be libidinal, it seemed inevitable that libido should become synonymous with the ego instincts.

These considerations led to the crystallization of the group of life instincts, which include both the self-preservative and the sexual instincts. This group of instincts from a *biological* standpoint, represents the fundamental tendency to maintain and increase organic life. From a *psychological* standpoint it may be regarded as composed of the sexual impulses, the self-preservative impulses which originate from the libido, and serve to protect the whole personality, physical and mental. From a *sociological* point of view the erotic instincts

represent the internal force which binds people together into units, e.g., family, clan, tribe and nation.

Besides the life instincts, which preserve the organic substance and bind it into larger units, there exists, in antithesis to it, another instinct which seeks to dissolve the unit, and to destroy the organic substance. This is the death instinct. The phenomena of life are explicable from the interplay of these two forces.

There was a tendency to ascribe all that is dangerous and hostile in love to a fundamental bi-polarity of emotions and feelings. At present Freud accepts that there is a non-erotic aggression, an independent impulse of destruction which is, in cases of sadism, for example, fused with the erotic instinct. One may even surmise that the two kinds of instincts, love and destruction, seldom appear in isolation. They always mingle with each other in various proportions, and so make themselves unrecognizable to us in their pure form. Sadism, the pleasure of torturing those whom we love, represents a particularly strong admixture of the instinct of destruction in the love impulse. Masochism, the pleasure of being tortured by those who love us, or self-torture, represents an alliance between sexuality and destruction, at work within itself—a narcissistic destruction. The tendency to aggression is thus an innate independent instinctive disposition in man.

From the *biological* standpoint, the destructive and aggressive instinct represents the tendency to lead organic matter back to the inorganic state, to death, or the tendency of living matter to decay and die.

From the *psychological* standpoint the aggressive instinct is composed of regressive impulses or tendencies to revert to previous phases of development, and im-

pulses to destroy. From a *sociological* point of view, the death instinct aims at the disruption of social life, of friendship, of family, of nations and of humanity as a whole. The psychic correlate, the emotional representation of the death instinct, is hate; the psychic correlate of the erotic instincts is love. Both love and hate can be directed inwardly, towards the ego, or outwardly towards the external object, towards other people.

In concluding this brief description of the psycho-analytical conception of instincts, I should like to emphasize the phenomena of fusion and diffusion of the two groups of instincts. As stated, they are mingled together. Every mental process is the result of the fusion of the two original qualities of Eros—love and life—and Thanatos—death and destruction. The difference between several psychic processes can be deduced from the proportions of the two qualities present in the fusion. Furthermore, as this fusion is dynamic in nature, i.e. of a fluctuating character, the interplay of love and aggression is not constant. We get a series of mental conditions arising from each other, but nevertheless totally different. Love turns into hatred, self-love may turn into self-destruction, ordinary sadism into passionate murder, in which the sexual admixture is very small indeed. Civilization as a whole is a struggle between these two Titans, Eros and Death, love and aggression.

Passing on to the psycho-sexual development of the human being, I must remind you, in the first place, that the force which represents the erotic or sexual instinct in the mind is called the libido (Similarly, hunger is the force which represents the nutritional instinct). The libido is the energy (regarded as a quantitative mag-

nitude, though not at present measurable) of those instincts which are connected with all that may be comprised under the word love.

The term "love" has a wider meaning in psychology than in ordinary language. It is, as I said before, the psychic correlate of the erotic instinct, but, particularly, of the main component of this urge known as the sexual instinct.

The sexual instinct, which is not identical in psychology with the genital expression of it, is usually defined as a group of impulsive tendencies whose final aim, in the adult, is sexual union, and whose natural end is reproduction. This teleological definition of the sexual instinct is, psychologically, not quite correct. According to psychoanalysis, the term "sexual" is regarded as a comprehensive bodily function, having pleasure as its goal, and only secondarily coming to serve the ends of reproduction. Psychologists also speak of a sexual aim, or a sexual goal, but it is necessary to distinguish very clearly between the biological goal of an instinctual impulse, and its psychological aim. Rightly or wrongly, the biological student may say of a sexual impulse, that the sole reason for its existence is the perpetuation of the species, but, for the psychologist, the goal of the instinct is the actual appropriate situation which brings its drive to an end. The love impulse is ultimately, even from a physiological standpoint, due to the accumulation of sexual substances, which is relieved by a certain series of reactions, and this relief, as well as the whole process, is pleasurable to the human being.

The biological goal of the nutritive instinct for example, the force of which is represented in the mind by hunger (hence the analogy between libido and hunger), will be a series of metabolic or chemical processes to

preserve the individual, but the psychological goal will be the act of eating and drinking.

There is a tendency to regard gratification of instincts as an unworthy activity. It is said, *edimus ut vivamus non vivimus ut edamus*. Sexual gratification is especially regarded as degrading, unless accompanied by the teleological act of reproduction. "But there is just as much justification for calling a sexual union the act of reproduction as for calling eating the act of anabolism."

At present it must be admitted that the element of reproduction, or the bringing of children into this world, which, according to the text books, is supposed to be the mainspring of the sexual instinct, is, on the contrary, an inhibiting force and the cause of severe disturbances of the sexuality of men and women. It may be true that, from the point of view of natural history, the libido acted in the first place merely reproductively. It did perpetuate the race, but with the emergence of sex differences there came a differentiation between the reproductive and the sexual elements proper. From the point of view of the individual, only the direct craving for gratification of the instinct is relevant. We must agree, once and for all, that whenever we talk of sex we do not mean reproduction of the species and the perpetuation of the race, but the sexual element proper.

It is part of the popular belief that the sexual impulse is absent in childhood and that it first appears in puberty. Actually, the sexual instinct is active from the day of birth to the last day of life, and manifests itself in a variety of ways, the nature of which is often unrecognized. The sexual instinct does not emerge *de novo* at puberty, the age of sexual maturity, unless one regards the adult sexual situation as limited to the act of coitus or sexual intercourse, followed by reproduc-

tion. But even a layman knows, and for this it is not necessary to be a student of sexology, that the sexual situation includes a normal stage of fore pleasure, in which the components of viewing, exhibiting, of sadism and masochism receive a measure of gratification, and regularly, there is a stimulation of one of several extra genital zones, as in kissing, embracing.

On the other hand, observations of children, child analysis and analyses of adults, recorded a wealth of evidence that viewing, exhibitionistic, sadistic, masochistic and other impulses are manifested in infants. What is lacking in a child is the genital primacy and capacity for fecundation. On the basis of this empirical knowledge, we are bound to accept a genetic view of sexual development, namely that the sexual instinct originally consists of various components, which at a certain age fuse into an entity. This fusion, which is never ideal, normally takes place in the years of puberty, while in childhood the sexual instinct presents itself in the form of single components, and in a variety of forms. In infancy the sexual impulse attaches itself to various body areas, namely to the organs of nutrition, organs of excretion and only later to the genital organs. These areas of libidinal attachment are called the *erotogenic zones*.

The sexual impulse, and this must be clearly understood, is *per se* independent of its object. It is a primary urge first and it is not originated by stimuli proceeding from the object. It is in the later development that it becomes partly a reflex action. It is customary to think of sexual desires as being connected with an object, hence the erroneous conceptions of what is normal and abnormal in sexuality. We must separate the connexion between the impulse and the object. An impulse is the primary element, the object is the secondary element.

Although, bread constitutes the main product for gratification of the nutritional instinct, nobody will always couple hunger with bread. Hunger is an independent force, which may be gratified by various objects. Similarly, the distribution of the libido, the direction of the flow of the sexual energy, changes, and so also the objects to which the libido cathezes itself and that it uses for achieving its gratification. The flow of the libido may, for example, be directed *inward*—*autoerotic* object choice—or later, *outward*, when it is called *allerotic* object choice.


In studying the development of the libido, the following aspects will be considered :

(i) The periods of development. (ii) The localization of the erotogenic zones. (iii) The sexual aims and modes of gratification. (iv) The object cathexis, the objects to which the libido may attach itself.

We will discuss as briefly as possible, each separate aspect, and we will begin with the periods of development.

It is remarkable, as Jones says, that the libido development has to be passed through twice over. The two periods in which this happens are in early childhood below the age of five, and the years following puberty. In the interval, that is, between the ages of five and puberty, there is a relative standstill in development. We have thus indicated in the opposite diagram the three periods of development, infancy, latency and puberty.

I hope that it is not any exaggeration to state that infantile sexuality is, at present, acknowledged by practically every student of child psychology. It is generally admitted now that there is such a thing as a complex infantile sexual life and, finally, that the mental life of early childhood is closely connected with the child's sexuality, and that abnormal sexual develop-



ment is of paramount importance for the future trends of the individual. Any injury at this period of the child's development may have far reaching effects.

Freud understands by infantile sexuality the fact that every child is born with an organically determined sexual excitability, which during its very early years demands in varying degrees specific forms of motor discharge. The libidinal impulses of the infancy period are egocentric, primitive and asocial in their manifestations. They are earlier developed than the ego components of the life instinct.

But the reality principle soon interferes with the infantile desires, and the child early senses the opposition to its desires from the external world. A state of inner conflicts and anxiety arises. As the ego of the child is still too weak to handle the situation by postponement of gratification or by transformation of these desires, the child early represses the forbidden urges into the unconscious. Hence the infantile amnesia, the complete forgetting of sexual experience in childhood. On account of this amnesia, this forgetting, the adult does not remember his infantile experiences, and does not attribute any value to the infantile period of his sexual life. This veil can only be lifted by the technique of the psychoanalytical exploration of the unconscious.

Infantile sexuality is most accessible to observation from the first years of life. The child, as Freud expresses it, is a polymorph pervert, and shows all forms of perversion. The term polymorph pervert is based on the similarity observed between adult sexual aberrations or perversions, and infantile modes of gratification. But the child does not experience them as abnormal. One may say that the child is perverse only from the adult's point of view. The infantile sexual trends are abnormal when found in the adult but not when found

in the child. Likewise, it is normal for a child to wet itself, but not so for an adult.

The latency period, from the age of five to the age of twelve, is characterized by the discarding of the crude infantile sexual interests. New activities and attitudes emerge (games, sport, school interests, friendships, etc.). The libidinal energy is partly sublimated. It is led off into new paths acceptable to the ego, and in this way a reconciliation with the environment becomes possible. In normal persons the moral counter-charge of the super-ego is used to bring about a modification of the instinctive urge, its domestication : whereas in neurotics it is dispersed, and used up in punishment and suffering. It must be clearly understood that the latency period is latent only relatively, and one need not imagine that no sexual activity takes place at that period. Because of the decline of the Œdipus complex this period is accompanied by a diminution in the force of the sexual instinctual trends.

At the puberty period there is a revival of the sexual impulses ; there is a new flood of sexual energy which is, or to be more correct, which should be, of predominantly genital character. The sexual instincts should all be submerged in the powerful genital impulse. The separate elements do not disappear entirely, but, in a normal person, they should have no right to an independent existence, and should not in any case dominate the individual's sexuality. There is masochism, sadism, exhibitionism in everybody, but these should not dominate the individual's sexual life.

At puberty, the child is at once thrown into a struggle between the standards built up during latency and the double dose of the libido. It must be realized that a new period does not necessarily mean a total abandonment of the previous developmental phases. It is more cor-

rect to imagine every new step in the development as overlapping the old one, partly absorbing the previous impulses and partly destroying them. But there always remain unconscious remnants of the previous infantile libidinal phases in the healthiest individual, in individuals with the most perfect genital sexuality. The characteristic feature of the genital phase, as compared with the pregenital phase, consists in the fact that the infantile impulses serve only as fore-pleasure, the end-pleasure being the genital form of gratification.

THE EROTOGENIC ZONES AND THE SEXUAL AIMS

During infancy the sexual instinct is broken up into partial impulses, each of which strives independently for satisfaction. These infantile components are originally closely connected with the gratification of organic needs, nutritional and excretory in the first instance. According to the predominance of one or other impulse in the sexuality of the child, the infancy period is subdivided into three stages, viz.: the oral, the anal and the phallic stages. Oral is derived from the Latin *Os oris*, meaning a mouth and the adjective oral denotes any pleasure derived from the mouth. Anal is derived from the Latin word *Anus*, meaning the end opening of the digestive tract, and the adjective anal indicates everything connected with the act of defecation, or the opening of the bowels. The anal phase also includes the urethral, which indicates urinary functions. Phallic is derived from the Greek word *Phallus*, for the male sexual organ. The Latin expression for the male organ is *Penis*. Both these terms are used in psychoanalysis and in science.

The first stage in the process of sexual development is the oral stage. It is characterized by pleasures which we

are entitled to call sexual and which are connected with the activities of the mouth. The oral stage of libidinal development is divided into two sub-stages.

On the primary level the libido of the infant is attached to the act of sucking. Although a derivative of the nutritional instinct, sucking becomes by itself an act of pleasure, and the breast, or the substitute for it, is an object of pleasure. The sexual element of the sucking process is of tremendous importance to the human being. It reinforces the nutritional instinct, because the baby derives pleasure from it, and it stimulates the child to nourish itself. In this way the two components of the life instinct assist each other.

The second oral sub-stage differs from the first in that the child adds, or exchanges, its sucking activity for a biting one. Undoubtedly the teeth are the first instruments with which the child can damage the outer world and can express a feeling of aggression. At that phase the concept of an object is present already in the child, whereas in the early stages there is no differentiation between the self of the child and the object of pleasure. With this there appears an ambivalence of feelings: love is mingled with hatred and destruction. In the light of the recent classification of instincts, one can say that at this stage the child uses his mouth not only for purely love impulses, but also for gratification of his aggressive instincts and hatred. In the biting stage of the oral phase the child attempts to incorporate the object, and in doing so destroys it. We know how destructive a child is at that period of development. As soon as he sees an object he attempts to destroy it. I realize that it sounds far-fetched if an analyst makes the statement that there is "no sharp division between the infant's desire for his mother's breast and the adult's desire for his wife." If we cannot recognize the infant's

desire for sucking as sexual, it would seem that we must also deny this quality to those oral activities, such as kissing, which are derived from the sucking habits of the infant. Thumb-sucking and smoking are other forms of the same oral impulses.

After the oral erotic phase of development, analysts distinguish an anal stage which is again subdivided. The first stage is characterized by a great pleasure in defecating or emptying the bowels, and the second by an obstinate refusal to do so.

The anal impulse is, of course, distinct from that of the sexual impulse, for it relieves a different need. But psychology has shown that each has borrowed something from the other, and we must recognize the significance of the anal impulse. The child undoubtedly takes a sexual interest in the act of defecation, and in the organ which performs this function, and also in the products thereof. These three interests often recur in the adult as fixed sexual perversions, or as exciting preliminaries to the sexual act.

"The anus has evolved from a common cloaca in the lower animals which performed the functions of sex as well as excretion, so that it is not even biologically surprising that its stimulation should excite erotic feelings similar to those produced by the stimulation of the male and female organs."

In the first anal phase the child takes an interest in the organs of defecation as well as in the products of defecation. The act of emptying the bowels is pleasurable to children, and remains so in many adults, as also is the act of urination, especially to a boy.

The anal impulses are at first objectless, but, under conditions of civilization, the child is soon taught not to relieve himself when he so desires. This factor may explain the sexualization of anal impulses, which

appears to be more developed in the perversions of civilized peoples than in those of savages. The "big business" becomes too important a factor in child life. The "big business" is admitted by many children to be delightful, which they prove by sitting for hours on their "throne." The evacuation of the bowels calls forth a pleasurable excitation of the anal zone.

To this primitive experience is presently added another, based on the reverse process, the retention of the excreta. And let me tell you that the enormous frequency of constipation among civilized peoples is, to a large degree, due to this pleasure in the retention of the excreta. In neurotics this interest in the process of defecation occasionally reaches amazing forms, in which every detail is studied with care and interest. Unfortunately, mothers and teachers, who are not free themselves from this infantile mode of pleasure, impose and strengthen in children under their care the same anal component of the libido. Excessive and unnecessary enemas are often given, with injurious effect. It may be disturbing, but it is none the less true, that much of our most deep and tender feeling is a derivative of the experience of satisfying anal impulses, both of expulsion and retention.

Already in the second oral, but more especially in the anal stages, the destructive impulses come greatly to the fore, and for that reason we say that every child is a sadist (if the aggression is turned outward), and a masochist (if the aggression is turned against the child itself).

Melanie Klein in a masterly fashion described the early sadistic and destructive impulses of a child in her book on "Psychoanalysis of Children."

The destructive impulses which precede those of love are primarily responsible for the origin of the super-ego

and the early development of the Œdipus. As Melanie Klein puts it: "If we are right in supposing that the child's Œdipus tendencies set in in the phase of maximal sadism, we are led to accept the view that it is chiefly impulses of hate which bring on the Œdipus conflict and the formation of the Super-Ego."

We further see that there are other elements of perversion in the child, such as exhibitionism, where the child derives great pleasure from showing itself, undressing or swanking with whatever it possesses. There are also elements of voyerism or peeping, where there is a desire to see, to find out or to watch someone else. All of us as babies have taken part in the "you show me yours and I will show you mine" experience.

All these impulses exist in a child independently of each other, and form by themselves a final aim as the end-pleasure, while in the normal adult they only act in the fore-pleasure condition, the end-pleasure being the sexual union. Only in perversions do these single components of the sexual instinct achieve a primacy and become the end-pleasure. A pervert exhibitionist aims only at the exhibiting of his body, and does not require the sexual act. Perverts are therefore people in whom the infantile aims did not fuse with the genital impulse. A pervert is an adult with an infantile sexuality, or more correctly with a predominance of one or several of the infantile components of the sexual instinct.

After the anal phase, there is an awakening in the child of sexual curiosity, in its own organs in the first instance. The child inquires and investigates, and is usually rebuffed by the adults. He takes a pleasurable interest in his sexual organs and touches and plays with them. It is during this period that masturbation becomes prominent (it begins much earlier).

"Masturbation occurs generally in the sucking stage

and is very commonly prolonged, in a greater or less measure, right up to the latency period (6-10 years). One need hardly say that one does not expect to find children, even small ones, masturbating openly."

In the period before puberty and particularly during puberty itself, masturbation becomes very frequent again. At that period the child also begins to propound its own theories of what is taking place between his mother and father.

In the latency period there are no new sexual aims. It is the period of sublimation and reaction formations. It is the period of the solving of the Œdipus and castration complexes.

This is also the period during which, according to Freud and Klein, the child's struggle against masturbation is at its height. Freud says that during the latency period the energies of the child seem to be mainly taken up with the task of resisting the temptation to masturbate. Masturbation arouses an extensive sense of guilt, and the latter stops the masturbatory activities. Complete inhibition of masturbation frequently leads to the development of phobia (fear) of touching and, later on, to grave disorders of sexual life, mainly in the form of impotence and frigidity according to the sex of the individual. For some reasons women suffer more from masturbatory sense of guilt than men (see Chapter V: "The Œdipus in the Girl" and the influence of the anatomical differences on the psyche of a Girl).

As to the object cathexis of the libido, or in other words the objects to which the libido attaches itself, there are roughly three stages:

(I) The autoerotic period. In the first oral sucking phase there is no differentiation yet between the ego and the outside objects. The movements of the lips

themselves are pleasurable, or the act of defecation. The libido of the individual gratifies itself on its own body. It is of local erotic excitability without any accompanying libidinal relation to the self and to the outer objects. Autoeroticism preponderates throughout the infancy period. It is found again in the insane adult.

(II) The narcissistic object cartesis is found in the second stage, when a part of the libido is branched off in the direction of the self. The discovery of its own body as a source of pleasure brings about, for the child, the further possibility of finding, within the ego, an independence of the outer world. The libido has no object but the ego itself.

The distinction between the autoerotic and the narcissistic phases is a subtle one. In the former, the erotogenic zones have no relation to any object, and there is no unification of the impulses. In the narcissistic stage, the whole body becomes the love object, and stimulation of one zone may produce a stimulation of others.

(III) Alloeroticism is a phase when the main volume of the libido is directed towards external love objects. This phase sets in at the phallic stage. The child's first objects of love are mother and nurse and the people who are constantly with him, who provide him with all that is pleasurable and who protect him. Therefore the first object choice is called "anaclytic."

We have seen from this brief description of the libido development what a complicated structure it is, and what a long way it has to travel before it reaches the subordination of all the sources of sexual feeling to the primacy of the genital zone. It can easily be realized now that many factors may interfere with the normal development of the sexual instinct.

The libido may, first of all, be arrested in its development. Such a checking of the infantile libido at one or other zone, or phase, is called *fixation*. A fixation means that the child was not able to relinquish one of the infantile methods of sexual gratification, or could not give up the objects of his gratification in childhood.

The significance of fixation is as follows:

- (1) A certain amount of libido is fixated or tied up, and therefore there will be less free floating libidinal energy at the disposal of the individual.
- (2) A fixation will diminish the plasticity and dynamic properties of the adult's libido.
- (3) A fixation will constantly interfere with the normal forms of the libido, and lead to a perversion.
- (4) A fixation in early infancy determines the form of an adult's mental disturbance. An obsessional disease has its origin in a fixation at the anal-sadistic stage; hysteria is closely connected with a fixation at the phallic stage,

The causes of a fixation may be, among others:

- (1) Experiences which stimulate prematurely and excessively the infantile components of the sexual instinct.
- (2) Actual injuries to the child by adults.
- (3) Inhibition at a new phase of development, which will automatically keep the child back at the previous phase. If the new phase is not tolerable, the child adheres to the previous one.

A *regression* is closely connected with a fixation. It means a retreat of the libido to a lower level of development: in this process it will naturally move to the fixation. The stronger the fixation, the easier the regression. The healthy and relatively non-fixated individual will meet frustrations in life, either by holding the libidinal urge in suspension until a suitable moment arrives, or a suitable substitute for gratification is found, or he will fight reasonably for gratification, or finally he will sublimate. The strongly fixated individual will, in the face of the same difficulties, react with a regression. He will withdraw his libido from the real objects and take refuge in the world of the past, will run back to the times when gratification found no external difficulties. His libido will flow backward to seek out infantile ways, infantile desires and modes of gratification, and in this flow backward he will stop at the fixation points.

Freud brings the following analogy which illuminates the concepts of fixation and regression. In the case of migrating people who have left large numbers at the stopping places behind them, you will see that the foremost will naturally fall back upon those positions when they are defeated, or when they meet an enemy too strong for them. And again, the more of their number they leave behind in their progress, the sooner will they be in danger of defeat.

CHAPTER IV

THE ŒDIPUS COMPLEX : THE CASTRATION AND INFERIORITY COMPLEXES : THE ŒDIPUS IN THE BOY

THE greatest hostility towards psychoanalysis has been evoked by two of its contentions—that the affections of the child are sexual and that they are incestuous. I do not know how far I have been able to convince you of infantile sexuality. I am afraid that some people will find it even more difficult to agree with me now. But, however this may be, actual analysis and observations must remain the final arbiter of the truth of psychoanalytical assertions. The theoretical exposition of these principles can only aim at provoking an interest and giving a general outline of the subject. An author cannot bring sufficient proof to dispose of all doubts, or even opposition. I can only bring forward information, which I ask you to believe as being truthful and objective, as, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is.

As I said in the previous chapter, the sexual impulse is, *per se*, independent of its object. It is customary to think of sexual desires as being invariably connected with an object. Hence the erroneous conception of what is normal and what is abnormal in sexuality. We must separate this connexion between the impulse and the object. An impulse is the primary, the object the secondary element.

In discussing various perversions and their connexion

with fixations and regressions, I intentionally omitted incest. Incest means sexual relationship between the members of a family, e.g., between mother and son, father and daughter, brother and sister. The reason for this omission is the following: sadism, masochism, peeping, exhibitionism, are physiological as well as psychological aberrations. It is the quality of the sexual activity, the mode of gratification, which is abnormal in these aberrations. Incest is a sociological, ethical and psychological perversion, but not a physiological one. Sadism, masochism and the others, although of a purely developmental origin (a result of fixations and regressions) are abnormal in any society, as being against the decree of men and nature. Incest is only abnormal in the society in which it is tabooed. It is abnormal only as being against the decrees of men. It is perfectly normal in the animal kingdom.

The majority are of the naïve opinion that the incest taboo is an inborn impulse, i.e., that the aversion to sexual relations between members of the family is inborn. There is no evidence that inbreeding is detrimental to human beings and to the race; Abraham has rightly suggested that inbreeding is rather the effect than the cause of an inherited neuro-character. In other words, a man who has not solved in a normal way his infantile relations to the members of his family, will show a tendency to choose one of them as the object of his love.

It is argued that the more primitive the people the more stringent is the incest taboo, and the inference is made that this taboo must therefore be a natural instinct, that people are born with a natural aversion to incest. But if taboos and punishments of great severity are necessary to support a natural instinct, then the converse, the tendency to break the incest pro-

hibition, is the more natural of the two. If stealing is illegal and severely punished, we may infer that stealing is the natural instinct and that respect for other people's property is a late, and certainly not an inheritable character trend. (Money-Kyrle).

Honesty is created by society, and must be fortified by the law of society. These social inhibitions create, in the civilized, a moral character, and they become absorbed by man in the form of conscience. The concepts of good and bad are so early assimilated by the child's psychic apparatus, that they seem to the adult to be an integral part of him. It is for this reason that honesty and the incest taboo seem to us to be inborn. We can safely say that before law existed, stealing was a regular occupation of every honest man, and incest a regular relationship between men and women. The incest taboo of primitive people is a proof of the existence of the tendency it inhibits. "According to the evidence of the anthropologist, the incest taboo of the sophisticated cultures is considerably weakened, and some nations or classes have even ridiculed such taboos as being only against the laws of men. The Sophists of Greece, the Pharaohs of Egypt, the Kings of Persia, the Incas of Peru, following the example of their gods, regularly transgressed the incest taboo, and the common people were only too eager to follow the example of their superiors". (Money-Kyrle).

It might be suggested that the truth of the assertion of the psychoanalyst that incestuous desires are found in every child, could be easily detected by direct observations of children. This method of testing, however, though eagerly taken over by mothers and fathers, would probably result in failure. Anyone who tries to do so finds himself confronted with the greatest difficulties, which lie first of all in the observer, the adult himself.

If the observer has himself an Œdipus complex and repressed incest desires, he will not be able to see, and he will simply overlook in children things that might remind him of his own repressed desires. As a defence, people become blind and deaf to facts which might bring to consciousness what has been repressed. The instance I have mentioned concerning the man who was afraid of the slightest noise will be remembered.

I cannot recapitulate here the evidence which analysis, both of children and of adults, has supplied, evidence which, with tireless monotony, has revealed that incest is the primary form of love. Records of analysis are generally distrusted, even if they are brought forward in full. Luckily, indirect evidence is furnished in great quantity in literature, and I must ask you to wait patiently for the evidence which will be revealed by our subsequent analysis of books.

The Œdipus complex is a direct consequence of the incest desires of the child.

The Œdipus complex can be defined as a libidinal striving on the part of every child, in the form of an unconscious desire for sexual gratification with the parent of the opposite sex, and an unconscious feeling of hatred against the parent of the same sex. The Œdipus situation begins in infancy, and is marked in the phallic phase. The whole drama of the Œdipus and the castration complex, which is closely connected with it, exists in the fantasy of the child. It is, therefore, a gross misunderstanding on the part of the father to think, looking at his son of the age of four to five, that this scrap of humanity consciously wants to murder him. It is not the actual conscious relationship between the father and the boy which makes up the Œdipus in the individual, but the unconscious fantasy life of the child, which is based on the incest desire. The Œdipus complex is a

natural universal occurrence, and is present in the childhood of every human being. In its development it passes through a number of phases and leaves traces in every individual. The Œdipus, just as the incest wish, is not inborn. The sexual instinct only is brought into the world with the child. Incestuous desires are a result of the situation arising in the infancy of man. When the libido of the child seeks for an object, it naturally takes the mother, or the mother substitute, as such an object of love. The Œdipus is occasioned by the family trinity of mother (or mother substitute), child and the father (or father substitute).

The term Œdipus was inspired by the Greek myth concerning the life and fate of King Œdipus, which was the subject of tragedies by Sophocles and other Greek dramatists, such as Æschylus, Euripides, Xenekles. The story as told by Sophocles runs as follows:

Laius, King of Thebes, married Jocasta. After years of childless marriage Laius visited the Delphian Apollo, and prayed for a child. The answer of the god was that the king would have a son who would kill him and marry his mother, Jocasta. In spite of the warning a son was born but, remembering the oracle, the child's feet were pierced and he was exposed in the mountains. A Corinthian shepherd found the child, and brought him to the King of Corinth, who himself had no children. The child was named Œdipus (swollen feet), and he was brought up as if he were the king's son. When the boy grew up into manhood, he became uncertain of his origin, and, consulting the oracle, received the following message: "Do not return home, for you are destined to kill your father and marry your mother." To escape this prophecy Œdipus at once left Corinth, in order not to return to his adopted parents, whom he thought to be his real parents, and all un-

knowingly wandered towards Thebes, his homeland. On the way he met his real father, Laius, in a narrow pass. Laius refused to make way, a fight occurred and Œdipus killed his father, thus fulfilling the first part of the prophecy. He continued on his way to Thebes, which was then plagued by a Sphinx, a terrible monster, half lion and half woman. Œdipus solved the riddle submitted by the Sphinx, and, as a reward for ridding Thebes of this scourge, he was elected king and married Jocasta, his mother. Thus the second part of the prophecy was fulfilled. He reigned in peace for many years and had two sons and two daughters by his own mother. Then a plague broke out, which caused the Thebans to consult the oracle. It was soon learned that Apollo was provoked because of the terrible crime committed by King Œdipus. The true relations between Œdipus and Jocasta were discovered. The Sophoclean tragedy ends with Jocasta hanging herself, and Œdipus wandering away into voluntary exile, after having blinded himself.

The myth of Œdipus was elaborated by numerous writers and poets, as, for example, the Romans, Seneca and Julius Cæsar. It is remarkable, by the way, that Julius Cæsar remembered a dream of an incestuous relation with his mother. Voltaire's first drama, which he wrote at the age of nineteen, is based upon the Œdipus situation; Corneille wrote *L'Œdipe* shortly after the death of his father; similar themes were elaborated by the English dramatists, Dryden, Lee, Whitehead. Among the Germans who wrote Œdipus dramas we find Schiller, Lessing, Hebbel and later, Hugo von Hofmanstahl. Stravinsky also, recently composed a ballet, *Œdipus Rex*. In all these works the Œdipus situation is dealt with in a direct way, as in the Sophocles tragedy. The indirect presentation of the

Œdipus situation in literature will form our subject later on.

Before I proceed with the analysis of the Œdipus situation, permit me to say a few words about the objection raised against the term Œdipus, on the ground that the psychoanalytical term is not appropriate to the Œdipus situation of the Greek myth. The first objection is that Œdipus killed his father, Laius, without the knowledge of the relationship between them, and long before a love relationship developed between Œdipus and his mother. This incest love grew as between strangers, neither mother nor son realizing their real relationship. Finally, Œdipus was a stranger to his parents, and, therefore, his love for his mother and hate for his father cannot be compared with what psychoanalysis understands by the term Œdipus.

Karl Kautsky, the veteran Socialist leader, in his book "Materialistische Geschichtseuffassung" of 1927, writes: "Freud calls the desire of the boy to sleep with his mother and kill his father the Œdipus complex. But Œdipus was not in a position to love his mother or hate his father, as he did not know them. He was not in a position to kill his father out of love for his mother, because he only got to know the mother after the father had been killed by him." "The psychological drama of King Œdipus," says Kautsky, "fits in the Œdipus Complex of Freud like a fist in the eye." It is astonishing that a man like Kautsky should not understand that the crux of the whole story of the *Œdipus Rex* lies in the fact that the prophecies of the oracle were unavoidable. The killing of the father and marrying the mother by Œdipus was predetermined. This unavoidable determinism of the whole chain of events is an expression of an unavoidable unconscious incest desire. The Œdipus situation is just as unknown to the child as it was un-

known to Œdipus. The legend puts it in such a way that the son did not know that Laius and Jocasta were his parents; for he was an adult, and the legend could not make him unaware of actual sexual feelings. "Poetic treatment is impossible without softening and disguise. The naked confession of a desire to murder a father, which one arrives at in the course of analysis, is intolerable to people. Therefore Sophocles introduced a toning down by projecting the motive of the hero into a compulsion of destiny. The hero commits the crime unintentionally and apparently uninfluenced by the woman. The connexion with a real parricide is, however, preserved by making the winning of the queen mother dependent on the repetition of the deed of parricide on the Sphinx, the monster who symbolizes the tyrannical father. After the guilt is revealed to his consciousness the hero makes no attempt to exculpate himself as a victim of fate, to which extenuation he is entitled." (Freud).

If Œdipus did not know that they were his parents, he could not be guilty. Nevertheless the guilt is recognized, and punished as an intentional crime. The punishment appears unjust, but it is psychologically perfectly correct. In this factor lies the importance of the Sophocles tragedy. Our unconscious desires are destined to seek gratification, and no flight is of any avail against these instinctual impulses. Therefore Œdipus could not escape the fulfilment of the prophecies of the oracle. These desires emanating from the id are unconscious, and the modes of gratification are also unconscious. Similarly, Œdipus is not aware of what he is doing. But Sophocles must have understood the drama of his hero. When Œdipus was profoundly mortified by the true fact of the tragedy, his mother Jocasta consoles him in one passage, thus: "Do not

worry over this, because many a man had found himself in his dreams the partner of his mother's bed, but those go through life best who take such things as trifles." It seems evident that Sophocles himself was on the thorns of the Œdipus dilemma.

The Œdipus situation is universal and is remarkably deeply rooted in the mythology of the ancient nations; of Greeks, Egyptians and Persians. Students of anthropology and mythology could tell you more than I, who have no knowledge of the subject. I shall mention two other characteristic legends, which will further illustrate the matter.

The fantastic conception of the ancient Greeks of the creation of the world is a typical incest and Œdipus fantasy. Ge, the earth, procreates out of herself, without "the friendly love," in the words of the legend, her first son Uranus, the sky. She marries her son Uranus, and gives birth to Titans, cyclops and giants. But Uranus hates his sons and buries them soon after their birth. Ge, the mother wife of Uranus and mother of the Titans and giants, revenges herself against her son-husband with the help of their son Kronos (Saturn). When Uranus tries to make love to Ge, Kronos comes in suddenly from his hiding-place and cuts off with a hook his father's genitals, and throws them into the sea. From the foam produced by the genitals Aphrodite is born, and, from drops of blood that fell on the earth, giants, nymphs and others were born. Kronos succeeds to the throne and marries his sister Rhea, but Kronos is later overthrown by *his* son, Zeus.

The aborigines of Jorub in Central Africa have created a remarkable myth concerning the parents of the world. The son and daughter of the world parents marry each other and they have a son, who falls in love with his mother. As the mother refuses to gratify her

son's desires, he violates her. She runs away crying, but the son follows her, gets hold of her again and throws her to the ground. Her body begins to swell, two streams of water begin to flow from her breasts, finally her body bursts and fifteen gods come forth. This is indeed a remarkable infantile sex fantasy, which has much in common with children's fantasies about sex and birth.

The law of natural history says that ontogenesis, the development of the individual, is a short and quick repetition of phylogenesis, the evolutionary development of the species to which the individual belongs. It seems that in questions of sex and birth fantasies, incest and Œdipus, one finds the application of the same law. The fantasies of children and of primitive peoples are identical. In this connexion, one may repeat the words of Goethe: "Even if the world as a whole progresses, the youth must nevertheless start every time from the beginning, and, as an individual, has to go through the phases of the world culture." There are psychoanalysts (their number is now very small) who treat races as if they were individuals, and with Jung, accept the possibility of transmission of inhibitions and repressions to the next generations. It is difficult to accept such an hypothesis. As Money-Kyrle puts it: "If a man has become less ferocious than his ancestors, this is perhaps due to group selection, more than to the racial memory of a bygone crime. I must confess that I personally see in the primordial crime evidence that aggressiveness against the father existed from time immemorial, but the primordial crime does not explain why a little boy, at the present time, hates his father. Both phenomena are rooted in the same incest desires and Œdipus situation which was present a thousand years ago, and is present now."

The Œdipus situation in a boy consists of two elements which must be clearly distinguished: the incestuous relation to the mother and the hostile attitude towards the father. Fantastic parricide is the negative side of the Œdipus, the positive being the love for the mother. But the relation of the boy to his father is not entirely negative or hostile. It is ambivalent, that is, it is composed of conflicting feelings of hostility on the one hand, and tenderness on the other. In addition to the hate, as a result of the desire to get rid of the father as a strong rival (and we all know that children hate sharing their objects of love), a certain measure of tenderness for him also exists. Both attitudes to the father, hostility and love, act in a synergetic way, which means that both combine to produce, later, an identification with the father.

An identification means an unconscious mechanism of moulding a person's own ego, after the fashion of one who has been taken as a model, in other words the desire to become like the ideal. Identification must be differentiated from love of the ideal as an object: in love there is a desire to possess the object, in identification there is a desire, which is unconscious, to be like him whom we love. The boy, in the Œdipus situation, wants to take his father's place in the sense of being the chief person to whom the mother devotes her attention and love, and with whom she spends most of her time. But the boy also wants to be in the father's place because he admires him, and wants to be like him. This phase is an evolution from the primary hatred to the father, and is the first step towards a normal solution of the intricate situation.

But the boy soon comes up against an obstacle. The father is the strong man, the omnipotent authority, against whom the child feels powerless. At a certain

moment, sooner or later, the boy having already crude ideas of right and wrong, comes to understand that the attempt to remove the father, or do anything against him as a rival, would be punished by the father, although no actual threats have been made against prohibitions enforced upon him. The boy's own destructive desires are unconsciously projected on the father, and the fear of the father becomes very intense. In the phallic phase, in which the whole situation arises, the boy takes a particular pride in his penis, his male organ. On the other hand, it is the interest of the boy in this organ which leads to the unconscious conflict between him and his father. A natural fear and anxiety arises in the child that the father will punish him with the removal of this valuable organ, will punish him with castration.

The castration fear, or the castration complex, as it is called, that is, the fear of losing virility, makes the boy feel helpless against the father, in some cases to such a degree that unconscious death wishes arise in the son against the father. This fantastic parricide is the main source of guilt, because, to the super-ego an intention is treated as a deed. So far as the death wish against a father remains in the unconscious, it forms the basis of the sense of guilt. The fear of castration may, however, become fixed in the child if the external circumstances are unfavourable; for example, if there are actual threats on the part of the parents. In the phallic stage of the sexual development, the child turns his interest to his genital organs, which is betrayed by his frequent handling of them. He is bound to find out that grown-up people do not approve of this activity. More or less brutally, more or less plainly, Freud says, the threat is uttered that this highly valued part will be taken away if he continues with his practices. Usually it is by the

women that the threat is made. Very often they seek to strengthen their authority by referring to the father or the doctor, who, so they assure the child, will carry out the punishment. This fear creates in the child a desire to give up his phallic sexuality; it leads to the first sexual inhibition. Even in cases in which no actual threats of castration are uttered, this inhibition may take place. The child seems to sense that the parent will not sanction his activities and his desires. The sexual inhibition, if excessive, is the kernel of the future inferiority complex.

The inferiority complex is the opposite of the sense of positive self-feeling. The positive self-feeling may be described as the totality of bodily sensations, which arise with that aggressive sexual excitation which is ready to defy all rivals. It is a feeling of virility, of possession, of ability. If a sexual feeling has to be inhibited because of fear of the father, or later, the internal authority, the super-ego, then negative self-feeling results, which is the inferiority feeling. In the adult, one sees this inferiority feeling in men suffering from impotence. Closely connected with the sense of inferiority is the sense of failure. But the two are not identical.

The sense of failure is best expressed by the complaints of people who say: "Everything that I think and everything that I do is bad." This feeling is due to the ambivalent feeling towards the father, to the inhibition of fantastic parricide through love for the father, whereas the inferiority complex is due to the inhibition of incest through fear of the father. The inferiority complex is a denial of the child's sexuality; a sense of failure is Hamletism, a feeling: "What is the use of attempting? In any case I shall not be able to bring it to a successful conclusion." The inferiority

complex is more developed in women than in men because, as you will see later, they begin with a great disadvantage in life, which is best expressed by Freud's aphorism: "Anatomy is destiny."

The ambivalent relation to the father is the central point in the Œdipus situation. There are two ways, or two possibilities, of solving the difficulty, an active and a passive way. The active is the striving to take the place of the father, to overcome him, which is the psychic equivalent of the primordial crime of parricide. The passive solution is to give up the fight and attempt to be loved by the father. Both forms of solution contain a threat of castration: in the first form, it is a fear of castration by the father, in the second it is a voluntary castration through surrender and becoming passive. The gratification of its desires, the child fears, may cost its virility. A conflict arises between the narcissistic attitude of the child to his genitals or virility, and his attitude towards his parents. Normally in this conflict, the first, self-love, triumphs; the child's ego turns away from the Œdipus desires. Thus both impulses, love and hatred for the father, become repressed, because castration is terrible, both as a punishment and a price for love. Besides the double repression, a new factor arises, the identification with the father, which ultimately compels for itself a permanent place in the ego of the child, in the form of the super-ego, which as we know, is the inheritor of the parental influences. If the father was hard, violent and cruel, the super-ego takes these characteristics from him, and behaves towards the ego of the boy in the same way as the father himself behaved. Thus the super-ego becomes sadistic, the ego masochistic, weak and soft with a craving for punishment, which finds its satisfaction in the ill-treatment by the super-ego.

To sum up, the infantile reaction of the Œdipus complex—the relation between boy and father—is transformed into a relation between the ego and the super-ego, which becomes permanent for the life of the individual. An abnormal situation and solution of the Œdipus will, therefore, remain as an abnormal relation between the ego and the super-ego, with all the consequences I have several times described. The infantile relationship may disappear if reality provides no further nourishment. The ego gets stronger, loses its passivity, the boy loses his inferiority and sense of failure and is able to resist the cruelty of the super-ego. But if the conflict goes on, and the character of the father remains the same or gets worse with years, the wish for his death is maintained, or even strengthened, with all the terrible consequences of sadistic sense of guilt. I hope to be able to illustrate the fate of such human beings in the analysis of Dostoieffsky and Wassermann.

After this rather complicated explanation, I will attempt to summarize the salient points of the Œdipus complex:

(1) The Œdipus complex is a sexual striving of every child in the form of a desire for gratification with the parent of the opposite sex, and a feeling of hostility against the parent of the same sex. In the case of a boy it means love for the mother and aggressiveness against the father. Two hundred years ago, the French philosopher Diderot, in his *Dialogues*, said: "If the little savage (boy) could have been left to himself, and could have been able to retain the whole of his naïveté, and could have been able to combine the small reasoning power of the child with the intensity of passion of a man of thirty, he would have broken his father's neck, and slept with his mother." (*"Le neveu de Rameau"*).

(2) It is predominantly an unconscious mental

process, which manifests itself in various ways in reality, but the greater part of it is experienced in fantasy, in the inner world of the child. It influences nevertheless the whole future life of the child, because, as we have seen in the case of a boy, the relation between the father and son is transferred into a relation between the ego and the super-ego.

(3) There are two elements in the Œdipus : one which is based on the object cathexis to the mother or mother image, and the second which consists in the ambivalent attitude to the father. The libidinal attachment, known as incestuous impulses, becomes evident in the phallic phase (between the ages of four and five), the period of the first genital impulses.

(4) The boy turns to his mother because of:

(a) The anaclytic object choice. Anaclytic means leaning on somebody. The mother, nurse, etc., were the persons who had met the primary impulses of the boy, gave him food, protection and care. It is therefore only natural that when in the phallic period the libidinal instinct has reached the alloerotic phase, and seeks for objects of attachment, of cathexing its energy, the child takes the mother as the first object of its love. Freud has expressed an opinion that a man's love is generally of an anaclytic type.

(b) There is also a social factor which is responsible for the attachment of the boy to the mother. This is the preference which mothers display for their sons and fathers for their daughters. This factor, in my opinion, is itself rooted in the Œdipus of the mother and the father. In their children they reactivate the old situations of their infancy.

(5) The love of the boy for the mother expresses itself *consciously* in desires for various forms of physical intimacy, desire for bodily contact, caressing, sleeping in

the same room, or in the same bed. I could recount endless numbers of tricks which little boys use to achieve their purpose of a bodily contact with their mothers. There is also evident in the little boy a desire and interest in watching the mother undressing herself, and only too frequently an active spying out of what is going on in the bedroom.

Unconsciously the love for the mother expresses itself in the fantasy of direct incestuous actions, of being her husband, as taking Daddy's place. The incest desires are natural desires. Their taboo is the result of the demands of society, which is threatened by incest. These taboos are so profoundly and so early internalized in the child's psyche that they seem to the adult to be inborn.

(6) The negative side of the Œdipus consists of the hostility towards the father, for the boy feels consciously and unconsciously that the father stands in his way. Hostility against the father manifests itself consciously in the expression of joy at his departure, his absence, lack of the desire for his return, and unconsciously in fantastic death wishes, fantasies of killing the father. It must be realized that a child has no perception of death; to him it means to be away, and not to be seen; to a child this is synonymous with death.

(7) The relation to the father becomes complicated on account of a love for him and a primary identification with him. As a result of love and hate, a feeling of ambivalence arises. Both attitudes, of hate and love, lead to an inhibition of the sexual impulse, the development of the castration fear, inferiority complex and a sense of failure. The projection of the boy's own aggressiveness to his father is also greatly responsible for the fear of the father, even if no actual threats have ever been uttered by the latter. Projection means attribut-

ing to someone else one's own unsuccessfully repressed desires. Thus those who have only partially repressed their sadism, project their cruelty on to others, rediscover it in others, and become ardent and fanatical members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals and children. Similarly, the boy attributes his own hate, and envy, and hostility to his father. "If I hate him he must hate me." And this is the chief motive for his fear of the father, for his fear of being castrated. This fear of castration leads to an inhibition of the genital impulse and a sense of inferiority.

(8) The amount of distribution of love cathexis to the father or mother, and the degree of identification with this or other parent, is responsible for the variations of the Œdipus, of which two are of importance; the normal positive, and the inverted in which the father becomes an object of love, and a feeling of jealousy and hostility arises to the mother.

(9) The Œdipus complex finds its solution in the years of the latency period between the ages of five and twelve. There is a reactivation of the Œdipus at the years of puberty. At this period the Œdipus complex is entirely unconscious.

We will discard here all possible complications which are of an internal and external origin, and confine ourselves to the three main types of solution of the Œdipus. They are:

(1) The normal heterosexual way. The boy becomes a man and takes a woman as the object of his love. This he achieves by sublimating part of his libidinal impulse to the mother, and by partly renouncing and repressing these feelings. The conflict with the father is solved by the so-called identification with his father. The child builds up a picture of his father as a sort of superman free from doubt, insecurity and fear, and longs to think

of himself as equally courageous, and identifies himself with this image of the father and the sexual inhibition, the sense of guilt, inferiority and failure, ceases to dominate the boy's mental life.

(2) The inverted, or homosexual solution of the Œdipus is based on the innate bisexuality of human beings. The sexual impulse, as I have emphasized several times, is primary and independent. It is capable of attaching itself to objects of the same sex; in other words, all human beings are potentially homosexual, not only children but adults also. Anybody who went through the war, or has studied the life of prisoners, can supply ample proofs of the present conception of homosexuality, namely that the most respectable normal human being and lover of the opposite sex may find himself in love with one of his own sex. If the identification with the father cannot take place, the boy identifies himself with the object of his love. Such an identification with the object of love, which is not attainable or lost, is called secondary identification and is very common in life. One finds that to avoid pain and suffering associated with the loss of the love object, human beings attempt to solve the tragedy by a fantastic incorporation of the lost object into themselves. The abnormal forms of such an incorporation one sees in the mental condition known as melancholia. In this disease the identification may go so far as to bring the human being to unconscious self-destruction, if the object of his love has undergone the same fate. Such suicide is not out of despair, but is due to an automatic repetition of the fate of the loved person.

The identification with the mother leads to a seeking of an object resembling the self, a seeking for male objects. The attitude of the boy to the father and mother is of a very complicated nature, on account of a

fusion and defusion of the sexual and aggressive instinct. A series of other factors within the child, and in the outside world, influence the solution of the Œdipus. One can appreciate how complicated this problem may become in the life of each individual and how dangerous it is to apply general statements and schematizations to an individual case.

(3) The third mode of solution is the neurotic. Inadequate sublimation of the ambivalent feelings to both parents, with the results of constant conflicts. The id clings to the incestuous wishes which have not been sublimated. The ego and the super-ego sadistically repress these desires, with the well-known results of sense of guilt, need of punishment, attempts to renounce sexuality, and the unavoidable sense of inferiority and abnormality.

In the case of the inverted development of the Œdipus (love for father) the repression may become still stronger. As the Œdipus conflict becomes internalized, and transferred into the psyche of the boy, the future object-seeking and findings, the future relations with people and the attitude towards life, are determined by the solution of the Œdipus.

Normally there is a revival of the Œdipus in puberty, and in healthy individuals a gradual emancipation from the parents takes place. The boy seeks for objects of love and hatred outside the Œdipus choice. But in the neurotic the parental fixations prevent such a development.

To show the influence of the Œdipus solution on the type of object choice, I will bring two variations which are commonly met with in life: The first is the case one frequently meets of a man choosing a woman with respect to whom some other man has a right of possession. Here there is a need for an injured third

party as a condition of love. In some cases this condition is so evident that a given woman is ignored and even treated with contempt as long as she does not belong to somebody else, but instantly becomes the object of violent love as soon as she belongs to another. This phenomenon is based on the child's concept that his first object of love, the mother, necessarily belongs to the father. At the same time, such a choice gives a feeling of gratification of the aggressiveness against the man (representing the father) so fulfilling the infantile desire of taking away the woman—the fulfilment of a desire which had to be repressed in infancy.

A second variety is the need for the light woman type as an object of love.

Such men never find any charm and attraction in a virtuous reputable woman, the attraction is only exercised by one who is more or less sexually discredited, a woman whose fidelity, loyalty and purity admit of some doubt. By a rough characterization this condition may be called the "love for the harlot." In this case, it is the feeling of jealousy which seems to be gratified. The lover himself must fulfil a rescue. This type of love choice can be traced to an unconscious fixation on the mother, first as an ideal of non-sexual purity, with the subsequent destruction of this illusion. During the Œdipus situation the boy regarded the mother as being unfaithful, during adolescence there is a revival of the desire to rescue her.

In the child's mentality the refusal of the mother to love him and her preference for the father is regarded as an act of what we would call promiscuity. In his infantile way the boy dreams of rescuing his mother and not being able to do it in the period of the Œdipus, he unconsciously does it as an adult. He marries a harlot type to purify her and make her belong to him only.

In these examples one again sees evidence of the ways in which the unconscious dominates our activities and behaviour in life. Guided by the unconscious urge of the repetition compulsion, men repeat in life in a nonsensical and destructive form what was sensible and natural in the early childhood. To break this harmful repetition is, among other aims, the important and difficult task of every analysis.

CHAPTER V

THE ŒDIPUS IN THE GIRL

AS we shall have ample opportunity of illustrating the Œdipus in literary works, I will now present as an illustration a case from life. This is not, however, a history of a patient.

You may have read the case of the student, Philip Halsman, who was found guilty of killing his father while mountaineering in the Austrian alps (The description of this case is largely based on an article by Erich Fromm, "Œdipus in Innsbruck"). There was no direct evidence against the son, no bloodstains, no weapons, no finger-prints, and even no motive for the crime was discovered. I happened to be in Vienna when the case was heard in the Appellate Division in Innsbruck. The Crown called, as experts, famous psychiatrists from Vienna. The experts came to the conclusion that there was some misunderstanding between father and son, that there was an appreciable difference in their characters, interests, and mode of life. The father was a lively man, who enjoyed life in every form, while the son was more reserved, and kept away from the pleasures of life: he often found the company of the energetic father tiresome. The psychiatrists, on the basis of these findings, gave evidence against the accused. The conclusion at which they arrived was that Halsman's action was the result of "an acute Œdipus complex," i.e., the son suffered

from an undissolved Œdipus and therefore killed his father.

This statement of the psychiatrists, who always opposed psychoanalysis, provoked a violent protest from the psychoanalysts. Freud published a letter to Professor Kupka, who was fighting for Halsman or, as he said, for the honour of Austria, protesting against the misuses of the term Œdipus. "Even if there were objective proofs that Halsman killed his father, one cannot bring Œdipus as the responsible factor. The universality of the Œdipus speaks against parricide." It might have been the archaic method of solving the conflict, when the son, in the primitive society, used to kill his father, but this is not the case in our times; otherwise all of us should have killed, or attempted to kill, our fathers. Freud then brings in connexion with it the following anecdote: "A man was accused of house-breaking, the only evidence against him was that a skeleton key was found in his pocket. He was found guilty, and after the sentence had been pronounced, he was asked by the judge if he had anything to say. 'Your Lordship,' he answered, 'I demand to be punished also for adultery, as the instrument for this crime I also had with me.' "

There was one feature in Halsman's case which remained a puzzle. The poor student, who was obviously innocent, was finally convicted on his own evidence; he persisted that his father's death was due to an accident, while the post-mortem examination definitely proved that the son's statement was not correct. The fatal wounds were not the result of an accidental fall in the mountains, but had been inflicted by some deadly weapon. If the accused had only said that he did not know what had actually happened to his father, as was really the case, instead of being stubborn and

obstinate in clinging to his story of an accident, there would most likely have been no case against him, and less probably a conviction.

The defence had to answer two questions: what were the reasons for the son's fantastic story of the father's death, and why did the accused adhere to it all the time? The jury, the medical experts and the judges regarded this story of the accused as a deliberate attempt on his part to mislead the court, and to conceal the actual facts which would have gone against him. The defence built up the theory that the sudden sight of the dying father acted as a mental trauma, as a shock with a retrograde amnesia. In the circumstances, it was natural that the first idea which should have come to him was that it had been an accident. This theory was substantiated by the fact that the father had always joked about the dangers of mountaineering and the possibility of accidents. The psychological explanations of the defence were obviously not satisfactory, because they did not explain why the accused would not give up his fantastic story even after the details of the father's death became known from the post-mortem. Here lies the interesting psychological problem, which requires an explanation.

We have learned that the hostile feelings of a son towards his father belong to the most repressed and forbidden mental experience; these feelings are entirely pushed away from consciousness, so much so that they appear only as unconscious fantasies. But should reality fulfil these repressed desires, they may become tragic for the individual.

It was proved that the Halsmans, father and son, differed from each other in many respects. The son unwillingly followed his father in mountain climbing and other sports. He felt irritated with the old man,

who generally domineered him and forced him to lead an active life, to get up early and to take long walks. One can safely presume that the relation of the son to the father was ambivalent; on the one hand, idealization of the strong character and a pleasurable masochistic submissiveness to the strong man and, on the other hand, a feeling of animosity against the superior man, for whose sake he had to give up his freedom.

The father was rather a flirt and successful with women, and a lot was said by the Crown about the son's jealousy. All these facts justify the conclusion that the son did indeed have hostile feelings against the father. One can go even a step farther, and state that he must also have had death wishes against the father, because it is known that every feeling of animosity is bound to find its unconscious expression in death wishes. Psychoanalysis has proved that death wishes occur even in cases of mild hostility whenever the individual feels helpless in the situation.

The death wish of the adult is a repetition of the infantile wish to have the father out of the way. One can safely maintain, therefore, that young Halsman had had unconscious death wishes against his father, he might even have experienced them on the morning of the tragedy. In such a state of mind the son wandered in the mountains with his father. The possibility of an accident might have crossed his mind—a terrible thought, which was most likely repressed. Suddenly, the son hears the scream of the father and at the next moment sees him lying fatally wounded. The sight of the dying father must have acted on the son as a mental trauma. He has seen a sudden realization of his fantastic, unconscious, repressed death wishes. One can safely accept the fact that the son had never done anything wrong to the father, and, most likely, would have

never been capable of doing any such thing, but the sight of the dying father temporarily paralysed his conscious censorship, and the unconscious criminal desire, "I wanted this to happen," broke through, even if only for a moment. This moment was a triumph for the aggressive emotions, the feeling of liberation, the feeling of freedom which one often finds in sons, even the most attached to their fathers. But the next moment brought a sense of guilt as if he himself had actually killed the father. This sense of guilt is unbearable, it is worse than remorse. There is only one way to escape the torture, a repression of the whole situation. An absolute repression which leads to an amnesia of the infantile sexuality. The slightest trace of the unconscious death wishes that were gratified at the sight of the dead father, must be erased from the memory.

The father is dead, but he still exists for the son in the form of the super-ego.

There is a further complication: to save the son from the super-ego, the father must not have been murdered, otherwise it might have been the son who murdered him. Hence the version of the accident. Nobody killed the father, so certainly he, the son, could not have been the murderer. The young Halsman did not invent, and did not give up the version of an accidental death to save himself from the laws of justice. On the contrary, just this adherence to the accident fantasy was actually the only evidence against him. In all probability there would have been no case against him otherwise. It was to save himself from himself, his ego from his super-ego, that he invented the whole story about the accident, and, for that reason, the defence could not influence him to give up, or change his version by simply stating that he did not know what had happened.

You will rightly say that all this is merely specu-

lation which cannot be proved. But, fortunately, we are not called upon to pass judgment on Halsman. I only wanted to demonstrate how unconscious reasons can be responsible for a self accusation. I wanted to show how an Œdipus conflict might influence a human being, but not in the way the Viennese experts imagined was the case. The hatred of the son for the father, which is a neurotic solution of the Œdipus (fixation to the father instead of identification; hatred enslaves one as much as love) did not lead to the destruction of the father, but to the self-destruction of the son.

In the case of a girl, the development of the Œdipus is slightly different. Here the material, as Freud recently said, becomes shadowy and incomplete. On some points there is still a difference of opinion. The girl also develops an Œdipus, a super-ego, goes through a phallic phase and a castration complex. But there is a distinction between this and the similar development in the boy on account of the anatomical differences.

The first phases of sexual development are characterized in the girl by the same narcissism and autoerotic object cathexis. Unfortunately, the girl's narcissism is, sooner or later, injured by the discovery of the anatomical differences between herself and her little brothers, or playmates of the opposite sex. She feels that she has come off short and takes this fact as a sign of ill-treatment and as a reason for feeling inferior.

I, personally, even go so far as to say that even without such a trauma, I mean without even being able to compare her genital organs with a boy's, a girl does not have the same feeling of possession, the positive self-feeling, which is typical of a boy. On the other hand we can safely accept the fact that there are plenty of opportunities in the little girl's life for making comparisons between her own and a boy's genitals. The

girl consequently develops in the majority of cases, an inferiority feeling in the pre-œdipal phase, that is, before the ages of four and five. This is the so-called primary masculine envy, primary masculine complex.

From the analyses of adult women, we have learnt that the baby girl goes through an early phase in which she envies her brother's token of maleness, and feels herself handicapped and ill-treated on account of the lack of it. During this period little girls often make no secret of their envy of the favourite brother, and of their animosity against him. So it happens early in the life of the girl that she becomes extremely sensitive about the lack of the penis. The majority of women analysed feel that they have been treated unfairly. There exists in them a repressed wish to be a male. The primary masculine envy in the girl is a new factor in the sexual development, a factor which is absent in the development of the boy.

It is necessary to analyse the psychological content of envy to be able to follow more clearly the further development. According to Abraham, in the narcissistic period of its life, the child carefully watches over its possessions and regards those of others with envy. "It is a well known fact that every child wants to keep what it possesses and get what it sees others to possess. If anyone had an advantage over the child, two reactions occur: a hostile feeling against that person, and an impulse to deprive him of what he possesses. The union of these two reactions constitutes envy." (Abraham).

On account of the primary penis envy a double feeling develops in the girl—hostility against the male organ and a desire to possess it. If we take a normal positive Œdipus in a girl, it runs as follows. In the phallic phase the mother is the first object of her love, the same as in the case of the boy, on account of the

anaclytic object choice. But the girl soon develops an ambivalent feeling towards the mother (love associated with hostility) on account of the primary penis envy and castration complex, for which she blames her mother in the first instance.

She takes her father as her love object. The girl turns away from mother to father for two reasons: firstly, as a reaction to disappointment and as an expression of hostility, and secondly, as an expression of a hope to get back that of which she considers herself to have been robbed. Melanie Klein holds the view that the girl turns to the father in her desire to get from him gratification of the frustrated oral desires (after the mother's withdrawal of the breast). "Consequently she (the girl) is brought under the sway of her *Œdipus* impulses not indirectly through her masculine tendencies and her penis envy, but directly, as a result of her dominant feminine instinctual components."

One sees, now, the difficulty in following the development of the *Œdipus* in the girl quite clearly. In the boy, the mother was the first anaclytic object and remained so in the later development. In a girl a change must take place: she has to loosen the mother fixation of the pre-*œdipal* period. The years before the *Œdipus* are of greater importance in the life of a girl than that of a boy. If one can say that the *Œdipus* is the kernel of a neurosis in the life of a man, one must modify this statement in its application to a woman, by adding that the neurosis is also largely due to an abnormal solution of the pre-*œdipal* mother fixation. (Freud).

The other complication in the life of a girl lies in the bi-sexuality, which is much more pronounced in a woman than in a man. A man has one sexual organ, while a woman has two. The first sexual sensations are connected with the clitoris. A transformation must take

place from the clitoris phase into a vaginal primacy. One must analyse both factors separately.

The man has only one conducting genital zone, only one sexual organ, which remains the same during the whole of his life, a woman has two, the female organ proper, the vagina, and the male-like organ, the clitoris. The analytical studies of woman have proved that the vagina attains its primacy only later, nearer puberty. Although there is evidence that vaginal sensations may occur early in infancy (according to Melanie Klein and Helene Deutsch, the girl has vaginal sensations even in the pre-œdipal years) the fact, nevertheless, remains that every woman has to go through a transformation from the first clitoris into the second vaginal phase. In other words, the sexual sensations are originally bound to the clitoris, and to a certain degree remain so for life. The full vaginal sensations develop after sexual intercourse. This transformation is alien to the man.

Parallel to the internal sexual transformation there takes place in the girl's life a change of object love, the mother is replaced by the father. On account of these two factors, change of sexual zone, and change of object love, the Œdipus in a girl is complex.

The classical Œdipus of the boy is as follows: love for the mother, rivalry and hatred against the father; castration fear on seeing the female genitals; the fear of being punished by the father; the running away from the castration fear, and solving the ambivalence to the father; the identification with the father and solving, in this way, the Œdipus situation; the development of the super-ego by internalization of the father. All these factors are clear in a boy, in the case of a normal Œdipus.

A woman begins with a castration complex, which

leads to a primary inferiority feeling, even in the pre-œdipal phase. Against this inferiority feeling the woman naturally fights. This may lead to the following complications in the further development of the girl. The girl renounces sexuality, she inhibits it, as we say; there is a flight from sexuality. The girl, not satisfied with the crippled penis, gives up the phallic pleasures. This frustration as we have learned increases the inferiority complex because of the inhibition of an instinct.

The girl may persist in her masculinity, and may cherish fantastic hopes of acquiring a real penis. This fantasy, incredible as it may sound, may remain throughout the adult life of a woman. Such a masculine complex may easily lead to homosexuality, to a latent inversion, or to actual Lesbian love.

The third possible outcome of the primary castration complex is the choice of the father as an object love and the creating of a normal Œdipus situation for reasons already explained. Thus in a girl the Œdipus complex is an outcome of the fight against castration, whereas in a boy the castration fear develops largely during the Œdipus phase. Therefore pre-œdipal mother fixation plays a bigger part in the life of a girl than in the life of a boy.

The loosening of the primary fixation to the mother takes place as a result of the penis envy and primary castration fear, since the mother is held responsible for the lack of the male organ. The mother brought her into the world. She gives her everything, and therefore she is held responsible for this lack. The girl then turns to the father, from whom she expects a substitute for her loss, with a fantastic desire for a child. Playing with dolls at that period is a typical substitute gratification. She takes the father as a love object and the mother naturally becomes an object of jealousy. The feeling

towards the mother soon becomes ambivalent ; love and hostility, just as in the boy in his relation to the father. From that point the further development is on similar lines to those in the boy.

The dissolution of the Œdipus in the girl is much slower than in the boy. Because the wish for a child is never fulfilled and partly because of the rôle of masturbation in her life, a girl is less tolerant of sexual practices in the phallic phase than a boy. In her the dread of punishment is more serious. The secondary castration fear acts on her differently, as the castration is already there, while in a boy there is only a fear of castration, and a hope to escape it. According to Helene Deutsch, the girl passes through two phallic phases ; in the first there are masturbatory practices, just as in the boy, but the lack of a penis is interpreted as a punishment. The second phase is similar to that of the boy, her incestuous wishes for the father lead to a secondary castration complex. On account of the fear of the mother, a sense of guilt develops, which helps her to dissolve the Œdipus. The girl identifies herself with her mother, runs away from masculinity, and seeks men as objects of love. In this phase the pre-œdipal fixation to the mother, which was disturbing in the early years, is of considerable advantage to the girl. It helps her to solve the ambivalence by dropping the hostility to the mother and so making the process of identification with her mother much easier. The pre-œdipal phase must therefore be considered to be of positive value to the girl in her Œdipus phase.

There are the same three classical solutions. The neurotic solution of the Œdipus in a girl may be of two types. It may happen that the woman will remain with a strong emotionally toned but unconscious desire to adopt a male rôle, with a fantasy of being a man. This

type of solution is a wish fulfilment type, a fixation to the childish desire to be a boy. The other solution will be an unconscious refusal of the female rôle, without an active desire to be a man, and, closely connected with it, a repressed desire for revenge on the privileged man.

In the wish fulfilment type we have the castration complex practically undissolved. Unconsciously the woman makes the assertion that she is a man and is going to exercise the male function. Abraham presents an excellent illustration of such a solution of the *Œdipus*. The patient was an only child. Her parents had ardently desired a son, and, in consequence, had cultivated their daughter's masculinity fantasies and desires—unfortunately a very common occurrence in every-day life. According to the expression of the parents, she was to become quite a celebrated *man*. In her youthful day-dreams she saw herself as a female Napoleon. She began a glorious career as a female officer, advanced to the highest position and soon all the countries of Europe were lying at her feet. After having thus shown herself superior to all men in the world, a man was to appear, at last, who surpassed not only all men in the world, but also herself, the super-woman-man. She gladly subjected herself to this super-woman-man. In her marital relations in real life the patient resisted assuming the feminine rôle. One of her dreams revealed her unconscious wishes. “‘My husband seizes a woman, lifts up her clothes, finds a peculiar pocket and takes from it a hypodermic syringe. She gives him an injection with this syringe, and he is carried away in a weak and wretched state.’ The woman in this dream was the patient herself, who took over the active rôle of the man. The syringe, the injection and the weak and wretched state of her hus-

band are obvious symbols of herself being the man, and castrating the husband." (Abraham).

The other form of an undissolved Œdipus is the revenge type solution. During the war prominent psychoanalysts came across women who took a particular sexual interest in crippled men, those who had lost a limb. These were women with a strong inferiority complex; their libido preferred a mutilated man, for the mutilated man has also lost a limb, a part of his body, and was thus in an inferior position. They were, so to say, companions in distress. The desire for revenge against the man is often satisfied by disappointing the man at the last moment. In her relation to the man the woman responds to his advances up to a certain point and then refuses him. In such cases this refusal is not due to morals or fear of consequence.

The other way of seeking revenge on the man is the so-called frigidity of the woman. In such cases this frigidity is due to an ambivalent relation to the man, in which, however, hostility prevails, a hostility which cannot express itself in a flat refusal. Such a refusal would mean giving up, consciously, her femininity, a thing which no woman, even the most masculine, will dare to do.

A woman whose life was markedly polyandrous was nevertheless frigid when she had to acknowledge her lover's superiority. If, however, she had a quarrel with the man and succeeded in forcing him to give in to her, her frigidity disappeared completely. (Abraham).

Some women try to overcome their masculinity complex by relegating the man to the order of a beast. They find nothing in the man but sexuality, and in contrast to this by being sexual they feel superior to the man—an attempt to free themselves from an inferiority feeling.

According to Reik, frigidity is a *sine qua non* of prostitution. Just as Don Juan, during the whole of his life, revenges himself on endless numbers of women for the disappointment he received from the first woman who entered his life (and this woman was his mother), so does the prostitute avenge herself on every man for the disappointment she once received from her father. Frigidity, in such cases, signifies a humiliation of all men and, therefore, an unconscious mass castration-punishment of men.

Some neurotic women seem to be able to maintain their feminine attitude on one condition, that they are considered by man the most beautiful, the most charming of all women, and all men lie at their feet, at the feet of the most beautiful woman. Some of them nevertheless add: "Then I would show them the cold shoulder." Other women of this type, being afraid that anti-feminine trends could be discovered, easily give in to the man, but begrudge every moment of his pleasure, and make the sexual relationship a source of endless torture.

As in the case of a boy, there is also a homosexual solution of the Œdipus which I hope you will easily deduce from the knowledge you have already gained from the study of a similar solution in the boy. Instead of an identification with the mother there is an identification with the father, and women are looked for as objects of love. Whatever I said about the possible complications of the Œdipus solution in the life of the boy, applies to the girl.

The abnormal solution of the Œdipus is, in my opinion, more tragic for the woman than for the man, because of the physical inferiority and of all the conditions of life, social, economical, moral, and the whole code of social life, which provides fewer substitutes,

fewer opportunities to alleviate the consequences of the undissolved Œdipus in the case of the woman. The age of puberty is much more complicated for the woman. The fact of menstruation, which is regarded by many women as a curse, augments the inferiority complex. There is one compensation which a woman has in life—the giving birth to a child. Hence the enormous tragedy of sterility in the life of a woman.

A normal solution of the Œdipus is, therefore, of still greater importance to the woman than to the man. It is a tragedy for any woman not to be able to drop her hostility against man with whom she should be able to build up a life in common.

An abnormal solution of the Œdipus influences not only the woman, but, indirectly her children. Women who have not solved their own castration complex have a detrimental influence on their children. They influence their daughters in their psycho-sexual development by talking to them with disgust about sexuality, and showing them their aversion to men. In this way, they undermine the normal heterosexual development of a growing girl. Some mothers go even so far as to say to their daughters who are about to be married: "What is going to happen to you is disgusting." Such a warning may act as a psychic injury, and is, in any case, superfluous. This type of mother early makes the little girl aware of the inferiority of her position in the world, and, in such a way, furthers the development of the inferiority complex.

The influences of such women on their sons may also produce serious effects. They depreciate the masculinity of the boy, the very thing of which he is so proud, and inhibits in him the feeling of possession which is important to the child. The influence of such a mother may be of greater importance in the development of the

castration fear in boys than the actual threats of castration.

In the foregoing account of the development of female sexuality I have closely followed the classical description given by Freud himself. It should be stated, however, that certain eminent psychoanalysts have expressed views which differ in some respects from those given. The chief point at issue is the relationship between the Œdipus complex and the castration complex in the female. Freud holds that the castration complex is primary and that it is under the influence of this complex that the girl turns away from the mother and chooses her father as a love object. The writers to whom I have referred interpret the analytical material in a somewhat different way. They do not deny that there is a certain degree of primary penis envy, but they consider that the girl's attitude is essentially feminine to begin with, and that the masculinity feelings are developed mainly as a defence against or retreat from the Œdipus wishes which are incapable of fulfilment and are charged with intense feelings of guilt. Time will show which of these two views is nearer the truth. The divergence between Freud's view and that of Klein, Horney and others, however, "becomes less great if we reflect that they agree on two important points—namely, that the girl wants to have a penis and that she hates her mother for not giving her one." (Klein).

CHAPTER VI

THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE UNCONSCIOUS, AND THE PRINCIPAL METHODS OF ITS EXPLORATION

AN attempt will now be made to define, or rather to describe, the essential characteristics of the unconscious and the conscious mind. The former, as it is well known, is the basis of the whole psychoanalytical structure. The concept of the unconscious was not invented by Freud. "It has been a storm centre of argument between philosophers and psychologists both before and in Freud's time." On the other hand, the terms "unconscious" and "subconscious" are used so widely and indiscriminately that one is often at a loss to understand the sense in which they are meant. It is not advisable to use the term "subconscious" but rather the term "unconscious."

Mental life may be divided into conscious, unconscious and preconscious, which is a qualitative distinction: these terms denote the dynamic qualities of mental activity and describe the mechanism of mental processes. The division of the mental structure of the personality into the id, ego and super-ego is a topographical one, each part representing, so to say, a distinct and separate element of the individual.

The conscious mind denotes that form of mental life of which the individual is aware at any given moment.

Consciousness is the essential characteristic of the

cortex of the brain which anatomically represents the upper superficial level, and is, phylogenetically (developmentally) the youngest part of the brain. From a developmental standpoint, unconscious processes are older than the conscious, because the latter have developed chiefly under the influence of the external reality. Contrary to academic psychology, psychoanalysis maintains that consciousness is not the only property of mental life, not even, as is commonly accepted, is it the most essential. It may be absent in some forms of mental activity, as for example in dream life.

The preconscious mind is topographically situated between the unconscious and the conscious.

It contains derivatives from the unconscious, but on the other hand it internalizes and retains object ideas from the external world. The preconscious has a contact with the conscious as well as with the unconscious mind and plays the rôle of a mediator between the two systems. It is, however, nearer to the conscious, and the distinction between the two is often artificial. The preconscious is often defined as that part of the mind of which one is not aware at a given moment, but which in appropriate circumstances, through an effort of will, favourable associations or accidental conditions, may be brought into consciousness. As distinguished from the unconscious, the preconscious material has once been verbalized, and can therefore be "put into words" again. In the case of preconscious processes the lack of awareness seems to be easy to explain. "I walk along the street with my mind absorbed in some engrossing problem. I have no true consciousness of what is going on about me. Nevertheless I turn the proper corners, avoid collision with other pedestrians, and stop at the right house."

The preconscious process can at any time come into consciousness, and acquire awareness if interest or attention is directed to them. The whole essence of studying, for example, is to retain what we wish to remember in the preconscious, for it is impossible to retain everything in the conscious, as some would no doubt like to do.

The lack of awareness of those processes which belong to the *unconscious proper*, cannot be explained in any such manner. For the unconscious is that vast material of mental life which was never contained in consciousness, or, having been once expelled from the consciousness, is never able, by itself, to become conscious again. It is very difficult to give a strict definition of the unconscious. It must be emphasized that "unconscious" does not denote "not conscious"; it is a mental quality *per se*, and not merely the negative side of the conscious mind.

Only an attempt to describe the unconscious can be made. The difficulties encountered in defining the unconscious are well illustrated by the following statement of Freud. "We challenge anyone in this world to give a correct scientific explanation of this matter." But the unconscious is a true factor which nobody with psychoanalytical experience will deny. Nobody who has had an opportunity of analysing a dream, an error of speech or of following a train of free associations, needs further proof of the existence of the unconscious mind. The most sceptical person under analysis very soon convinces himself of the truth of the Freudian conception of the unconscious mind. On the other hand, the soundest theoretical evidence in favour of the unconscious may have no effect on people who are accustomed to think in terms of consciousness only.

The following is a brief enumeration of the theoretical

and practical considerations usually brought forward as arguments concerning the existence of the unconscious :

(1) The post-hypnotic state : It is a well known fact that hypnotized people carry out orders given to them during hypnotic sleep long after they have been awakened. For example, one may suggest to the patient in hypnosis that he should at a certain time take a book from his shelf and read a page aloud. He will do it without being conscious of why he does it. When the actual reasons of his peculiar actions are explained to him, he will deny such a possibility.

(2) Analysis of dreams, and the discovery of the latent content, i.e., the hidden meaning of dreams.

The discovery of unconscious motives in errors of speech, forgetting, mislaying, etc., etc.

(3) The sudden appearance of ideas and memories during the process of free associations.

(4) The discovery of unconscious motives for actions and behaviour, especially in cases where no conscious motives can be demonstrated.

(5) The unconscious motives in neurotic and psychotic symptoms.

It must be emphasized that only the *repressed unconscious* plays a part in formation and causation of neurosis and mental illnesses as well as in the various errors mentioned.


The following diagrams should serve to demonstrate the topographical and qualitative division of the human mind as accepted at present by psychoanalysis.

From the diagram it can be seen that the unconscious part of the mind is bigger than the preconscious and conscious. The whole of the id, the greater part of the super-ego, and a considerable part of the ego are unconscious.


To sum up, the mind, in Freudian psychology, is con-



Conscious Conflict




Unconscious Conflict



A = = Conscious Mind

B = = Preconscious "

C = = Unconscious "



The role of the Super-Ego in Repression. Repression is a reflex arc consisting of a sensory (dotted line) and a motor part (the arrow in the super-ego.)

The arrows in the Ego and the Id. represent the unconscious conflict.

UNCONSCIOUS

ceived of having three levels, the superficial or conscious, embracing all those mental processes which at any given moment possess the quality which we call awareness; the preconscious, containing those elements which can be reached by voluntary introspection, and are capable of being brought to consciousness, but at the time lack awareness; finally the third and deepest level, the unconscious, embracing all those impressions or processes which not only lack awareness, but also cannot, by any unassisted efforts, attain awareness. Obviously, the boundaries between the three systems are not absolute.

There are three essential methods used in the exploration of the unconscious; the method of free associations, interpretations of dreams and analysis of the errors of speech and similar mistakes.

I will begin with the exploration of the common errors and the unintentional mistakes made in everyday life. The German language has an exact term for these errors—*Fehlleistungen*, which denotes that one omits some things while performing the customary functions of life. These blunders are very common and familiar to us and usually no significance is attached to them. Neither does anybody see any necessity for their explanation and interpretation. "Just a slip of the tongue," a man will say when his attention is drawn to the fact that he has used the wrong word instead of the one he intended. It is called a slip of the pen if the same mistake is made in writing. When one reads something different from what is printed, it is called misreading. There is another group of unpleasant errors, which consists of forgetting names, faces, quotations, and words, or forgetting to carry out some intentions or resolutions.

All these errors are in no way due to bad eyesight or faulty hearing, neither is there a disturbance of the

memory even in the most pronounced cases, such as forgetting the name of the street where one lives, or even one's own name. The forgetting in all these cases is temporary, but is nevertheless very annoying.

A doctor who had a very good memory for names once failed to remember the name of a very well known German writer. He felt annoyed: he had it on the tip of his tongue, but all kinds of other names were recalled instead of the one he wanted. The first one was Tetmaier, the name of a Polish writer, then the name Manthausen. He suddenly remembered that this was the name of a camp for war prisoners where at that time (it was during the war) a typhus epidemic was raging. He was afraid that he would be sent to this camp, and this was a very unpleasant prospect. He then became aware that he was trying to push away all thoughts of such an unpleasant possibility. His further associations were the following: A few days back there had been talk among his colleagues about another camp where typhus was even worse than in Manthausen. The name of the other camp was Weissenberg. Then he suddenly remembered the forgotten name, which was Weissenhof. It became clear to him that he had forgotten the name Weissenhof to avoid the painful thought in connexion with Weissenberg. From this example one can clearly see that the forgetting of the name was a mental act, which had cause and meaning, and which was an act in accordance with the pleasure principle to avoid painful thoughts and ideas.

The meaning of forgetting to carry out intentions and resolutions is obvious even to a layman. A young lady whose friend is late for an appointment is annoyed, not only on account of having to wait, but because she feels that being late is an unconscious (or conscious) expression of a loss of interest in the rendezvous. In psycho-

analytical practice we know that if a patient is late for the appointed hour he has a resistance against the analysis. I had several opportunities of seeing and convincing myself of the truth of this during my own practice.

A young man told Freud the following story: "A few years ago there were misunderstandings between myself and my wife. I thought her too cold, and though I willingly acknowledged her excellent qualities we lived together without affection. One day, on coming in from a walk, she brought a book which she had bought because she thought it would interest me. I thanked her for the little affection and promised to read the book. I put it among my things and could never find it again. Months passed by and occasionally I thought of this derelict book, and tried in vain to find it. About six months later my dear mother, who lived some distance away from us, fell ill; my wife left our house to go and nurse her mother-in-law, who became seriously ill. This gave my wife an opportunity of showing her best qualities. One evening I came home full of enthusiasm and gratitude towards my wife. I walked up to my writing-desk, and opened a certain drawer in it, without a definite intention but with a kind of a somnambulistic sureness, and there before me lay the lost book which I had often looked for." You see from this example the unconscious motive for not finding the book. With the disappearance of the motive, the inability to find the mislaid object came to an end.

less a deep meaning. The common explanations given for them are excitement of the speaker, quick speech, resemblance of sound. These factors may play an important part in determining the exact form taken by the mistake but they do not explain the essence of the slip. Freud says that psychological factors such as excitement, fatigue, absent-mindedness, distraction of attention, provide very little in the way of explanation. They are mere phrases, they are screens and one should not be deterred from looking behind them. They may facilitate the slip, but the actual cause lies in the two opposing tendencies, one of which is unconscious and interferes with the intended action: a desire to say something and an inhibition against saying it, and as a result a nonsensical compromise. A member of the House of Commons referred to another as the "honourable member for Central Hell" instead of Hull. The meaning of this mistake is obvious. No comments are required when a lady who is well known for her determined character says: "My husband asked his doctor what sort of diet ought to be provided for him, but the doctor said he needed no diet, he could eat and drink whatever I chose." The President of the Austrian Parliament once opened the session with the words: "I declare the session closed." And he had very good reason to want it closed instead of opened. The motives of these slips are obvious.

But the repressed desires do not always come straight to the surface, and often one gets to their hidden meaning only by a regular analytical procedure.

Ludwig Jekels of Vienna reports an analysis of a complicated slip of the tongue, which at the same time serves as an illustration of analytical procedure. A strange lady, who was excited and nervous, put the following question to him in a rather arrogant tone:

"Why did I say to-day that I have twelve fingers?" Asked for further details she said that she was going to visit some friends with her daughter, who suffered from a mild form of dementia. She asked her daughter to change her blouse, which the daughter was in fact doing in the other room. When the daughter came in changed, the mother was still busy manicuring her nails, and the following conversation took place between the mother and daughter:

Daughter: "You see I am ready and you are not yet ready."

Mother: "But you had only one blouse to change and I have to manicure twelve fingers."

Daughter: "What?"

Mother: "Yes I have twelve fingers."

Asked to bring associations, the lady answered promptly: "Twelve is to me no date." Then she added: "In my husband's family children had six fingers* on their feet. When my children were born their fingers were immediately examined." Next day, the 12th of December, she came to the doctor in a state of great excitement: "Only think what has happened to me: for the last twenty years I have congratulated my uncle on his birthday, I usually write him a letter on the 11th. This time I completely forgot and could only wire." It is striking that the patient, when asked on the previous day for associations with the number twelve, had not remembered her uncle's birthday. Such forgetting of an important event (for twenty years she had never forgotten it) is in itself suspicious. So was also her decisive statement that twelve "was no date." Further associations revealed that she expected an inheritance from this uncle. About this inheritance she

*In the patient's native tongue the word for fingers is also used for toes.

had lately thought quite a lot, as times were so bad. A few days previously she had gone to a fortune-teller and had been told that she would soon get money. The idea of the uncle's death came immediately to her mind. He was the only one, she thought, who could save her and her children. She further remembered that the uncle's wife had already promised to provide for the children in her will, but she had died without a will. "Had she given the necessary instructions to her husband?" She obviously had death wishes against her uncle. These death wishes had even been very strong, because when she was told by the fortune-teller about the money she replied: "But your prophecies are inducing people to murder others." During the six days, which elapsed between the visit to the fortune-teller and the date of the uncle's birthday, she eagerly read the personal announcements in the papers from her native town. She was naturally interested in what was going on at home. It turned out, however, that she paid special attention to death announcements. Obviously the lady had strong death wishes against her uncle, which, in the circumstances, one could consider normal. These death wishes were repressed, but they found their expression in the forgetting of the date of the birthday and in the forgetting to write a letter. That the uncle should have had a funeral, not a birthday, was the hidden unconscious meaning of this forgetting. The repression of the date of her uncle's birthday, which in the circumstances was unpleasant, caused the nonsensical slip of the tongue with regard to her fingers. Further analysis showed, however, a deeper motivation for this slip. There was another chain of associations connected with six fingers. Six fingers are abnormal. Twelve fingers are two abnormalities. Two abnormal children. And then the patient told a tragic life story.

She had married young : her husband was an eccentric and a highly neurotic man : he committed suicide soon after the marriage, and she was left with two children, also neurotics. The elder daughter had only recently come out of a sanatorium, and now the younger had become ill. Two abnormal children who gave the poor widow very little pleasure in life. Unhappily married, she had to suffer now on account of her daughters. She had no life of her own. On account of the daughters she had to give up a second marriage, renounce love and a home. In such circumstances death wishes against the abnormal daughters were only too natural, but were not accepted by her. They were repressed, but they slipped through in her nonsensical mistake that she had twelve fingers. The number twelve was determined first of all by the death wish against her uncle, whose birthday was on the 12th, and secondly by the death wishes against her two daughters. In this case the number twelve symbolized two abnormal children. Further associations confirmed the connexion of the number twelve with death wishes. Her husband had died on the 13th, the day after the 12th, she remarked.

These few examples, which could be multiplied *ad infinitum*, force us to the conclusion that every error is the outcome of two opposing tendencies. One of them is unconscious and aims at the avoidance of pain, which might be connected with the word we have to say, the action we have to perform, or the name which we have to remember.

According to the law of physics, if an object is driven in two directions at an angle simultaneously, the object will move in neither direction, but in a middle line between them, on the diagonal. In my opinion, similar laws govern mental processes : if there are two groups of motives which act in different directions, the external

expression of this internal fight will not correspond with either of them. This law may be applied to any form of mental activity in which some of the forces behind it are unconscious. To carry our physical analogy farther, we can say that if a conflict is produced by consciously opposing tendencies the outcome will be in the direction of one of them (A—B). But if one of the tendencies remains unconscious, the result will be in neither direction. It is for that reason that one is so puzzled in searching for the hidden meaning of various errors, dreams, etc. It is only through the analytical method of approach that some light can be thrown on these obscure questions.

You may wonder how it is possible that such little occurrences can disclose the innermost secrets and unconscious desires, as we have seen in the case of the twelve finger slip. But are not the biggest crimes detected by most insignificant clues? No detective will expect to find at the scene of the crime a photograph with the name and address of the criminal. Similarly the super-ego and the ego do not permit the id, which is bursting from high tension, to leave a card with the specification and an index of its forbidden desires. The id is then compelled to use peculiar methods of expression, such as errors, forgetting, dreams, nonsensical actions and, finally, neurotic symptoms. Thanks to Freud we have, through the technique of free associations, been enabled to find the true meaning of these unconscious mental activities, and we are able to reconstruct the mental conflict causing them. The desires of the id are censored in a reasonable way by the ego and in an unreasonable, tyrannical way by the unconscious infantile super-ego. The id, therefore, expresses its desires in masked forms, so as to deceive its censors. It is natural that this can be done best when the

censors are tired, or their attention is directed to something else. This explains the significance of those factors, which some writers have placed in the foreground, such as disturbances of circulation, fatigue, excitement, distraction, disturbance of attention. These factors must be regarded as only contributory in the causation of errors, slips of the tongue, mislaying, etc. Freud uses a wonderful illustration of this state of things, which I cannot resist bringing to your attention. "Just suppose that on some dark night I am walking in a lonely neighbourhood and am assaulted by a rogue who seizes my watch and money, whereupon, since I could not see the robber's face clearly, I make my complaint at the police station in these words 'Loneliness and darkness have just robbed me of my valuables.' The police officer might reply to me: 'You seem to carry your support of the extreme mechanistic point of view too far for the facts. Suppose we put the case thus: Under the cover of darkness and encouraged by the loneliness of the spot, some unknown thief has made away with your valuables. It appears to me that the essential thing to be done is to look out for the thief. Perhaps we then shall be able to take the plunder from him again.' "

Similarly, psychoanalysis is interested in discovering the factors responsible for the disturbance and not the circumstances which facilitated them. You have seen from the example of the finger slip, how deeply rooted were the causes of this extraordinary slip of the tongue. It was the cry of a most unfortunate human being appealing for freedom, peace and love and, at the same time, an unconscious confession compulsion.

Not in every slip of the tongue are the unconscious motives so deeply repressed. There are cases in which the interfering tendency is even known to the speaker,

but, at the last moment, it is felt that the intended word has to be omitted.

Freud once met two Viennese ladies who were starting on a walking tour. He accompanied them part of the way and they discussed the pleasures and the trials of touring life. One of the ladies, admitting the discomforts of such life, remarked: "It is certainly unpleasant to tramp the whole day in the sun till one's blouse and—things—are soaked through." She hesitated again and continued: "But when one gets 'nach hose' one can change." "Hose" in German means knickers, "House" means home. She omitted the word hose at the first hesitation, but it came through a few minutes later when she wanted to say "house!"

There are cases in which the interfering tendency causing the slip is admitted after interpretation. But from a psychoanalytical point of view the most interesting is the third group wherein the speaker energetically repudiates any interfering tendency: not only does he dispute that it was active in him before the slip of the tongue, but he will maintain that the motive is altogether strange to him. This may serve as a warning to readers not to be eager to have some of their slips interpreted: they may not accept the given interpretation, in spite of their sympathy with analysis.

There is an interesting group of errors which are regarded by people as omens or premonitions. At the moment the interpretation is given there is no evidence of its truth, but the future proves it to be correct. Freud was once a guest of a young married couple and heard the young wife laughingly describe her latest experience. After the return from her honeymoon she had called for her sister and had gone shopping with her as in former times, while her husband went to business. Suddenly she noticed a man on the other side

of the street and nudging her sister, she said: "Look, there goes Mr. K." She had apparently forgotten that this man had been her husband for some weeks. A shudder went through Freud as he heard this story, but he dared not openly draw the inference. Several years later the little incident came back to Freud's mind, when he heard that this marriage had come to a most unhappy ending.

The losing of a wedding-ring is regarded as a bad sign, often rightly, because there may be a wish to do so. It is told of a famous chemist that he never married, because when he should have gone to the wedding ceremony he went to his laboratory. They say that he died at the age of eighty, a happy bachelor.

"Nonsenical actions" are also an expression of unconscious wishes. It is a kind of working in symbols. To this group, first of all, belong the involuntary movements, habits; they seem to be harmless and meaningless, but people would be astonished to find out the real meaning behind them. This "*agieren*," as it is called in German, plays an important part in analysis. As you may not be acquainted with the analytical situation, I will give a few examples from ordinary life. A young doctor was telling his friend that he had nearly got an appointment in a hospital, but missed it because he did not pay a visit to the superintendent. He said it in a very casual manner, so as to show that the loss of the appointment did not worry him at all. But he soon betrayed himself, for while telling the story he dropped a piece of cake which he had been putting to his mouth, at the moment when he said that he had omitted to visit the important person. We see thus that he was not at all indifferent to the loss of the appointment. He admitted the truth of this interpretation.

A lady who had recently been divorced from her

husband was running down men violently with the usual talk of infidelity, selfishness, and brutality. She happened one day to indulge in this kind of talk in the presence of two gentlemen, one of whom was a psychoanalyst. The latter, understanding the real motives of the lady's hatred of men, interrupted her by saying: "Please stop complaining and running down men, it is very suspicious. You seem to be endangered at the present moment by some of them, and you seem to find it difficult to fight your real feelings." Naturally a flat denial and an abuse of psychoanalysts, who jump to ridiculous conclusions, followed. The psychoanalyst then demonstratively opened a conversation with the other man, leaving the lady to herself. After a few minutes he heard the lady humming a melody, and he promptly asked what this melody was. She blushed and said that it was from the opera *Butterfly*, when Kokors was sitting on the shore, waiting for the return of her husband. She disclosed the real motives of her hostility towards men. She wanted her husband back, whereas the selfish and brutal man did not show any signs of returning.

We may thus summarize this matter of errors:

(1) Errors are mental phenomena with a meaning and purpose.

(2) They arise from mutual interferences of two different intentions, one of which is unconscious and strives to avoid unpleasant emotions. Errors are therefore compromise formations.

(3) All the errors may be divided into five groups:

(a) Slips of tongue, slips of the pen, misreading, and mishearing.

(b) Acts erroneously performed, mislaying, losing objects, breaking things, etc., etc.

(c) Forgetting names, wishes, resolutions, impressions.

(d) Acts revealing destructive tendencies towards others, or oneself, including self-destruction.

(e) Symbolic or Symptomatic activities, as mannerism, *agieren* nonsensical movements of limbs, humming melodies, etc., etc.

(4) From the study of errors, we have learnt the principle of psychological determinism, by which we understand that every mental process, or occurrence, however small it may be, has its cause, and is a link in an endless chain of causal sequence of things. This law is not new. Spinoza and Descartes maintained this view long ago. It is due to the activity of the unconscious that we lose the connecting links, and it is the task of psychoanalysis to discover them again. The law of determinism of natural phenomena should not be confused with belief in Fate; a belief that there are mysterious forces outside our conception which pre-determine all that will happen to us, even before we are born. The belief in Fate is due to our ignorance of the causes of events.

There is still much more to be inquired into and discussed about common errors. But we will put aside a deeper analysis of them. It will be sufficient if you have gained at least a new insight into these accidental phenomena. Next I will proceed with the exploration of the unconscious by the interpretation of dreams.

The content of the unconscious mind will then become considerably clearer.

CHAPTER VII

THE UNCONSCIOUS (*Continued*)

I. DREAMS

MEN have always taken an interest in their dreams, and their significance is a matter of old-age knowledge. The primitives have seen in dreams the work of demons and the spirits of ancestors. Religious men have regarded dreams as divine signs. The ancient Egyptians, Greeks, Romans and Jews developed a special art of dream interpretation. Dream symbolism was also known long before psychoanalysis. Mr. Im. Velikovsky of Tel-Aviv, Palestine, has recently published interesting examples of sexual symbols in dreams that were known to the old Talmudists (in the beginning of the Christian era). Rabbi Ismael gave the following interpretation of two dreams told by *sadukkai*. The first dream: "I dreamt that I watered an olive tree with olive oil." The rabbi interpreted: "This is a sexual relationship with your mother." The second dream: "I kissed my own eyes." The interpretation was: "This is a sexual intercourse with your sister."

According to Bar Hedja, a falling down of the outside door signifies death to the dreamer's wife.

Rabbi Simon used to say that a dream shows the dreamer nothing else but a wish of his heart.

On the whole, however, before Freud it was only the prophetic value of the dream which was the object of

interest and study. Philosophers and scientists were inclined to dismiss the problem of dream interpretation as a fanciful and undignified one. Freud came to different conclusions. He was "forced to admit that here once more we have one of those not infrequent cases where an ancient and stubbornly retained popular belief seems to have come nearer the truth of the matter than the judgment of science which prevails to-day."

In the course of his psychological studies of hysteria Freud early came to the conclusion that dreams actually had a significance and that a scientific procedure in dream interpretation was possible. In this way he rescued dreams from the realm of superstition and scientific indifference and gave them a fresh scale of values in scientific thought. Dreams soon became invaluable for the study of the mental life of the individual. "The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to the knowledge of the Unconscious in mental life," as Freud put it.

It is impossible to go into a detailed study of dreams, and only the fundamental psychoanalytical conception of dream-formation, dream-work and dream interpretation will be briefly dealt with.

The most essential feature of a dream is that it occurs during sleep. The phenomenon of sleep is still an unsettled problem for the scientists, but it can be stated that sleep is, from a psychological standpoint, a condition in which the sleeper withdraws his interests from the outside world by warding off the stimuli proceeding from it.

During sleep there is a suspension of interest in the world. The warding off of the stimuli is partly achieved through dreaming. Freud believes that the general purpose of dreaming is to deal with external and

internal stimuli which would tend to arouse the sleeper. Unpleasant stimuli arising out of the external reality are transformed and changed in the dream to such a degree that they become unrecognizable and thus non-disturbing. The internal stimuli emanating from the inner instinctual life (from the *id*, which never becomes totally inactive), are given full play and are allowed to find an outlet in a distorted and masked form.

The kernel of a dream is therefore a wish fulfilment, a fantastic gratification of repressed wishes predominantly sexual and aggressive.

The character of wish fulfilment in dreams is often undisguised and recognizable.

If one goes to bed thirsty one dreams of endless drinking. Sexual privation leads to so-called "wet dreams."

It is interesting to note that with the progress of analysis and the removal of inhibitions the patient's dreams become less disguised, and *Œdipus* wishes come forward in their naked form.

Dreams of little children are simple fulfilment of wishes which were not gratified during the day.

In the dreams of adults the wish fulfilment is not so evident and recognizable on account of the distortion which the dream-thoughts undergo. The repressed wishes, the unconscious *id* desires which never rest, make use of the nocturnal relaxation of the inhibiting elements of the ego to push their way into the pre-conscious mind and to give rise to the dream, but the resistance of the ego remains active during sleep in the form of what Freud called dream-censorship. The dream censor, which is localized in the preconscious mind, chooses, criticizes and, if necessary, condemns the demands of repressed impulses and the forms in which they attempt to express themselves. A dream is

therefore a compromise between the repressed unconscious and the resistance of a censoring force of the ego.

The ego carries out its censoring activity through the mental mechanism known as "dream work." This is the process of changing the hidden elements of the dream into its manifest content.

The hidden elements of the dream, as revealed after a psychoanalytical interpretation, are called the "latent dream-thoughts," or in short the "latent dream." The manifest dream is all that is directly known to and recalled by the dreamer. The manifest dream appears often absurd and confused, because it is nothing more than a distorted, abbreviated and misunderstood translation of the latent dream-thoughts into visual images.

"It is essential to keep distinct these two groups of mental processes, for in the appreciation of the difference between them rests the whole explanation of the puzzling riddles of dreams. The latent content, or dream-thought, is a logical and integral part of the subject's mental life, and contains none of the incongruous absurdities and other peculiar features that characterize the manifest content of most dreams. This manifest content is to be regarded as an allegorical expression of the underlying dream-thoughts, or latent content." (Jones).

The thoughts and wishes in the dream, as well as the external stimuli which give rise to the dream, originate from the waking state. "What has occupied our minds during the day also dominates our dream-thoughts, and we take pains to dream only of such matters as have given us food for thought during the day." (Freud). These residues of waking life are called the preconscious material of the dream and are intelligible and known to the dreamer. The pre-

conscious material which stimulates the formation of a dream explains only the origin and some fragments of the dream, for the dream not merely reproduces the original experience but elaborates it, plays upon it, fits it into a context, in which the original factors are not recognizable at all.

The essence of a dream is the gratification of repressed unconscious id wishes. The external or the bodily stimuli operating on the sleeper are merely the occasion for the dream, but its proper nature and meaning are to be found in the deep layers of the unconscious mind.

Dreams are not bodily manifestations as some people think, but mental phenomena representing the outcome of an interplay of the dynamic forces in the human mind.

A dream is not in itself a primary and essential thing, a "thought proper," but a substitute for something else, something which is unknown to the dreamer. The interpretation of a dream aims at the discovery of this unknown "something," the latent dream-thoughts.

The methods the ego employs for the purpose of dream-censorship are briefly as follows:

(1) The dream mechanism regroups the material, brings modifications, allusions, hints, in place of the true meaning.

(2) When an unpleasant element is coming to the surface it makes it fainter. People in a dream begin to speak indistinctly, murmur something, or omit to say the most important thing. Often the dreamer wakes up at the most interesting moment.

(3) Through the mechanism of displacement, the psychic importance of the accent is transferred from an element in the latent dream to a different unrelated element in the manifest dream. Thus it happens that

the most intense emotion may centre in a dream around some trivial and unimportant event. The displacement may also cause a replacing of one element by another totally different.

(4) In every dream there is always a certain amount of condensation, i.e., fusion of various elements of the latent dream into one or few.

The manifest dream is therefore less rich, shorter, simpler than, and only a small part of, the original latent content. The manifest dream is a kind of abbreviated translation of the latent dream-thoughts.

Condensation is achieved by the omission of some elements, putting similar elements together, producing composite pictures.

“One figure in a dream may be built up by the fusion of the traits of various persons—proportions, face, hair, colouring, voice, dress; each of these may belong to different personalities and be fused together to form a composite portrait in the dream; similarly with places, episodes and names. Again, the condensation-process may operate by collecting and making prominent the characteristics common to several persons, ignoring the differentiating traits.”

(5) The dream work changes thoughts and words into visual images. This change is called “dramatization” of the dream. The manifest dream mainly depicts a situation or action, and on account of pictorial thinking and the rapid replacing of one scene by another it resembles a theatrical production, or, more correctly, a silent film.

Visual dramatization is generally typical of the mode of thought of the unconscious and of early and primitive life. (See the second part of this chapter.)

(6) The most striking and effective distortion of the latent dream-thoughts is achieved through the mechan-

ism of symbolization, which plays an important rôle in dream work.]

A symbol may be defined as a constant relation between a latent and a manifest element of the dream. Symbolization is found in other spheres of mental activity, in folk-lore, myths and legends, but it is especially common in dream work. There it acts as the most powerful weapon of the censorship of the unacceptable wish-impulses. According to Jones, dream symbolism is predominantly sexual. This is most likely due to the inherent interest in sexual matters and taboos in connexion with it, which lead to the use of allegories and symbols for sexual matters.

Freud states that the number of things that find symbolic representation is not great, but the number of symbols runs into thousands.

It must be emphasized that the process of symbolism is carried out unconsciously, and the dreamer is quite unaware of the meaning of the symbol or of the fact that he has employed a symbol.

Although there are a few general symbols, as for instance protruding objects for male sexual organs, hollow objects for female sexual organs, water for birth, etc., the meaning of a symbol cannot be known without the dreamer's associations called forth in the process of interpretation.

Even if the symbols commonly appearing in dreams are known to the interpreter, he must be acquainted with the personality of the dreamer, the impressions in his mind which led to the dream, the preconscious material, and finally the associations which the dreamer brings forward with each element of the dream.

Freud notes that the method of interpretation of dreams which is based on the knowledge of symbolism, cannot replace or even be compared with that of free

associations. It is complementary to this latter and the results it yields are only useful when applied in connexion with the latter.

There is always an individual factor in dream symbolism which makes the understanding of symbols employed in a dream difficult. "The dreamer, owing to a peculiar set of recollections, may create for himself the right to use anything whatever as a sexual symbol, though it is not ordinarily used in that way."

(7) There is, finally, a further distortion of the dream which takes place in the waking state. The dream as remembered by the dreamer is not necessarily the same as seen by him at night. The majority of dreams are forgotten altogether. This further distortion in the waking state is called "secondary elaboration." The longer the period which elapses between the seeing and the telling of the dream the more profound the secondary elaboration may become and the more altered the original dream.

Jones says that secondary elaboration is allied to rationalization. Secondary elaboration is unavoidable. It is primarily due to the difficult task of putting pictorial images into words. A dream is also timeless, and is governed by the so-called primary process of thinking which is characterized by the absence of logic.

The dreamer, on the other hand, in his waking state is accustomed to think logically, and he therefore involuntarily changes and elaborates the dream.

All these distortions and elaborations of the latent dream-thoughts make the work of dream interpretation very complex and difficult.

The interpretation of dreams requires not only infinite patience but immense skill. In running through the work of Jones on dream-interpretation we find that recognition is required of "opposites, distortions, rever-

sals, absurdities which are distortions welcomed by resistance, transpositions, twistings, modifications, transformations, references, representatives, symbolizations, contradictions, substitutions, displacements, reminiscences, wishes—superficial as against deeper expedencies, conjurings up, inversions, repressions, elaborations, interchanges.”

The enumeration of all these difficulties which confront the psychoanalyst in the interpretation of dreams will suffice to dispel the illusion harboured by some people that they can interpret dreams,—even their own—after having read the works of Freud on this subject.

Nobody can analyse his own dreams, and may I venture to say that even Freud's own dreams published in his “Interpretation of Dreams” cannot be regarded as analysed successfully, in the light of the present knowledge of psychoanalysts.

It is customary to bring in a treatise on dreams examples of dream interpretation.

As I have already stated, this would be impossible without giving full details about the patient, about his conflicts, his state of mind and all the other numerous factors responsible for the formation of a dream. Such an attempt would overstep the aim of this book.

II. NEUROTIC SYMPTOMS

THE greatest discovery of psychoanalysis is that the mental factors causing an illness are for the most part unconscious. To take a simple illustration from every-day life.

A girl of about twenty-five or twenty-six years of age suffered from severe attacks of vomiting. For about two

weeks she brought up practically everything she ate. She lost weight and looked very emaciated. I had known the patient for seven years and to the best of my knowledge she had had no serious illnesses of any kind. Physical examination did not reveal any organic cause to account for the vomiting. There was no history of poisoning, no sign of gall bladder trouble, or any other disease associated with vomiting. There was no suspicion of pregnancy, although the possibility could not be excluded.

Medicines and diet had no effect. I suspected the vomiting to be of nervous origin, an hysterical conversion symptom, but the state of the patient was too serious to allow me to be satisfied with such a negative diagnosis. Besides, the girl was in no way hysterical, or even what one would call nervous. She was a hard-working girl, well adapted to reality. I decided to make a short psychological investigation. From psychoanalytical experience it is well known that vomiting is frequently connected with unpleasant sexual experience, such as fear and desire for pregnancy, reactions of disgust and aversion to sexual matters, forbidden oral desires, etc. As there could be no question of a systematic analysis, I asked the patient if she had recently had any unpleasant experience. The patient was an intelligent girl and understood the meaning of my question, but could not at first give any valuable information, although I had the impression that she honestly desired to do so. But gradually she remembered a sexual experience which she had had a few months previously, and which she had entirely forgotten. She met a young man from the country. They liked each other, but her parents were very much against him; they could not tolerate the idea of her leaving them. During the next few hours the patient remembered the actual experi-

ence which was disgusting to her from every point of view, physical, mental and moral. The vomiting, however, did not begin soon after the unpleasant event, but a few months later at the dinner table, when her father inquired about the young man, and spoke about him in very adverse terms. She suddenly felt bilious, wanted to suppress it, but, as is usually the case, the feeling became more intense; she had to leave the table, and since then the vomiting had not stopped. We had a few more conversations, and the vomiting gradually disappeared. A few months later she had a mild relapse, but for the last two years she has been perfectly well.

Thus an ordinary psychological investigation revealed that an unpleasant incident had for a time been repressed and forgotten, and instead of it the symptom of vomiting appeared. The symptom was *thus a substitute* for the memory of an incident which had become unconscious.

The absolute forgetting of the unpleasant event is not always required for the causation of a symptom. Obsessional patients, and some insane patients, remember events from their earliest childhood very clearly. In the case quoted it could have happened that the girl had not forgotten her experience and nevertheless become ill. What remains unconscious is the connexion between the event and the symptom it produces. In many cases the external events which led to the outbreak of the disease are known, but the motive, the why and the wherefore of the symptoms, remain unknown to the patient.

The case referred to in Chapter II will serve to illustrate this point. It was that of the man who suffered from insomnia. He was twenty-nine years old, single, physically healthy (although he had several

minor complaints). He suffered also from numerous fears, was shy and timid, never looked a person straight in the face; he was even shy to talk and preferred to write down his complaints, until I stopped that. He had suffered from insomnia for years, and attributed his trouble to his extreme sensitiveness to noises. He lived in hotels and boarding houses, where he always chose the most isolated room, somewhere overlooking the back yard. As the slightest noise disturbed his sleep he covered his face and ears with three or four cushions. He regarded this peculiar habit, as well as the insomnia itself, as due to the singular experience in an hotel many years before which I have already narrated. The room next to his was occupied by a honeymoon couple. For obvious and natural reasons the knowledge of this kept him awake. Every young man will understand this. Unfortunately, our patient had previously (in early childhood) had a similar experience of overhearing sexual relations, which had undergone repression. The new situation, the scene in the hotel, endangered the successful repression. He therefore inhibited every form of listening in, in the same way as a baby inhibits any form of grasping, as a result of a painful experience, such as burning its fingers in a candle-flame which it had grasped. So it happened that not only the special noise disturbed the sleep of our patient, which was natural in the circumstances, but any noise disturbed him. It was obvious bluff; to avoid such an impression he unconsciously made the fear of noises a reality. The original natural anxiety was soon generalized and stabilized in the psyche of the patient in such a way that any noise was disturbing. We see in this case that the event which produced the symptom was known to the patient, but the why, the motive, the sense and meaning were not known to him, and until

these were made known to him his insomnia did not improve. As in the first case, the actual cause of excitement remained unknown to the patient.

I am indebted to Dr. Liknaitzky for permission to report the following case.

A middle-aged woman, married for twenty-eight years, but childless, complained of the sensation of something sticking in her throat. This had been present for eighteen months. At the time of the onset of the symptom she thought that she had swallowed a bone, but repeated examination by throat specialists failed to disclose the presence of any foreign body. Nevertheless, she could not be convinced that there was really nothing there. The sensation persisted, and in her attempts to remove it she developed the habit of constantly swallowing. Eventually she suffered from severe discomfort in the stomach from the large amount of swallowed air.

In the course of analysis it became clear that the symptoms represented an impregnation fantasy. About six months before the onset of the symptoms the patient's husband became impotent. The patient thought that she had long reconciled herself to her childless condition, but unconsciously she had still harboured the thought that one day her wish for a child would be gratified. With the development of her husband's condition her last hope vanished. She could not tolerate this final frustration of her desires, and was forced to take refuge in a pregnancy fantasy, which found distorted expression in her neurotic symptoms. In the course of the analysis she came to realize the connexion between her symptoms and her repressed wish, and this realization brought her considerable relief.

In the first case the girl reacted with vomiting to

food, while actually it was a reaction of disgust to a sexual experience; in the second case the patient could not sleep on account of noises, while in reality he did not sleep on account of repressed excitement. In the third case the patient thought that her symptoms were due to the presence of a foreign body in her throat, whereas, actually, they were due to a repressed desire for pregnancy. Thus we see that in all the three cases the neurotic symptom was a piece of the unconscious mind, and the mental factors producing the disease were unconscious. It must be emphasized that only the *repressed* unconscious produces neurotic symptoms.

On account of the rôle of the unconscious in the causation of a neurotic symptom, the diagnosis of a neurosis is usually of a negative character. In other words, the diagnosis of a neurosis is made when one cannot find an organic cause to account for the symptoms. This is a very dangerous procedure, considering our imperfect methods of diagnosis of growths, cancers and other serious organic troubles. A diagnosis of a neurosis should be made not because no other explanation can be found, but the actual meaning of the neurotic symptom should be made clear and understood, and no pains and labour should be spared in this direction. This can be achieved only by exploration of the unconscious mind of the patient, more particularly in its relation to symptoms.

As I said before, (Chapter VI) the concept of the unconscious was not invented by Freud. It had been a storm centre of argument between philosophers and psychologists long before Freud. But the Freudian conception differs from that of the philosophers and academic psychologists. The latter recognize the unconscious in its negative sense. Unconscious to them is *all* that is not conscious. The psychoanalysts talk of

the unconscious in a *positive way*. The unconscious is a positive psychic process possessing certain characteristics and qualities by which it can be differentiated from the conscious.

The philosophers further think of the unconscious in a descriptive sense, while the psychoanalysts emphasize its *dynamic* aspect. The unconscious wishes and ideas are invested with a certain amount of psychic energy, which fluctuates and oscillates continuously. There is in the mind a constant interplay of the unconscious psychic forces, the outcome of which is of utmost importance to the individual.

The unconscious cannot be a subject of direct observation and study. Its content and working can only be deduced from the study of dreams and neurotic symptoms, and by the method of free associations.

What is the content of the unconscious? It consists of instinct presentations and concrete ideas of objects and events. An instinct presentation is a combination of an instinctual striving with an idea. (See "repression" in Chapter IX.) One is not aware of an instinct *per se*. An instinct becomes known by its psychic presentation in the form of wishes and desires which, when associated with changes in motor and secretory innervation (agitation, crying, laughing, etc.) become known to us as "affects." The affects are not unconscious, but the original idea through which the instinct presented itself may become *repressed and thus unconscious*. A neurotic is just a man who is full of affects through which he finds an expression for unconscious instinct presentations. But the affects of a neurotic are displaced, they are attached to false ideas. For instance, a patient of Nungesser dreamt that she had forbidden relations with her dead brother. Next day she developed a fear that her child might die of tuberculosis (the disease from which

her brother died). She thus had taken over the affect of fear from the dream into the waking state and changed the content of the affect.

An obsessional patient of Nunberg suffered from insomnia on account of numerous ceremonials she had to perform in bed. She had to lie on her back with her thighs tightly pressed together, and her knees bent, and the blanket was allowed to touch only her chin, knees and toes. She felt very excited when in bed and did not know the cause of the excitement and the meaning of the ceremonial (which was due to early primal scenes, incest desires and unsuccessful fights with masturbation). The patient explained her insomnia as being due to excitement from her being too sensitive to noises and to the touch of the blankets, but her excitement was in fact due to repressed sexual wishes.

An affect may be inhibited, in which case the patient develops bodily symptoms, hysterical paralysis, spasms. Such symptoms are called "conversion symptoms." In insane people the affects may not be at all inhibited, but their connexion with reality is entirely lost. In every symptom there is always a loosening of the relation of the affect and the instinct presentation. In every neurotic symptom there is a distortion and a displacement of affect.

Besides the instinct presentation, the unconscious contains the concrete ideas of objects and things to which the instinct strives to attach itself. In the mind the objects remain as ideas, as memory traces of what one has seen, heard, smelt, etc. The object ideas consist of concrete ideas and words (verbalized ideas). Originally the infant retains only the concrete ideas which are formed through visual, tactile and other sensations. The sum total of the concrete ideas form in the child a psychic picture of the external world and of

its own body. The ability to express ideas in words develops later, and verbal ideas are never very stable. Indeed, the verbal ideas (thinking in words) are easily transformed into concrete ideas (thinking in images) i.e.: a fantasy, a dream, is a visual presentation of abstract verbal ideas. The unconscious contains *only the concrete ideas*, the words belong to the preconscious and the conscious. "Unconscious ideas are non-verbal expressions of objects and acts—words being confined to conscious and preconscious processes." (Freud).

A neurotic symptom, and still more a psychotic, represents a regression from abstract thinking and expression of ideas through words to the infantile archaic way of thinking in images. A neurotic seems to have lost the ability to say what he wants, or to do what he wants because it is forbidden and repressed; instead of it he talks and acts through his symptoms, though he himself is unaware of it (remember the cases of vomiting and insomnia).

There seems to be a contradiction in the case of neurotics who talk incessantly. An obsessional neurotic thinks and talks excessively and shows no other symptoms. But these patients do not say what they really want to say.

Having now discussed the manifestations of the unconscious as seen in the analysis of errors of speech and similar phenomena, and the discussion of dreams and neurotic symptoms, I shall now conclude with a summary of the chief characteristics of the unconscious mind.

1. The unconscious is a positive psychic force in the mind, and does not merely denote all that is not conscious as it is commonly understood.
2. The unconscious is dynamic in its nature; a

continuous interplay of unconscious forces governs the psychic life of men.

3. The unconscious contains only concrete ideas and instinct presentations; words do not exist in the unconscious mind.

4. The unconscious manifests itself in dreams, neurotic symptoms, actions, behaviour, etc., but cannot be a subject of direct observation and study.

5. The unconscious is governed by the primary process, which is characterized by easy displacement of the psychic energy from one idea to another. The primary process operates through various mental mechanisms of which the most important are displacement, condensation, identification and projection. (See Chapter VIII). The primary process is the primitive infantile and archaic mode of the working of the mind. Contrary to the secondary process, in which ideas are logically connected with each other, the primary process knows no logic and logical sequence of events. "One idea may surrender to another the whole volume of its psychic energy and cathexis."

6. The unconscious knows no contradiction or negation. ("There is in this system no negation, no dubiety, no varying degree of certainty."—Freud).

7. The unconscious is timeless. The conception of time is alien to this system. Its processes are timeless, "they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time, in fact bear no relation to time at all." (Freud).

For example, a patient continued an unconscious fight against his father who had been dead for years.

8. The unconscious is governed by the principle of repetition-compulsion. An event of earliest childhood repeats itself endlessly through life in various and different forms. (See neurotic character in Chapter IX).

9. The language of symbols is typical of the unconscious. Every neurotic symptom has besides other meanings always also a symbolic meaning.

10. The unconscious is governed entirely by the pleasure-pain principle and the external reality is replaced in the unconscious by an inner reality.

11. The unconscious is that vast material of mental life which was never contained in consciousness, or, having been once expelled from the consciousness, is never able, by itself, to become conscious again.

The id and the greater part of the super-ego are unconscious.

12. The tension of the psychic energy in the unconscious is always high, the memory traces remain there potentially active, while in the conscious system the degree of tension becomes lowered through actual experiences in life.

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CHAPTER VIII

MENTAL MECHANISMS

THE mental mechanisms are unconscious processes which are in the service of the individual whenever difficulties arise in handling the complex sexual and aggressive impulses. These unconscious mechanisms are used by every human being and are first developed and utilized in earliest infancy. A proper understanding of them is only possible in the light of the psycho-analytical conception of the personality, as consisting of the archaic primitive id, the reasoning ego, the moral super-ego, and in the light of the pleasure-pain principle, explained in the first three chapters.

The ego's contact with reality leads it to become aware of three danger situations which arise at different stages of child development. The three danger situations are: (1) Danger of loss of love, already present in the pregenital phase (Pre-œdipal). (2) Danger of castration with its complications of inferiority feeling and sense of failure (œdipal). (3) Danger of unconscious sense of guilt and suffering due to the loss of the super-ego's approval. (Post-œdipal).

It is quite normal to fear these danger situations, but in the process of a normal ego development these fears should be left behind, should be overcome. If the ego remains undeveloped, these danger situations with their associate fear and anxiety remain throughout adult

life. The supreme achievement of the ego is to know when it is wise to fight and face the world, that is, to make an alloplastic adaptation. If this wisdom is not attained, the danger situations will become more pronounced.

It is in these danger situations that the various mechanisms are used extensively by the individual as specific methods of unconscious defence. The development of the defence mechanisms indicates that the ego no longer feels itself in harmony with the other components of the personality. The reasoning ego has lost the ability of acting as mediator between the outer obstacles—the external reality and the id desires and the super-ego's censorship. It must be understood that the unconscious mechanisms are found in a moderate degree at work in every individual. Their excessive use, however, is abnormal and detrimental because they absorb a great portion of the mental energy, which, normally, should be directed to the moulding of the personality, thus enslaving the individual. This will be seen from the discussion of each mechanism.

The mental mechanisms can be considered as fulfilling three functions: (1) They provide alternative avenues for discharge of the (libidinal and aggressive) instincts. (2) They bring about deflected and de-sexualized gratification of instincts in harmony with ego standards. (3) They may serve as barriers, or defences, which partially, or completely, hold back the unmodified libido or other instinctual energy from direct gratification, if the first two aims are not satisfactorily achieved.

There are about fifteen mechanisms described in the psychoanalytical literature. I shall discuss only five or six. The most important one is that of *Repression*, which is the foundation stone in the structure of the psycho-

analytical theory and practice, and is one of the most important discoveries of Freud. We must always be careful to distinguish between repression and regression. (See Chapters III and VI—the diagram.)

REPRESSION

The essence of repression lies in its function of rejecting and keeping something away from the consciousness. Repression may withhold from consciousness material that never was conscious; in such cases it is called *Primary Repression*. *Secondary Repression*, or *Repression proper*, is of greater importance. Repression proper is an expulsion of conscious or preconscious material back into the unconscious; it comes into operation when an impulse has to be made inoperative. External experiences, if unpleasant, are usually avoided by flight. In the case of internal unpleasant stimuli, emanating from the id or super-ego, flight is of no avail. In the early stages of development, when the moral and discriminating function of the ego and super-ego is still absent or weak, the internal stimuli cannot be rejected by ordinary condemnation. In such cases they are repressed: an attempt is made to make them non-existent in the conscious. On account of the principle of generalization, not only the unpleasant experience but everything connected with it is also repressed. (See Chapter II.)

Repression is a very complex problem which it is impossible to discuss fully here. I shall try to answer only a few important questions in regard to it:

(1) What is actually repressed? An instinct becomes known by its representation in consciousness in the form of ideas. A combination of a conscious idea with an

instinct is called an *Instinct Presentation*. In other words an instinct can never become conscious; we are only aware of the instinct presentation. If, e.g., the libidinal instinct did not attach itself to an idea, or manifest itself in an affective state, we should know nothing about it. It is the instinct presentation which is repressed. Repression therefore prevents the ideational presentation of an impulse and suppresses the development of an affect and emotion associated with it. It must be stated, by the way, that emotions, feeling, are conscious. There are no unconscious affects in the sense that there are unconscious ideas. It should be remembered that only the idea associated with the instinct can be repressed.

(2) When does repression take place? Whenever the gratification of an impulse is perceived by the ego to be dangerous, or unpleasant, and the impulse cannot be dealt with by other means. It is, therefore, a defence mechanism in the service of the pleasure principle which seeks avoidance of pain. A successful repression is beneficial to the individual. Unfortunately the process of a successful repression eludes our study and we know nothing of how it is brought about.

(3) What happens when repression takes place? We must discuss separately the fate of the instinct presentation, and that of the impulse itself. Repression does not destroy the impulse whose ideational representation is repressed: The latter continues to exist in the unconscious; there it develops in an unchecked fashion. "It ramifies like a fungus in the darkness and takes extreme forms of expression, which, when translated and revealed to the individual, are bound to terrify him." (Freud). In the case of an unsuccessful repression, with which we have to deal in every-day life, there is a danger of the return of the repressed. The

repressed seldom breaks through in a direct way, it usually reappears in distorted forms, neurotic symptoms, dreams, etc. The more remote the derivatives of the repressed are from the original painful ideas, the freer access they have to consciousness. The actual technique of psychoanalytical practice consists in producing such painless derivatives. The method of free associations during which the analysand refrains from any criticism and says whatever comes to his mind, is the fundamental way of approaching the repressed ideas. One often observes that the analysand goes on unperturbed, spinning endless chains of associations until he suddenly approaches a thought-formation which is too near to the repressed, then he attempts a new repression by suddenly exclaiming: "But this is too stupid to say," "I am sure you are bored with my nonsense," "I am only wasting your time," etc.

Thus the repressed idea attaches itself to other impulses and ideas and the repression becomes more and more generalized.

The fate of the instinctual impulse which was connected with the repressed idea is complex. By circuitous roads and associations it obtains various forms of discharge and gratification, e.g., in neurotic symptoms. Complete repression of an instinctual impulse is another possibility.

(4) What are the psychic powers that produce repression? The repressing agents are, among others, shame, fear, disgust, sympathy and sense of guilt.

Repression should be distinguished from condemnation. The latter is a conscious, rational process, whereas repression is pre-eminently an unconscious mechanism and must be conceived in terms of ego, super-ego and id functions.

As Reich says, "External frustration, together with

the anxiety it produces, sets the process of repression in motion, and inner frustration keeps it alive."

SUBLIMATION

Sublimation is the healthy and constructive way of dealing with a part of the infantile sexual and aggressive urges as they arise in the successive stages of development. For example, after the Oedipus complex has been resolved, the child should be tied to the parents only by means in which the direct sexual aim is inhibited, e.g., friendship, tender love. Sublimation is an exchange of infantile sexual aims for interests and modes of gratification which are no longer directly sexual. Freud however rightly points out that a few of the original sexual aims are also preserved, e.g., a desire for proximity with and for sight of the loved object.

The sublimated interests are of a higher social level, and are beneficial to the individual and to society. Sublimation is an unconscious process. It should in no way be mistaken for a conscious replacement of sexual interests by other interests.

Sublimated activities are usually described as de-sexualized or aim inhibited, in other words, prevented from reaching their final aim by original direct gratification. Sublimation is essentially a function of the ego, and serves the purpose of lowering the instinctual tension which arises whenever an instinct is denied gratification. This may occur if outer obstacles to direct gratification present themselves, if the ego's own narcissism interferes with sexual gratification, or, in cases of excessive severity, of the super-ego.

It is difficult to achieve a complete sublimation, and in some degree it will be commonly accompanied by

repression. Freud maintains that a certain amount of direct sexual satisfaction is necessary for most persons. Sublimation succeeds with the minority, and with them only intermittently, from time to time. The sexual instinct according to Freud is characterized by special stubbornness.

Identification plays an important part in every sublimation (see p. 147).

As an example of an ideal sublimation, we may take the well known case of the wolf-man described by Freud. The boy had an excessive love for his father, and a strong sense of guilt accompanied his homosexual trends. An external situation made possible what Freud calls an ideal sublimation. His mother had acquainted him with religious doctrines and the New Testament stories. The fact that the boy's birthday was on Christmas Day, made it very easy for him to identify himself with Christ. In this way he could love his father by loving God the Father. His desexualized libido found many opportunities for expression in ways laid down by religion, and these expressions of the desexualized libido were not haunted by that sense of guilt which had attached itself to his sensual love for his father. At the same time, as Freud points out, the boy's masochistic tendencies found perfect sublimation without much renunciation, because of his identification with Christ who was ill-treated by the divine father.

Sublimated love exists alongside with sexual love. It creates more permanent ties than sensual love. Sensual love cannot last, as it suffers great reduction by continuous discharge of instinctual energy, e.g., marriages resulting from love at first sight. In order to last, sensual love must be combined with sublimated tender components, or must be partly transformed into these. This combination is one of the few strong-

holds of marriage. Outside marriage the sublimated ties are very weakly developed, and therefore do not last.

"And then, as any man can tell you, love without marriage has little chance beside love with marriage—only as much chance as most illusions; marriage is so real: for better or for worse, it makes shadows of other things." (S. G. Millin in "Mary Glen").

In sublimation real fulfilment is not sacrificed, but the aims and the goals of the instincts change, so that the fulfilment no longer meets with resistance from the outer obstacles or inner inhibitions. The difference between a *neurotic restriction* of an instinct and *sublimation* lies in the fact, that whereas a neurotic would like to be free entirely from sexuality, sublimation does not actually inhibit the striving, but only changes its content.

Sublimation plays an important rôle in life. It is a more important factor in the choice of a profession or employment than external factors and opportunities. The latter are often but the pretext for the expression of some primary submerged striving.

REACTION FORMATION

Reaction formation consists in the development of conscious attitudes and interests which are the opposite to infantile trends, which were pleasurable but not acceptable to the ego, and were therefore forbidden by the internal authority. These infantile trends persist in the unconscious, and there is only an apparent conformity with the reality principle. Reaction formation is a correlative of sublimation, but the latter is much healthier. Reaction formation is insecure, deceptive and is constantly endangered by the repressed desires. The ego changes only serve to conceal the underlying

opposite to impulses. There is a certain hypocrisy about a reaction formation. For example :

(1) Excessive anxiety serves to mask hatred.

(2) A cruel child may develop exaggerated sympathy and tenderness, and hyper-sensitiveness to the pain and suffering of the people around him.

(3) A potential murderer cannot see blood.

(4) In animal phobia the feared object has originally been the means of sadistic pleasure ; the animal usually symbolizes the father.

(5) A hostile wish against the parent shows itself in excessive anxiety.

(6) Inability to kiss, to see naked people, disgust of everything sexual, can be traced to an early pleasurable sensation which had to be repressed.

The difference between sublimation and reaction formation is put forward in a most excellent manner by Jones, who says : "In contradistinction to sublimations, where the energy is not derived from the repressed impulse but flows in the same direction as it, that of reaction formations is derived from the opposing forces and is aimed in exactly opposite directions. They might, indeed, be described by the more static metaphor of barriers erected as dams against the repressed impulses."

The following examples will illustrate the difference between a sublimation and a reaction formation. The infantile tendency to self display, exhibitionism, may be sublimated into pleasure in making oneself prominent, either physically or in oratory, or in many varieties of seeking fame. On the other hand it may express itself in reaction formation, when the same exhibitionism leads to modesty, shame, sensitiveness. Take another example. The primitive pleasure all children take in dirt may be sublimated in painting or

sculpture, or it may lead to the formation of a reaction of excessive cleanliness, tidiness, (dirt is matter in the wrong place) orderliness, and similar traits of the so-called anal character. (See Chapter IX).

Another difference between reaction-formation and sublimation seems to lie in the degree of repression to which the original tendency is subjected. In sublimation the tendency finds expression in its original direction: for example, a destructive sadism, which expresses itself on a primitive level in wanton destruction and thoughtless infliction of pain for its own sake, is modified on a sublimated level into, let us say, the slaughtering of live cattle by a slaughter-house worker; on a more sublimated level, the cutting up of already killed animals by a butcher; on a still more sublimated level, the cutting up of animals and human beings in veterinary and human surgical experimentation and therapeutics. In all of this the primitive tendency is being manifested in its original directions, but modified so as to be socially acceptable and useful. The repression applies to the thoughtlessness and wantonness of the tendency, the strictly personal and selfish value of the tendency, thus allowing a certain conformity to social standards. In reaction-formation, on the other hand, the whole tendency is completely repressed, and its opposite is manifested, the "contrary forces" referred to by Freud. So a reaction formation to the destructive sadism whose sublimations we have traced might be manifested in an exaggeration of gentleness and humanitarian feelings, a fanatical vegetarianism or anti-vivisectionism, the founding of societies to prevent cruelty towards children and animals.

As a good illustration of the essence of a reaction-formation there is an episode in Tolstoy's life. Tolstoy, the vegetarian, was naturally very much opposed to

hunting in any form. Once in his country house while the house-party were at the hunt, he was discussing with a friend of his, the cruelty of such sport. Suddenly his dog gave chase to a hare, and Tolstoy, full of excitement, entered into the whole spirit of the chase. "Catch it! catch it!" he shouted feverishly.

RATIONALIZATION

Rationalization is a process which arises out of the need for justifying to the self certain feelings, ideas or actions or forms of behaviour, which are unpleasant to accept. Jones, who introduced this term, explains rationalization as a necessity of everyone to create a theory of himself. We feel that we ought to be able to account to ourselves for our conduct and opinions. Ask any normal man: "Why did you do that?" or "Why do you like this?" and he is pretty certain to give you an explanation that seems plausible and satisfactory to both parties. The cleverest and most highly educated man can never penetrate himself, his own unconscious. Is it not the common statement, "I know myself very well. Who else can know me, if not I myself?" It is no use arguing, and I must confess that I feel rather uneasy when tempted to try to persuade anybody that there exists at least the possibility that actions or feelings may come from some of his complexes, from something which is unconscious and therefore not known to him. Such an admission, or anything that is equivalent to it, is practically never heard. Our actions and feelings, even when most illogical and wholly determined by unconscious factors rather than by reason and judgment, seem to the majority of people (and cleverness or standard of education have nothing to do with this way

of thinking) perfectly logical and reasonable, or accidental and requiring no explanations. An unconscious reaction is invariably rationalized, furnished with a plausible explanation, often manufactured *post factum*. The rationalization has the same significance as the other mechanisms. It is in the service of the pleasure principle. It is more agreeable to us than a correct understanding of the real motive forces. In the case of neurotics, or during the process of analysis, the rationalizations are so extremely clever and sound, so plausible, that the analyst has to be constantly on his guard not to be himself deceived by them and so overlook the unconscious factors at work. In the resistance phase the explanations given by the analysand are often so logical that one can easily be misled by them. The ordinary psychologist would like to argue the falsehood of some rationalizations, and, by persuasion or other methods, to endeavour to break them in the patient—a useless task. Negative attitude of the patient is increased. The following case history of Fink is a good illustration of rationalization.

A young man confessed in analysis that it was always his intention to marry a rich girl. He nevertheless married a girl with no money at all. Before he married he had taken advantage of every opportunity to be in the society of rich girls, prospective wives, hoping to find one who would be attractive and would agree to marry him. When the psychoanalyst, taking into consideration his good looks, position and intelligence, expressed surprise that his efforts in this direction had met with such a meagre result, he explained that all the rich girls he met were so spoiled by their money, and so utterly selfish, that no matter how rich they were he could not marry any of them. All of them, he maintained, put clothes, dances and motor-cars before love

and sympathy and companionship, which he considered to be of vital importance in marriage. Nobody can deny that some rich girls may be spoiled, but nobody will generalize such a view, and the fact that this man could not find a single rich girl without such a complexity of faults requires an explanation. His failure to carry out his intention of marrying a girl with money (a thing he had many opportunities of doing) was, as it appeared from analysis, due not to the alleged faults of the young ladies, but to the peculiarities of his own character, and the explanation he offered was a typical rationalization. He had a typical money complex of an inferior type. He was really interested himself in money; he felt he could not be interested in a poor girl. By the process of projection he was compelled to doubt if a rich girl could care for him, the poor man. He could feel sure of the love of a girl who had no money, and who would, therefore, appreciate the little money he possessed. Instead of admitting his unconscious money complex, he built up a whole theory of bad character in rich girls, which seemed so logical and plausible that nobody could destroy it. And later on in his struggles in life, whenever he felt depressed on account of having missed the opportunity of marrying a rich girl, this argument was pleasant and soothing.

A typical case of rationalization, which is very common in endless variations, is the following: A patient was a very strong supporter of woman suffrage. His arguments were exceptionally logical and convincing. The further analysis revealed, however, that the basic reason for his attitude was his racial complex. As a Jew, he felt the effects of anti-semitism very keenly, but, as an assimilated one, he could not join his fellow sufferers in an open fight and protest, by, for instance, joining a

strong national movement. Instead, he sympathized to a degree of identification with women, because like them, he belonged to a group regarded as inferior and which is denied some of the rights and privileges which others enjoy. His interest in the equality of sexes was really a manifestation of his demand for equality of races. So, also, we often find Jews who are fighters for somebody else's national or racial rights, and rationalization of similar types is the basic principle of their actions.

Here is another example quoted from Fink :

A woman used to wear black dresses in the heat of summer and explained this by maintaining that such material was more durable, practical, and suited her better than any other. Asked if she were not perturbed by the idea that black dresses may be taken as a sign of mourning, she answered that she did not care about that. Her first answer about durability and comfort was very unconvincing, because it was in summertime and she was a very rich woman and usually not mean with regard to money. It was later found out that her habit of dressing in black had a symbolic significance and that her explanations were a pure rationalization. She was dissatisfied with her husband, who was a rather prosaic individual who did not pay attention to her dresses, an attention to which she had been used in her youth. She had been a popular girl, liked clothes, and was admired greatly by the opposite sex for her smartness. Her dressing in black was a symbolic expression on the one hand of her wish to be a widow, and, on the other hand, a symbol of her wish to give up her fondness for clothes and craving for admiration, which made her unhappy with her husband, whom she loved and respected otherwise.

Many further examples could be brought, but, the

few which are given here prove that rationalization is the work of the unconscious, by which the ego evades the recognition of irrational and inconsistent behaviour. The ego's narcissism is always the driving force behind every rationalization. A human being tries to advance a series of logical arguments to avoid a narcissistic wound where he would suffer by acknowledging the real state of affairs.

DISPLACEMENT

Displacement may be defined as an unconscious mechanism which consists of a transposition of a desire from its unaccepted ideas to such as are accepted by the censorship of the personality. Displacement, like other mechanisms, represents a compromise between the repressed and repressing trends. The compromise consists in this : although the ideas are repressed, yet the libidinal energy finds access to consciousness by transforming them into innocent ideas.

A business man, who had to do a fair amount of travelling, had a peculiar habit with regard to catching trains. He would never look up the time-tables to ascertain the times when the trains went, instead, he would take his time about attending his work, and then leisurely proceed to the station. If there was a train, well and good, otherwise he would patiently wait. A peculiar habit for a business man. He was aware of the waste of time, but could not give up this method of travelling. He'd "be damned," he said, in an angry voice, if the railway administration could hurry him at his office and make him adjust his work to their blessed time-table. He would go to the station when he was ready and not before, and nobody should dictate to

him when this should be. Analysis showed that this habit was really a displacement of impulses which represented a rebellion against his father's authority. The father was really an exceptionally nice man, to whom the son was greatly attached. But the father was a dominant person with dictatorial tendencies, from which the patient suffered as a boy. It was characteristic of the father that everything in the house had to be done at once: if an order was given by the father to the boy, then no matter what the boy was doing, he had to leave it and carry out at once his father's orders. The boy did it gladly, because he loved and respected the strong father, but unconsciously he objected to his father's demands. The forbidden desire to revolt against his father's authority he replaced by the nonsensical revolt against the railway authorities.

PROJECTION

Projection is a defensive process whereby the ego transfers on to the external reality unconscious wishes and ideas, which, if allowed to penetrate into consciousness, would be painful to the ego. (Another mechanism in the service of the pleasure principle).

Freud explains the projection mechanism as follows:

"The organism orientates itself in the world in the beginning by means of inner and outer perceptions. In the beginning, only the ego exists and the external reality is learned gradually. The external world is recognized gradually, as a perception which can be avoided, or altered, by motor or other activity." (For details see Chapter II).

So, too, in the adult there is at times a failure to distinguish between the ego and the non-ego. In

projection the ego gives in to the id, to the point of falsifying the perceptions of the real world and of reshaping them according to the inner, forbidden and not successfully repressed desires. In projection, a patient displaces outwards, on to reality, on to people, whatever becomes unpleasant to him from within. A child projects his own omnipotence desires, in which he is disappointed, on the seniors. "I cannot do it; my father or brother can do it." The weaker the child feels, the stronger is the projection on to the seniors in order to save himself from a narcissistic wound of impotence.

Projection is a common process in normal individuals. It is common to transfer one's own unpleasant sensations on to others. For example, the doubt of another person's love may easily be a projection of the individual's own unconscious doubt of his love for that person. If a man in his love relations suddenly looks for proof of the other party's love feelings, suspicion is often justified that there is doubt of his own feelings.

A man with dishonest tendencies which are not successfully repressed, becomes tremendously concerned with keeping a close watch on others, customers, and fellow employees, to see that they do not rob his employer. People with a strong inferiority complex are always transferring their own "running themselves down" to others. The mechanism of projection is ordinarily one of defence. The origin of "fate neuroses" is mostly due to projecting one's own unsuccessfully repressed desires on the forces outside of the personality.

The following story quoted from Fink is a good illustration of the mechanism of projection. A widow lived in a suburb of a big town. After a year she moved into the town, because she said the atmosphere in a small place was unpleasant. "Everybody is interested in you, keeps you under a microscope." All the people,

she complained, looked at her as a "designing widow" who was anxious to entrap a second husband, and she therefore could not speak a word to a man. The malicious comment of the neighbours made her nervous and sensitive. It cannot be denied that life in a small town gives plenty of material for unpleasantness, but the true causes of her nervousness and sensitiveness were not recognized by the patient. Her sense of being suspected really originated in her own psyche. What appeared to her as thoughts of her neighbours, were really her own ideas, externalized through the mechanism of projection, for in a certain sense she *was* a designing widow, and had reason to know it. Her married life, though not positively unhappy, had not been entirely satisfactory, for her husband was a very matter of fact person and had failed to satisfy her sentimental longings and her sexual desires. In spite of her loyalty to him, the reflection had on more than one occasion crossed her mind that his death might mean the opening of the doors to another relationship, considerably more romantic than the one she had experienced. Furthermore, she found that the craving for sexual gratification, which annoyed her little during her husband's lifetime, began after his death to be a very insistent yearning, with which she found it very difficult to deal, and, not unnaturally, she looked towards a second marriage as a means of solving this problem. But her consciousness was against this desire. She must be loyal to the dead, and at the same time she denied herself the rights for sexual desires at her age. She refused to admit that she herself really wanted what the people might have suggested about her. She used projection as a defence mechanism: "My neighbours think that I want to get married again—not I."

Another example: A young woman in analysis

suddenly displayed most open hostility and antagonism to the analyst, the origin of which was a projection. Her neurosis began when her parents interfered between her and a young man whom she professed to love and wanted to marry. Her hostility to the analyst developed when she came to the conclusion that the reason her parents had sent her to him was to help to break the relationship. The more patient and sympathetic the analyst was to her, the more she resented him as an accomplice in her parents' plan; she regarded his kindness as a Judas attitude. It was true that the parents did everything she accused them of, but in reality, it was also her wish to give up the young man in order to please her parents, and remain a model and obedient daughter. Thus the force influencing her to give up the lover, which she suspected emanated from the analyst, was really her love for the parents which she did not want to admit. The antagonism against the analyst was an expression of hatred against her own self, for letting parental love interfere with her romantic ideals.

The most classical projection is present in psychotics who suffer from paranoia, i.e., delusions of persecution. The ideas of being hated and persecuted, as is known from psychoanalytical experience, are based on latent homosexuality. Unconscious homosexual love leads to an internal conflict, the homosexuality is rejected, love turns into hatred. The paranoid then projects his hatred on others. "If I hate him, he must hate me."

A young woman student suffered from delusional attacks that her professors, one after the other, fell in love with her, were hypnotizing her, putting into her mind erotic wishes and fantasies, against her will compelling her to masturbate, by telepathic influence making her come to their apartments to have sexual relations with them. This would put her in a rage, and

she had to give up her studies. A typical projection. Hypnosis and telepathy were simply externalizations of her own desires. Her anger against the teachers was a representation of pathological resistance against these desires. If she could have regarded her sexuality as something normal, legitimate and healthy, what appeared as delusions would have been numerous love affairs.

IDENTIFICATION

Identification is an unconscious moulding of a person's ego after the fashion of one who has been taken as a model. Like to be, not like to have.

Often the term introjection is used. This is the reverse of projection. In projection the individual narrows his ego to such a degree that processes actually belonging to the ego are perceived as of an external origin; in introjection, the ego is widened so as to enable it to include within it what really belongs to other persons and objects. It must be admitted that the difference between identification and introjection is a subtle one and both terms are used interchangeably.

There are two forms of identification, primary and secondary. Primary identification shows itself when a child wishes to be like his parent, e.g., a boy like his father, to grow up like him and to take his place in many respects. The primary identification begins already in the oral phase, where it is the earliest expression of an emotional tie with the parents. The formation of the super-ego and the normal solution of the Œdipus complex is largely the result of primary identification. This was explained in detail in Chapters V and VI.

Primary identification is very pronounced in love relationships. In its highest form it reaches a state of an

unconscious sense of oneness. Identification may also be present where there is no emotional tie with the person identified. Primary identification may be carried out even in relation to inanimate things; the reader will find an example of such identification in the chapter on Wassermann, when Christian Wahnschaffe suddenly identified himself with the furniture, with the lamp, etc.

Secondary identification consists in replacing a lost object of love by a substitute object set up within the ego. In other words the unconscious id takes the ego instead of the lost object as an object of love, and in this way tries to make good the loss. Abraham explained the symptoms of melancholia on the basis of secondary identification. Melancholia usually develops after a loss of a love-object to which the attitude has been ambivalent, the love and hate element mingled together. By internalizing or introjecting the lost object, the patient continues his erotic attachment: and at the same time finds an outlet for his hate and torment of the original external object by transferring both elements (love and hate) on to his own self.

In this way, as Ferenczi remarks, the individual makes himself independent of the external object. Instead of external objects the libido and the aggression cathex themselves to the ego.

The following mechanisms, although of importance for the understanding of mental processes, will be only briefly enumerated.

Symbolization, an unconscious process whereby one object comes to represent (symbolize) another object. In symbolization the emotional value is displayed from the real object to the symbol.

Condensation is a mental process which may be

described as a fusion of several ideas, events and pictures into one.

Symbolization and Condensation together with the mechanism of unconscious fantasy, play an important rôle in dream work and are fully discussed in the chapter on dreams.

Conversion is a mechanism which signifies a symbolic expression of repressed wishes by means of physical (bodily) manifestations. It is typical of hysterical symptoms.

Recently, Freud described two peculiar mechanisms, those of isolation and undoing.

Isolation is a process by which the memories of unpleasant impressions or experiences are deprived of their affective element, "so that what remains in consciousness is nothing but an ideational content which is perfectly colourless and is judged to be unimportant."

Undoing is an attempt to abolish a past experience. Undoing is more radical than repression, as its purpose is to wipe out the past. It aims at the total abolition of the painful experience.

CHAPTER IX

CHARACTER FORMATION : CLASSIFICATION OF CHARACTERS, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSONALITY

PSYCHOANALYSIS has been able to show that character traits of individuals are based on the psycho-sexual life in infancy, not denying, at the same time, the importance of constitutional factors and influences of the later environment. The biggest rôle is played by those elements of infantile instinctual life which are excluded from participation in the sexual life of the individual, and undergo, in part, a transformation into certain character traits. The forms of libidinal impulses, their modes of expression, the paths of their development, the injurious factors accompanying them—such as, for example, fixations, regressions—all these factors are of paramount importance to the adult. What we call character is, to a greater and more important degree, a result of childhood life. As Jones puts it: "Wishes and interests of latter acquirement are chiefly significant in so far as they ally themselves with those of childhood life." He goes so far as to say: "The main traits of character are permanently determined for good or ill before the end of the fifth year of life."

The stages of the psycho-sexual development are the oral, anal and phallic (genital). Accordingly, one can distinguish three series of character traits: oral, anal and genital. As a general principle, we can accept the transformation of the libido into character features in

the following way: Those parts of the oral or anal libidinal components which do not pass on to establish mature genital forms, may produce, on the one hand, a neurotic predisposition, or a future perversion, or, on the other hand, they may become absorbed, by transformation, into personality characteristics. This transformation is brought about by the various mental mechanisms already discussed, of which the most important are: reaction formation, identification, sublimation and symbolization (see Chapter VIII).

One must be careful to differentiate between single character traits and abnormal characters. As single elements of character, the oral and anal trends are present in everybody. In some people one or other peculiarity is predominant and lends the individual a specific colouring. The presence of one or other peculiar trait does not, however, make the individual abnormal. It is the loss of proportion which is the main factor. The goal of personality formation seems to be largely a matter of balance, the avoidance of accentuating characteristics. A well balanced man should not be afraid to be obstinate or suggestible, assertive or submissive, active or passive, when the occasion demands it, but he should be able to steer clear between over-obstinacy and over-suggestibility, over-aggressiveness and over-submissiveness. The sense of justice should not manifest itself in excessive punctiliousness over trifles, nor should friendly feelings show themselves in over-kindness. So, too, impulses should be controlled, but not completely disallowed.

ORAL CHARACTER

The oral libido and its division into two stages were explained in Chapter III. Unlike the anal, the oral

eroticism need not be repressed to a high degree. A child is not only permitted, but even encouraged to kiss, and so, in later life, a great part of oral libidinal cathexis finds its legal way out and need not be changed into character formation, or sublimated to the same extent as the anal libido. Therefore, only very unfavourable circumstances produce a pronounced oral type of character. Great varieties exist within the realm of oral character peculiarities, but the most important differences are dependent first of all, on whether a feature of character has developed on the basis of the earlier sucking or the later biting phase; whether, in other words, the character trait is an expression of an unconscious tendency to suck or to bite.

Let us discuss separately each phase. In infancy the individual finds intense pleasure in the act of sucking, the mouth being the first erotogenic zone; this primitive form of pleasure is never completely given up, and persists, under disguise, during life. Given certain conditions of nourishment the sucking period can become a displeasurable one for the child. It may be imperfectly gratified, and the child may be deprived of the full enjoyment; in other cases, it may be the reverse—abnormally rich in pleasure. It is well known how some mothers indulge the craving for pleasure in their infants by granting them every wish, as in the case of an only child.

Whether the child has too little pleasure or too much, the effect on its character may be the same, and this is due to the fact that he has to leave the sucking stage under difficulties. When he passes into the next, biting, stage (masked sadism), he is, in both cases, in a state of anxiety: will the next stage be as good, or as bad, as the last? In both cases, this anxiety may be responsible for a regression to the early oral phase to which it becomes

fixated, and so the child does not reach the normal genital phase. If this takes place, the individual's entire character may be under the oral influence. For example, if children have enjoyed an undisturbed and highly pleasurable sucking phase, when they grow up they will bring with them from this happy period, a deeply rooted conviction that everything will always be well with them. They face life with optimism and achieve their aims. These are the cheerful, active optimists.

But the results of over-indulgence in the sucking phase may be less favourable. The children may remain dominated by a belief that there will and must always be some kind person—representative of a mother, of course—to care for them, and give them everything they need. They are not any longer healthy optimists, for their optimistic belief and demands condemn them to laziness and inactivity. Being over-indulged in the sucking period, their whole attitude to life shows that they expect the mother's breast to flow for them eternally. These people make no kind of a serious effort themselves, and, in extreme cases known to me, they even refuse to undertake a bread-winning occupation. This optimism which, as we have seen, may be beneficial or detrimental, stands in contrast to the pessimism of the anal types. It must be emphasized that the optimism of the oral may be more detrimental than the pessimism of the anal, because, as I said, it may lead to a carefree indifference and inactivity. Others must do everything for them. I have had the painful experience of treating patients of this type. During the course of the analysis such patients produce a series of obstacles. They see no need to do anything for themselves; it is the analyst who is to solve all their problems.

A character trait rooted in the pleasurable sucking

period, influences the entire behaviour of the individual, his choice of profession, his predilections and his hobbies. Think of a neurotic official who can exist only if everything is worked out for him, and for whom the circumstances of life have been planned. He must have a definite salary, and work strictly according to a timetable. He is reluctant to display any initiative.

So much for people whose character traits are influenced by too much oral eroticism in infancy. In psychoanalysis we learn, also, of people who are burdened throughout their lives with the after-effects of an ungratified sucking period. In the social behaviour of these people one finds that they are always asking for something, either in the form of a modest request, or of an aggressive demand; it is difficult to put them off by hard facts, or by reasonable arguments; just as babies they continue to plead and insist. One says of these people that they cling like leeches. They particularly dislike being alone. Another marked characteristic of these under-nourished types is impatience. If you imagine, now, the picture of an impatient, greedy, demanding infant, you will, I hope, visualize the basis of the development of these individuals. If other elements of the oral phase—particularly the biting, the oral sadistic—are admixed, then these people, just as children, become cruel; this cruelty makes them something like vampires—bloodsuckers—to other people.

If a displacement takes place, we meet, at the first glance at least, quite different traits. The longing for sucking has changed, in some, to a need to give by the mouth, so that we find in these people, besides the longing to get, to obtain everything, a constant need to communicate themselves, orally, to other people. This results in obstinate urge to talk, connected, as Abraham says, with a feeling of overflowing. Generally, one must

say that speech is used to express the entire range of instinctual trends, whether friendly or hostile, social or unsocial. In some neurotics the impulse to talk signifies desires to attack, to kill, or to annihilate. Poetic creation, according to Brill, is also an overflow of oral desires.

The biting stage of oral eroticism, the oral sadistic, produces a marked ambivalence in accordance with the ambivalent content of the biting phase, as biting expresses incorporation and destruction at the same time. As a character trait, this ambivalence, consists of double feelings, positive and negative, hostile and friendly tendencies. The character traits developed from the sucking phase, do not show such an ambivalence. It is characteristic of the purely oral types to be generous, for in this way the orally gratified person is identifying himself with the generous mother. Things are very different in the oral-sadistic stage, where envy and hostility make such behaviour impossible. On the one hand there are people who can give very generously, especially if there is some identification with or reminder of the early childhood attachments, such as an old nurse, the town where one was born, or one's country; on the other hand where this old tie is absent, they will show stinginess, greed, envy, hostility to their nearest friends, to their wives or even to their children.

The oral sadistic stage is closely connected with the anal sadistic, and the people fixated on these stages show, therefore, a number of common characteristics. While people gratified in early childhood are bright and sociable, those who are not, are hostile and malicious. Persons with an oral character are accessible to new ideas, while the oral sadistic, and especially the anal sadistic, are stubborn, conservative and opposed to all innovations. The oral types are usually impatient, hasty and reckless. The oral trends, oral fixations, find

their expression in various ways in life, otherwise than in character traits, e.g., in various sucking habits, eating habits, preference for fluids and sweets, interest in dieting. Sucking eroticism may influence the behaviour of an adult in all spheres of life. As Abraham says, "a great many people have to pay a permanent tribute to their oral zone."

ANAL CHARACTER

Freud in his first article on the anal character wrote: "Among those whom one tries to help by means of psychoanalytical treatment, one often meets with a type of character in which certain traits are strongly marked, while, at the same time, one's attention is arrested by the behaviour of these persons in regard to a certain bodily function, and to the organ connected with it during childhood [Freud refers to the act of defecation]. I can no longer say on what precise occasions I first received the impression that a systematic relationship exists between this type of character and the activities of this organ, but I can assure the reader that no theoretical anticipations of mine played any part in its production."

The persons whose character is clearly bound up with anal eroticism, show, according to Freud's original description, a combination of three peculiarities. They are orderly, parsimonious and obstinate. Each of these words really covers a small group, or series, of traits which are related to one another:

Orderliness comprises both pedantic cleanliness and conscientiousness in the performance of petty duties. It is the opposite of untidiness and negligence.

Parsimony may be exaggerated up to the point of avarice.

Obstinacy may amount to defiance, with which vindictiveness may easily be associated.

Of the three, the first is not always present, but the other two are persistent, and are always present in the anal character.

From our discussion of the anal phase of the libido development, we saw that the child has to be taught cleanliness, and the performance of the excretory function at regular times. In other words, the child has to give up corporophilia, (interest in the excretions) and the pleasure of performing the excretory function when he wishes. The child's narcissism undergoes a severe trauma. He makes a virtue out of necessity (fear of loss of love, and desire for praise). Some children do not succeed, and only forced obedience makes them good. In such cases the obedience, politeness and goodness, break down, and instead are shown rebellious attacks, obstinacy and spitefulness. There is always danger in an early and too strict demand for cleanliness, because it kills in the child the desire to do things in its own way. In neurotics one finds this infantile desire expressing itself in a pride in doing everything themselves. As a character trait it shows itself in regarding oneself as a unique person, in pretentiousness and arrogance. These people are sensitive to any encouragement; they can manage everything themselves. Such patients give endless trouble to the analyst. They have their own system and way of doing things. They work out endless regulations in the house. A mother, (a case of Alexander's) a typical anal character, drew up a written programme in which she scheduled her daughter's programme for the day: (1) get up; (2) use the chamber; (3) wash; and so on. The girl had to answer questions as to how far she had advanced with the programme, according to the

number of the items contained therein. Anal types love indexing, registering, summarizing and statistics. Their independence must express itself in the free choice of making a gift. A husband opposed the expenditure proposed by his wife, but gave in to her later of his own free will. These people keep their wives permanently dependent on them financially. Assigning money in portions which they themselves determine is a source of pleasure to them. So, too, I have encountered neurotics who show the same attitude regarding their excretory function. There is also the tendency to distribute food in portions, an example of which is the story of the stingy man who fed his goat by giving it each blade of grass separately. (Abraham).

Similarly, these people make necessary innumerable applications for the payment of accounts.

The positive traits of an anal character are remarkable perseverance, thoroughness, endurance. In others, however, only stubbornness and inaccessibility are manifest. "Whoever gives me something is my friend, whoever demands from me is my enemy." A patient declared he could not have friendly feeling to the analyst. "So long as I have to pay I cannot be friendly."

Envy is a typical character trait of the anal type. As one said in analysis: "I have to visit, produce associations and pay money into the bargain."

Parsimony and avarice, retention of everything, is another characteristic. A banker used to impress on his children that they should retain the contents of the bowels as long as possible in order to get the full benefit of every bit of the expensive food they ate. (Abraham).

Some are parsimonious only in peculiar forms, e.g., the value of what they buy must remain, must not disappear. A neurotic used to buy the scores of the operas, but could not spend money for a ticket. These

people buy jewellery, or houses, but cannot spend money on food or travelling.

Money can be replaced by time, so they are afraid to waste (spend) their time. Hence the Sunday neurosis in such people. They enjoy looking at their own creations. If they happen to be prominent, they collect cuttings from newspapers. They will save small sums and then suddenly spend a big sum. The anal people are as a rule very orderly and clean. Some of them, on the contrary, are dirty, but not untidy.

The pregenital levels of development are important as creating archaic forms of character, but these forms are of a temporary nature. Though they cannot entirely be surmounted or completely obliterated, they are modified when the genital phase is attained. If one reaches the full genital phase, one is able to retain from the previous ones that which is positive and favourable, e.g., enterprise and energy from the oral, endurance and perseverance from the anal, and, from sadistic sources, enough aggressiveness to help the individual in carrying on the struggle for existence, and a certain amount of masochism to be able to endure suffering, which any one of us may encounter at any moment of our lives.

At the same time, the extreme forms are normally eliminated, as anal avarice, and suspiciousness, sadistic hostility and destructiveness.

One need not be a student of psychology to know that human beings vary indefinitely, from the standpoint of their habitual patterns of behaviour, mental activities and attitudes, interests and social connotations, in short, from the point of view of what is called the Individual Personality. For the sake of orientation, however, attempts are constantly made to classify human beings into groups, taking various criteria as the basis of such

a classification. Some students take the physical characteristics, notably the glands of internal secretions, as such a basis; others take the mental characteristics. It is natural that psychoanalysts should regard the libidinal development of the ego and the super-ego tendencies as the cardinal basis of their classification of human beings. The fact must be emphasized, again, that the psychoanalytical classification is an empirical one. As Freud says, one must demand that the libidinal subdivision should not be deduced only from our theoretical knowledge of the libido, but the libidinal types should be found in life. In describing types of personality, the latter must not be confused with distinctly diseased pathological forms. Freud has differentiated three cardinal types: the erotic type, the narcissistic and the obsessional, dominated by the id, the ego and the super-ego respectively.

The erotic type has his main interest in direct gratification of his libido. To such people the main interest in life is love, to love somebody or more especially to be beloved. They are dominated by an anxiety of loss of love, and these people therefore depend very much on others, lest they lose their love. These people show a weak ego and super-ego development, and, from a social and cultural point of view, since they are governed by the id, they are the least reliable. Their sublimations are of little social value.

The second type is the so called "obsessional" type. These people show a strong super-ego development, and a marked tension between the ego and the super-ego. They are dominated by anxiety of internal conscience, instead of the anxiety of loss of love, as in the case of the erotic; they show an internal dependence instead of the external. Every step is guarded by what is right or wrong. They are therefore very independent of others,

recognize only the internal authority, which is of an archaic nature, and, in society, belong to the conservative elements as *kultur-Traeger*. They are law abiding, and oppose any change, because this would mean a destruction of the parental authority.

In the third group, the narcissistic, there is no domination either of the id or of the super-ego, the main interests being directed to the preservation of the self. The ego is invested with a considerable amount of aggression. In their love relationships, they prefer to love rather than to be loved. Such people usually impress as personalities, and are often regarded as examples, as models, and are especially suited to become leaders. Their conscience does not prick them easily and they are not carried away by their desires. They are intuitive, self assured, and have strong control. They want to create authority, and themselves to be the authority.

These three types seldom exist in their pure forms. Usually one finds some combination of the various types, of which the following three are the most interesting:

The combination of the erotic and compulsive produces a person with a strong eroticism, which is inhibited by a strong super-ego. These persons show, simultaneously, a dependence on people round them, and an internal dependence on the impressions of childhood.

The erotic-narcissistic is the commonest type. Here one finds a combination of the opposites; love and self-love, but the second usually predominates.

Finally, the narcissistic-compulsive type represents the most valuable combination from the social and cultural standpoint, as, in addition to the external independence, there is domination of the conscience.

One may expect, theoretically, a fourth combination

of all the three types: erotic-narcissistic-compulsive; in other words, a human being who is able to love and to be loved, has strong personality and is independent i.e., strong ego development (narcissism), and finally possesses a strong sense of morality, i.e., is guided, in his activity, by a conscience. Such a combination would represent the ideal harmony.

This would no longer be a living type, but an ideal of perfect normality. In normal life, the id, ego and super-ego never achieve an absolute harmony and equal strength; one of the three usually suffers at the expense of the others.

A normal average personality necessarily shows the predominance of one or other of these elements, but without extreme suppression of the other elements. There is, to a certain degree, an harmonious working of the three elements. The original urges are not inhibited unhealthily, but rather domesticated in the service of the individual and society. Nor does the super-ego create too many obstacles to block the urges; its influence in the normal personality is confined to insistence upon unpermissible urges being transformed into socially valuable activities, in the form of sublimations. The normal personality is able to secure an equilibrium between the id desires and tendencies and reality. These reactions begin in the period of infantile sexuality, and form a continuous series of adaptation. There should not be many fixations in the normal individual. When, in the development of the instinctual life, there are too many fixations and regressions, constant ambivalence is produced. The fixations also prevent a healthy development and adaptation to life.

An inhibited personality is a product of an over-strenuous, over-moral super-ego, which creates an unliberated, shy type of personality. The inhibitions

express themselves in minor disturbances of common activities in the sexual, nutritional, locomotor and occupational spheres. In its pathological diseased forms the inhibition assumes the various forms of melancholia and depressive states, states of inertia and inactivity, although the potential capabilities do not suffer. The disturbances of the inhibited personality manifest themselves in the lack of pleasure in sex activity, loss of appetite, disinclination for walking, sport, feeling of weakness, poor execution of work and easy fatigue. Inhibitions manifest themselves in a withdrawal of the ego from difficult or dangerous situations, as I have mentioned before. From this point of view, the inhibitions are used for the defence, just as are the various mental mechanisms. The ego unconsciously renounces, and submits to restrictions in order to obviate the necessity of fighting or creating new defences. Freud suggests that an inhibition may also be used as a means of self-punishment. This frequently occurs in connexion with professional activities, where a certain clumsiness of performance, or lack of satisfaction in something which has previously been highly pleasurable may develop. In this way the individual satisfies the need for punishment and avoids an internal conflict.

Brill publishes an interesting example of the development of an inhibition in an adult woman, which served the same purpose as the development of a neurotic symptom, namely, in withdrawing the ego from a danger situation. A woman who had always enjoyed letter-writing suddenly found herself greatly disinclined to carry out her correspondence. She found that she had to make a very great effort before she could bring herself to write a letter. This was due to the fact that she had received one particular letter which necessitated an equivocal reply. She was undecided as to

what to say, so she did not answer the letter at all, and the decision was unconsciously transferred to other letters, bringing about an inhibition to letter-writing in general. According to Jones, inhibitions of interest may serve to explain cases of what appears to be intellectual incapacity.

The aversion for, or the inability to comprehend, some particular study in the school, while the child is good in others, may simply be due to some symbolical association with a primary unconscious idea, and the child, for that reason, avoids the activity which may bring him into conflict with his super-ego. The difference between one geometrical figure and another, between the spelling of one word and another, and still more, in such gross matters as the difference between the preference for one language and another, may strike different roots in the unconscious, and dictate all sorts of preferences and distastes. "A so-called general inhibition of thought frequently occurs in adults who, as children, were exposed to a parental attitude which demanded suppression of all doubt and curiosity in connexion with sexual and religious matters." (Jones).

Abraham traces many of the inhibited reactions of women to the castration complex in the Œdipus phase. The sexual inhibitions arise even when the woman, consciously, is willing to assume the female rôle, because of the unconscious desire to take revenge on the man by arousing his expectations, and then disappointing him. This may extend itself to a more general personality characteristic in other branches of life, namely to "excite expectations of a pleasant nature in their environment, and then not to fulfil them." Abraham draws attention to the fact that many women only achieve a normal sexual life after they have had a child. The castration wound has been healed in the

compensatory way desired in childhood, the gift of a child.

To sum up, one may say that the inhibited personality fails in life because it is incapable, for unconscious reasons, of striving for any form of achievement. It has all the potentialities, but the owner unfortunately cannot make use of them. Unlike the individual who actually suffers from a neurosis, the inhibited personality does not manifest any symptoms, and does not appear in any way abnormal. He appears, on the whole, as inactive, lazy, unlucky, and devoid of ambitions and desires.

The *neurotic* character still belongs to the normal types and is the opposite of the inhibited. Such people are most active and energetic, with the most ambitious aims in life; their initiative, their energy, seems to be inexhaustible. But, in the end result, they achieve nothing. They seem to break down at the last moment. They seem to arrange their affairs in such a way that they fail just when success is in sight. While the inhibited scarcely attempt to make a single step in achieving their aims, the neurotic appears only too eager in this direction. They have in common the absence of definite symptoms, such as we find in hysterical people, patients suffering from compulsion neuroses, or phobias, in other words, definitely diseased people. The neurotic characters (who should be distinguished from neurotic patients, or those who suffer from a neurotic illness) are people whose fate appears to be tragic; something unfavourable always happens to them. Alexander defines them as individuals who suffer from no definite symptoms of illness, but whose behaviour in life is in the highest degree impulsive and frequently even compulsive; a repetition compulsion of continuous failure dominates their whole life in every sphere of

activity. On analysis it is found that their seemingly irrational and senseless behaviour is due to unconscious conflicts.

As an illustration, I will quote, briefly, the following case of Alexander's. As a boy, the patient had stealing tendencies, he stole money from his father's pockets; he stole pens, pencils and money from two schoolmates, whom he both envied and liked. He stole only from his father and these two friends, whom he considered to be cleverer than he. He had many narrow escapes; peculiarly enough, in most cases, he seemed to have been deliberately careless as if in order to be found out. His father died when he was young and his death produced a remorseful reaction and a desire to atone to the father for all that he had done against him. As an adult, he displayed certain characteristics and trends which were rooted in the father relationship. He was extremely devoted to his employers, worked with intense energy and sacrificed his own interests for theirs. He was over-conscientious and exceptionally honest in business (reaction formation). He was keen to detect any dishonesty in others. He was constantly lending money to his friends, never to be paid back by them; he was always defrauded and exploited by his friends. He had a sense of guilt over every acquisition of money, which he therefore managed to lose as quickly as he made it. The analyst was able to trace all this behaviour to a castration complex of childhood, which stood as the central point in the whole character-formation. As a result of the treatment the man's personality showed a complete change, and there were also external changes in his expression, his manner and his handwriting and, above all, his sense of guilt altered conspicuously.

Here is another example from Alexander. A man

showed a remarkable attitude to married life on the one hand, and to his profession and business on the other. He showed in marriage a feminine, infantile passivity and in his business an extremely manly aggressiveness. A very hard man in business, always independent and wanting to take the lead, he, at the same time displayed exceptional sentimentality, admiration of Nature's beauties, love stories, and cinema shows, which he often left with his eyes full of tears. In a dream he described himself as a colossal motor-car with an enormous horse power, but having the body of a light French cart, of the rococo style. He oscillated continuously between these two poles. He aimed at gratification of his feminine passive desires without injuring his manly ideals. The strong business man played the rôle of a child at home. His wife had to treat him as a child. But, remarkably enough, he only desired this treatment if he had been on the same day successful in business. Like the balance of a scale, one had to compensate the other. The relationship to his wife was a manifestation of a strong passive homosexuality. It happened, finally, that he failed once in business. He met a man who was stronger than he. When he met a stronger business man, his unconscious, passive homosexuality at home became unbearable to him.

The passive rôle in his marriage satisfied him no longer, so he looked for another woman with whom he could play the cave man. The wife remained the object of the passive homosexuality, the other woman became the object of his active masculinity, and so he tried again to maintain the balance. But he failed, and developed an actual neurosis. The splitting of his personality could be traced right back into childhood. He remembered that he had still taken milk from the bottle at the age of four. At the same time he already tried to be an

independent boy; he used to travel on a bicycle on a lonely road by himself. The oral fixation found its expression in adult life in his relationship to his wife, while his independence and early ambitions found their expression in his business.

Another case of Alexander's is also very typical. A man became an excellent surgeon without being a qualified doctor. He got a position as an assistant in a university clinic. He operated continuously and with great success and wrote scientific papers. He was found out in a very peculiar way. He was caught stealing books and parts of microscopes, things which he could easily have obtained in an honest way. The sense of guilt and craving for punishment must have been very strong. He was caught stealing the books, but the police did not want to proceed with the case. Then he himself confessed to stealing parts of a microscope. On the one hand, highest success, fooling the world; on the other self-destruction. This is so typical of a neurotic character.

The definitely abnormal, pathological types of personality, such as the insane, the neurotic, the criminal and the pervert will be fully discussed in a later volume. At present I will confine myself to a brief classification of human beings from a psychoanalytical point of view. It must be understood that any division of men into categories is arbitrary. Nobody just fits into a pigeon-hole devised for him by the psychoanalyst.

With these reservations, human beings may approximately be divided into the following groups:

1. The "normal" people. A normal personality is a relative conception, and is not synonymous with an ideal personality. The term normal is applied to an average individual, who manages to establish harmoni-

ous working of the reality and pleasure principles, a harmony between the id, ego and super-ego. He is able to cope with his instinct so as to avoid excessive fixations and regressions. He is able to cathex (attach) his libido to external objects (alloplastic object choice), he does not indulge in autoplasic (infantile narcissistic) modes of sexual gratification, and finally, he is able to sublimate a certain portion of his sexual and aggressive instincts, and in this way avoids abnormal forms of gratification. Normal people are in short, those who are able to live and love and enjoy both love and life.

2. Neurotic people are those who suffer from neurotic symptoms, e.g., in the form of hysterical attacks, obsessions with ritual ceremonies, phobias, etc. The essential characteristics of neurotics are :

(a) An autoplasic, narcissistic mode of instinct gratification ;

(b) A substitutive gratification of their instincts and impulses (which are not accepted by their ego) in the form of symptoms ;

(c) The whole process is unconscious and the patients themselves do not understand the latent meaning of their sufferings and symptoms.

3. The neurotic characters. Those are people who are not ill, but nevertheless show definite neurotic trends in their character. In contradistinction to true neurotics, who squander their energy in futile inactivity, the neurotic characters live an active and eventful life. But there is an inner self condemnation of one part of the personality by another, and a craving for self-punishment which nullifies the results of their activity.

4. The psychotic people, the insane, are those in whom there is a regression of instinctual forms of gratification to the infantile level with an autoplasic mode of gratification, and a failing of the controlling

influence of the ego. There is a disintegration of the normal functioning of the three elements of the person, id, ego and super-ego. In other words, the insane has regressed to an infantile level, and his ego accepts and permits undisguised forms of expression and gratification of impulses. The normal apparatus of the ego the testing of things (real or not real), disgust, shame, etc., are absent. The reality principle ceases to function, the insane, as we say, turn away from reality.

As the instincts may regress in insanity to the lowest level, they find their expression in such primitive and archaic forms that they are totally incomprehensible to normal people.

5. The criminals constitute the fifth group. In them there is also a regression of their instincts to a lower level, predominantly to the stages of extreme sadism. The sexual instincts are desexualized; instead of practising sadism in its sexual form, the criminals convert it in to assault, murder. The aggressive destructive impulses manifest themselves in their pure forms, not mingled with the sexual instincts. The super-ego of the criminal is weak, and the ego does not interfere with the modes of gratification of his aggressive instincts.

The mode of gratification is alloplastic (external object-choice) as in normal people.

6. Finally, there are people who suffer from sexual perversions. In perverts there is also a regression of their sexual instincts, but without desexualization of them as is the case in criminals. Their ego accepts the infantile components of the sexual instincts in their pure unsublimated unchanged sexual forms, e.g., in form of masochism, sadism, voyerism, fetishism, homosexuality, etc. The mode of pleasure in the perverts is alloplastic and they may be also in other respects perfectly normal people.

PART II

THE APPLICATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TO THE STUDY OF LITERATURE

CHAPTER X

JACOB WASSERMANN; "THE WORLD'S ILLUSION;"
"THE MAURITZIUS CASE;" "ETZEL ANDERGAST"

IT is generally agreed that a work of art is a symbolical expression of the artist's feelings. Just as the ordinary man expresses his unconscious tendencies, desires and conflicts in fantasies and dreams, or in abnormal cases in the form of neurotic symptoms, so the artist's most wonderful imaginative work is based on these self-same fantasies springing from his unconscious self. In contrast to the ordinary mortal, whose fantasies remain shapeless and without form, "the artist is capable of transforming his personal feelings and strivings into a work of art by weaving them into an elaborate and skilfully arranged pattern." The artist is able to give expression to his unconscious life through the medium of artistic form, through words, colour or melody. Every artist records his own inner self in his creations, however impersonal his work may appear to us. Psychological determinism governs the life of the artist in the same degree as it dominates the life of the ordinary person, and the unconscious life of the artist is the determining factor which influences his ideas, his themes and his forms of expression. This is the reason why every artist has his own particular ideas, special themes and characteristic artistic forms of expression. The main features of the artist's personality is revealed in his earliest works. I venture to state that the works of a

really great artist, whether in the domain of literature, painting or music, are all merely an elaboration of a few themes which owe their origin to the unconscious urge for an expression of the internal conflicts. These conflicts as we know are rooted deeply in the life of the individual, in most cases dating from his earliest childhood. I was recently impressed by the study of the Concerto by Chopin which he wrote at the age of eighteen. One need not be a student of music to find that all his works are but an elaboration of the melodies and themes of this Concerto. Whoever studies the paintings of Gauguin with a knowledge of the history of his life, cannot fail to see the same theme, the same faces in all his paintings. I have been struck by the fact that the faces of the women he painted are all a copy of his mother's portrait. In nearly every dramatic work of Ibsen, from "Brand" and "Ghosts" to "The Enemy of the People" we find a symbolic elaboration of loneliness, of "strength in standing alone," because Ibsen himself was a narcissistic personality in its extreme form.

Every art expresses its period because it represents the unconscious motives and structure of the age. I do not agree with those critics who express fears that the present machine age will destroy art. Even if one condemns the present culture, (which I do not, though I see causes for discontent) these fears are unjustified. Art cannot be destroyed any more than can be destroyed the mental life of the individual, his instincts, his loves, his affections, his fears and struggles, his strivings and conflicts and more particularly his unconscious life. As long as there remains a spark of psychic life in human beings, the gifted ones will continue to express it in forms of art. Unconscious sufferings will always serve as an impulse and urge for self-expression in symbolic forms.

Every great writer, composer or painter has his own style, for it is a symbolic expression of the artist's very nature. The erotic personality, the one governed by the id, will create forms of expression different from those of the compulsive man dominated by his super-ego. Brill draws an interesting analogy between oral tendencies (overflow of oral desires) and poetic creation. Even in music, the most abstract of arts, we find this exemplified. "Mozart's optimistic loving nature shines forth in his simple tripping music; while listening to the works of Beethoven or Brahms one cannot help realizing that they come from intense brooding and that their Symphonies and Sonatas are a representation in symbolic form of deeply buried mental conflicts." Whoever is acquainted with Russian literary classics cannot fail to appreciate the Mozart-like style of the greatest Russian poet, Pushkin, a typical erotic personality, and in contrast to his, the heavy arhythmical, irregular and distressingly diffuse literary methods of Dostoieffsky, a typical anal and compulsive character. Compare Stravinsky and Rachmaninoff, Matisse and van Gogh. I could multiply these examples without end.

To sum up, one can say that art is psychologically the projection of the artist's unconscious in the form of imagery. This imagery is derived ultimately from the unconscious, of which it is a symbolic expression. A psychoanalytical study of works of art consists in finding and interpreting the deep unconscious complexes that reveal themselves in the artist's work without the artist himself being aware of them. And it is for this reason that the biography of the author is of less value to the psychoanalyst than a novel by the same writer. Similarly, a logically constructed story is less valuable during an analysis than a fantasy or a dream of the patient. In the analytical study of literature one applies the same

methods of exploration of the unconscious as in ordinary symptom and character analysis, and one uses the same principles of interpretation. It goes without saying that other aspects of literary analysis, e.g., the ethical, philosophical, æsthetic, are not ignored or denied by the psychoanalyst. I say this on account of the common accusation levelled against us, that we are blind to everything but psychoanalysis and Freud.

I will begin with the analysis of the works of Wassermann, who, in my opinion, is one of the greatest living writers. His novels contain an inexhaustible supply of material for psychological study and probably in this respect surpass everything that has been written since Dostoeffsky. It would obviously be impossible to do justice to all the psychological problems raised in the numerous novels of Wassermann in the course of one or even several chapters. There is enough material for years of study. I have therefore chosen one particular problem, a problem which is found in the three characters, Christian Wahnschaffe, Etzel Andergast and Dr. Kerkhoven.

The treatment of the subject will be from one particular angle, namely the Œdipus complex and the unconscious sense of guilt which, as we have learned, is the kernel of life and character formation. We have discussed in full the origin and the complications of the unconscious sense of guilt. It will suffice to remind you, that the unconscious sense of guilt is a function of the super-ego, and is actually a tension between the ego and the super-ego, and that the fantastic aggressiveness against the father, which, as a result of the ambivalent attitude, developed in the second half of the Œdipus situation, is the main source of the sense of guilt. "It can scarcely be a coincidence that such masterpieces of literature as the *Œdipus Rex* of Sophocles, *Hamlet*, and

"The Brothers Karamasov" should all deal with the same subject of a father's murder. In all three the motive for the crime, sexual rivalry for the woman, is laid bare." In all cases there is a masterly presentation of the eternal triangular situation based on the universal incestuous desires. The most straightforward is Sophocles's drama built on the Greek legend. The presentation of parricide in Hamlet and the Karamasovs is more indirect. I have already fully discussed the *Œdipus* drama; Hamlet and the Karamasovs are on our programme. I will, therefore, proceed with the analysis of the father-son conflict as represented in "The World's Illusion," and follow it up very briefly with the presentation of the same conflict in "The Mauritzius Case" and "Etzel Andergast."

In "The World's Illusion," Wassermann does not dwell directly on a father-murder, but the whole attitude of Christian to his parents reveals a series of conflicts. Christian's ideology of self-abnegation and suffering was determined by an unconscious sense of guilt. His deliberate destruction of the World's Illusion was an expression of self-punishment, a seeking for self-destruction rooted in the internal *Œdipus*. It was also a destruction of the father, not a direct physical destruction, as in the case of *Œdipus* or the Karamasovs, but an indirect annihilation of the father by severing every relationship with the world of wealth and happiness which symbolized his parents and, particularly, his father. It was an internal symbolic destruction. In "The Mauritzius Case," Etzel is already consciously at open war with his father; later in life he fights his master, Dr. Kerkhoven.

Christian is not only the hero of the novel, but also the central figure whose life and character represent the essential ethical and psychological problems of the

book. All the other figures, however interesting they may be in themselves, are of importance only as circling round Christian, in so far as they help us in the understanding of his actions and the gradual changes which take place in his whole personality. In this respect Wassermann's novels remind us of Dostoieffsky with whom generally he has so much in common. Like Dostoieffsky, Wassermann is not at all interested in the realism of his heroes. Karen Engelschall is just as unreal as Sonia Marmeladova: Eva Sorel is as unreal as Aglaia and Nastasia Philipovna. It is the psychological truth at which both are aiming. It would, therefore, be a mistake to study the heroes of Wassermann and Dostoieffsky from the standpoint of their being true to life. Alioscha Karamasov, Count Mishkin and Christian Wahnschaffe are certainly unreal. Such people who possess, in a concentrated form, all the virtues that nature can give do not exist, but Christian's conflicts, his internal struggles, and his seemingly unmotivated actions are real and exist in that form, or other forms, in everybody.

Christian is enormously wealthy, charming, young and attractive. "Nature has used in him her choicest material meant for permanence and delight, and a master has fitted the parts into harmony. If one were mean-spirited, one could burst with envy." He was only twenty-three, and yet possessed of a charm so exquisite that no man or woman could withstand him. The author does not spare any colours in painting the portrait of his hero, Christian. He was worshipped by everybody, except by his younger brother, for reasons which we can quite understand. His mother lived only for him. She adored him; he was the only person in her life. (A typical wish fulfilment of Wassermann's, who idealized his mother, whom he had lost when still very

young.) Frau Wahnschaffe made a divine cult of her son, and tried to keep him far from everything that was turbid, distorted and tainted with pain. She had even a marble copy of a plaster cast of Christian's hand on her desk. Frau Wahnschaffe had no other life, and those of you who know the influence of the mother on the psycho-sexual development of the boy will realize to what degree Christian was injured, while still a child by the abnormal love of his mother. It can be deduced from psychoanalytical experience that there must have been created in Christian an abnormal incestuous fixation to his mother, a fixation from which he could never free himself as an adult. He did not dissolve the normal Œdipus by an identification with his father and did not reach the phase of a free heterosexual object choice. The attachment of Christian to his mother was strong. In the difficult moments of his life he knew that his mother was faithful to him and would understand him, and, indeed, although unable to grasp the full meaning of Christian's action, she intuitively understood him, when on his visit for the pearls, he spoke about his mission in life. The scene of the pearls is a masterpiece of poetic treatment and psychological understanding. The pearls of Frau Wahnschaffe were the most beautiful and the most precious in the world. When she wore them she looked like an Indian goddess. The pearls meant everything to her and she herself tells us the reasons for this. "These pearls, Christian, have meant more to me than such things usually do to a woman. Your father gave them to me when you were born. I always wore them in a spirit of thankfulness to God for the gift of you. I am not ashamed to confess that. They seemed, I thought, to form a circle within which you and I alone had being. Did you really think I could deny you anything, no matter what it was? You are

to know this, and, indeed, you must have known that or you would not have come."

The pearls remained to Christian a symbol of the highest treasure. He expressed his love to Eva in the form of the precious stone Ignifer, which obviously symbolized his mother's treasure.

While on this same visit to his mother, Christian is able, for the first time, to throw light on and explain the meaning of his life since he left home. "It is not easy to explain the life one lives or the events whose necessity is rooted uncertainly in the past. If I search my own past, I cannot tell you where these things had their beginning, nor when nor how. . . . I cannot tell you exactly in what this great wrong consists. . . . But it exists, and it meets you in every turn. . . . One must drive to the very bottom of life to find the root and origin of the great wrong. . . . That wrong does not consist in the mere contrast between rich and poor. No, look! We have all grown up with the view that crime meets its expiation, guilt its punishment, that every human being bears its reward within itself, and that a justice rules which compensates, orders and avenges, if not before our eyes, then in some higher region. But that is not true." A remarkable description of the sense of guilt, the origin of which is not known, and which is therefore unbearable, and throughout life requires expiation. The question of the expiation of guilt has dominated Wassermann himself, and he tells us this quite frankly in his autobiographical sketch, "Mein Weg als Deutscher und Jude." The same problem is apparent in all his novels. The main canvas of "The Mauritzius Case" is a miscarriage of justice. Dr. Kerkhoven, a character from "Etsel Andergast," is a man "who cannot possess the angels, he must render unto the devil what belongs to the devil. . . . Such

was the man, with his sense of original sin, that he was obliged to pay for every happiness, or rather atone for it. He dared not trust his own heart and was always afraid of laughter, expecting no favours from fate, but bending tremblingly before it."

From the first acquaintance with Christian we feel this guilty conscience of his. He could not stand the memory of the past, whether pleasant or not. He could not see pain and suffering. Even in his childhood he had to refuse to pass places where ragged people were to be seen, and if told of misery or needs among men he left the room full of aversion for the speaker. This is not ordinary gentleness or goodness of character, but a typical reaction formation, an over-compensation of the reversed impulses in childhood. "How beautiful is fire!" This oft-repeated ecstatic exclamation of Christian's illustrates definitely his unconscious destructive wishes. In his autobiographical novel "Engelhardt Ratgeber," written in 1908, Wassermann tells us of his love for fire. He remembers from earliest childhood that he wished that the whole city might be burnt down, although at the same time he did not want to be disturbed from the pleasure of emptying a jar of jam in the pantry. He himself once arranged a miniature fire so as to be able to see the red flames coming through the windows of his playhouse.

Christian was dominated by a feeling of disgust at the sight of poverty, but there was no evidence of any impulse to help the sufferer. Once in the street a crippled beggar caught hold of his coat. He returned home and presented the coat to his valet. This act of giving away things has symbolical significance. It explains why he destroyed his wealth. He had to give away and renounce all he possessed because something disgusting and repulsive was attached to it, something

which he could not define, did not know, because it was connected with the unconscious sense of guilt. Even in his love relationship to women the same exaggerated feeling of fear of something disgusting and horrible paralysed him, made him turn away from the object of his love with an extreme aversion. Remember the love scene with Letitia when he grew pale and turned away from her when he suddenly became aware of a toad creeping along her white frock. Such reactions commonly occur in a man who suffers from an internal inhibition. In the tragic scene with Eva he deliberately destroyed his love, overcome with disgust at the sight of her naked feet . . . feet of the most famous dancer. There was, however, already a change in him. The disgust for ugly things had broken down. Christian suddenly developed a feeling of reverence and admiration for the lonely and poverty-stricken things, and at this moment the feet of the woman he loved, those rarest and most precious things on earth, suddenly seemed ugly and repulsive. At that moment he understood the sorrows of life.

He understood the feverish transformation of an evil conscience that had caused him to identify himself with the jug, the window, boot, rope and lamp. This symbolic projection of psychic qualities on inanimate nature is the source of the primitive and infantile animistic belief. As Ferenczi, the famous psychoanalyst, says: "Thus arise those intimate connexions between the human body and the objective world, remaining throughout life, which we call symbolic." Through his identification with the inanimate world, Christian understood for the first time "those thousands and thousands on the shore of the Thames, and their sombre silence. He understood the shipman's daughter, whose violated body had lain in coarse linen. He

understood Adda Castille and the will to destruction. He understood Jean Cadillac's melancholy seeking for help. He understood Dietrich, the deaf and dumb lad who drowned himself, and Becker's words concerning his dripping coat, and Lethar's horror at the intertwined bodies of the Hungarian men and maids. He understood the stony grief of the fishermen's wives, and the opera singer who had twenty francs in his pocket. These images of suffering suddenly became clear to him, and destroyed the possibility of his achieving the ideal happiness."

A classical description, a masterful presentation of self-destruction and self-punishment, for unconscious reasons. The sudden feelings of pity for inanimate things is of a purely psychological origin. The argument that he could not be happy because he had seen so much unhappiness round him, was a simple and pure rationalization. The misery in the outside world should not have interfered with him when he was with Eva. The truth is that it was not the sufferings of others which prevented him from being happy. They were only an unconscious justification for self-punishment. The truth is that Christian dared not achieve happiness, the screen memories of sufferings came then to destroy his happiness, like the episode with the toad in Letitia's case. If one is really free and gives oneself the right to happiness, everything is discarded which interferes at that moment. But Christian was not free in his relations with women on account of the mother fixation. The sense of doing something shameful, forbidden and disgusting, comes through in all his relations with women: to his mother, Letitia, Eva, Johanna, Karen Engelschall and finally Ruth. If you remember the abnormal solution of the *Œdipus* and its influence on the choice of the object love, you will understand,

easily, the symbolic significance of the sudden impulse of Christian to save a fallen woman, or the idealization of the virgin Ruth, who did not yet belong to anybody, and therefore was the only one who could save him and whom he could really love. The craving to save the mother from the father is prominent in Wassermann himself. In "Etzel Andergast" he comes out with this theme quite frankly. The whole fight of Etzel against his father aims at the return of the mother. A remarkable and frank fantastic representation of a wish fulfillment.

But let us not lose sight of the main theme of our discussions. From the moment of his parting with Eva, Christian started an extremely masochistic life of self-torture and destruction. It began with self-mockery at Eva's party when at her command, in the presence of her future lover, the Russian duke, he attempted clumsily to recite a poem. He continued this self-torture by his association with Amadeus Voss, the sadistic, stubborn, revengeful character, who, as Christian remarked, could not expiate the lust of his eye. (In the person of Amadeus Voss, Wassermann, as far as I can judge from his biography, portrayed a friend who had a destructive influence on him).

Christian followed Eva in her travels seemingly with the one aim of finding out that Eidolon, as he was called by her, meant a spirit to whom one sacrifices and whom one has to destroy. This self-destruction and the rebirth of a new man are brought to a logical end by Wassermann fifteen years later in the novel "Etzel Andergast," when Dr. Kerkhoven becomes a new man, the man who crossed the chalk line and helped Irlen to die. The parallelism between Irlen, the old Christian, and Dr. Kerkhoven, the new Christian, will become clearer still if we bear in mind that Christian left

Germany and went away into the unknown; that Irlen had just come home after years of travelling in Africa, and that further, Christian started medical studies and Kerkhoven was the eminent physician.

Christian's life became an orgy of suffering, and self-sacrifice. Sacrifices which, unfortunately, did not result in anything positive, or in anything which would create happiness in the people round him. He saved nobody, except the family of the workman who fought the old Wahnschaffe. This, by itself, is a very symbolic act on Christian's part—a fight against his father.

It seems that death followed Christian's every step. Even in his boyhood, on his visit to the lumbermen in the forest, he indirectly caused the death of the foreman who ran to save him. In a motor accident the young Meerholtz was killed, and Christian, who had been driving recklessly, remained unhurt. The Englishman, Denis, was drowned before his eyes, the circus girl killed herself on being deserted by him. He could not save Karen Engelschall because he himself felt that it was not money which was required in this case, but he himself. This was beautifully symbolized by Wassermann in Karen's sudden craving for his mother's pearls. Johanna who gave up everything for Christian, was crushed by his friend Voss indirectly again through Christian's fault. Eva perished in Russia in an ugly and terrible death. Christian's wealth, all his money, his charm and goodness, his sympathy, were of no value to the world. In this respect, he reminds one of Count Mishkin in Dostoieffsky's "Idiot." Mishkin was the personification of divine goodness, but was unable to fight the evil of the world. The "Christman," as he was called by Dostoieffsky, could not prevent any crime. Neither could Christian. (Neither, by the way, could Irlen in "Etsel Andergast," who, in his dying hour,

wanted to prevent the biggest crime, the last war). It is certainly obvious that the choice of the name Christian was not accidental, any more than was the fact that Johanna and Ruth were Jewesses. In this connexion, it is of interest to recall two details from the life of Wassermann which are described by him in the "Mein Weg als Deutscher und Jude," already referred to.

"After the death of Mother, we had," he says, "a nurse who loved me. In the evenings she used to tell us fairy tales. I remember that once, seeing me deeply absorbed by her story, she took me in her arms and said: 'You can become a good Christian, you have a Christian heart. . . .'" That Wassermann should remember it at the age of fifty, is, in my opinion, a fact which cannot easily be discarded.

In 1898, at the age of twenty-five, Wassermann was entangled in a relationship with a woman. The affair lasted four years, was of a purely sexual nature, and was regarded by him as shameful and destructive. He was in despair when his friends deserted him, and there seemed to be no solution for him. Then a young girl came into his life, a seventeen-year-old Russian Jewess, who, like a loving Madonna, was the first to bring him happiness. "Only through her art," he says, "to live, smile, to understand, a silent, deep and real understanding, she helped me to conquer. She was a working girl in a tobacco factory and extremely poor, but could have become a young princess. As quickly as we found ourselves, we lost each other and I have never seen her again." It is clear that Christian is Wassermann and Ruth is this young Russian Jewess.

Ruth suffered greatly, but her sufferings did not break her. She was free, and was able to do good in this world. She seemed to have possessed in full measure the *courtesia*—to give what is mine and to

appear only to take what is yours; *courtesia* for which Eva was looking in this world, but did not possess herself.

"One should be a spendthrift of oneself, give oneself without stint or measure," Ruth says to Christian. Life was so wonderful to her, so deeply moving, so rich and full of power in spite of all her sufferings, because she was internally free. She was to Christian, and to all people, a radiant light, a permanent source of help. She was the only one who transfused power into Christian's veins. Remember the remarkable scene at Joachim Heinzen's house, when the people suddenly felt Christian's power of healing. The vague idea or desire to study medicine, to help people became a reality after his meeting with Ruth. Christian learned how to protect Ruth, but actually Ruth saved Christian. While still alive she gave him to himself, and through her death he was reborn.

Ruth is dead. Christian's life, his mind, is shattered by the terrible news. That "no, never, nevermore," has driven him about without another thought; that "no, never, nevermore," was the mysterious meaning of the landscape vision. The old world disappeared. The open door showed a cavernous blackness, but through the black wall there were faint glints of the twilight. Christian was not crushed. A sudden fountain of energy emanates from hidden forces. When Michael comes home after the terrible experience of witnessing the murder of his beloved sister, he immediately finds in Christian a protector. Christian presses the boy to his breast, as though he would open his heart to him, as a shelter, and the boy clings to him with all his might.

People began to feel that they could come to Christian for help. The unfortunate doctor, Voltolini, tells him his sad story and asks permission to come again, but

Christian has to refuse, because he is confronted with a difficult task in finding the man who murdered Ruth. We know that he was not guided in his search by motives of justice. He gives his reasons for the feverish search in the following words: "What is the world without Ruth? For Ruth was the kernel and soul of life, of all things. To fathom what happened to Ruth, one must subordinate every other feeling and occupation. All delight, all pain, all plans—even eating and sleeping and seeing." One cannot but accept these conscious motives and feelings of Christian, but they should not prevent us from searching for deeper motives. These motives are a liberation from a sense of guilt.

Wassermann gradually develops this central idea of the book. Christian cannot yet see his own sense of guilt, but is already able to perceive it in Michael. Michael talks to Christian about his sister. "It is frightful to tell. Brother and sister, it sounds so innocent. But each of the two has a body and a soul. The soul is clean, but the body is unclean. Sister, she is sacred. But that is a woman too that one sees. And woman is terror . . . because woman is the body and the body is fear." . . . And then he had a dream, not once but twenty times, always alike. He dreamt that a fire broke out, and that Ruth and he had to flee quite naked down the stairs and out of the house. Ruth had to drag him, so terrible was his shame. It seemed to him that he soiled Ruth in his mind, and that he must cleanse that defilement. He was guilty before her and he must be liberated from that guilt. "It was a fatal delusion in which you were caught," Christian attempts to console Michael . . . "Guilty," Christian repeats to himself, and his face expressed a doubt. Michael answers for him: "Guilty or not, if I feel a sense of guilt who can redeem me from it? One can only do it oneself." "It

is a delusion," Christian continues to protest. In vain he feels that the boy is right. . . . We know why. It is not the deed which is important; to the super-ego an intention is as a deed. Christian helped poor Michael to free himself from the sense of guilt by giving him a chance of confessing the tormenting thought. Just as Ruth wanted to do the same for Christian by asking him in a classical psychoanalytical way: "Do not search your mind," said Ruth to Christian. "Tell what happens to come to your mind, just start, the first word is the hardest." But Christian could not come to the root of his conflicts by an ordinary catharsis, ordinary confession. He was searching for a criminal worse than he was, for a monstrous crime which he had to have the opportunity to forgive, and, in this way, be forgiven. This is the motive for pressing Niels Heinrich, the murderer, for confession. He demands a full and detailed description of the crime, so as to convince himself of its brutality and monstrosity. "I need you," he continued to implore the murderer . . . "I cannot explain it, I cannot possibly explain it. . . . I do not regard myself as a representative of public authority. . . . I neither want to ensnare you, nor to get the better of you. . . . Punishment? What does that mean? And is it my office or within my power to drag you to punishment? It does not even become me to say to you, you are guilty. I do not know whether you are guilty. I know," Christian says for the first time, "that guilt exists. But whether you are guilty, that I cannot say. . . . No one dares to be a judge." And these words Christian says to a man who has destroyed a being so precious, so irreplaceable, that centuries, perhaps many centuries, will pass before one can arise comparable to it or like it.

At that moment one need not possess psychoanalyti-

cal knowledge to see that Christian dare not accept crime and punishment, nay, he will have to be punished himself. Ruth might have helped him to expiate his unconscious sense of guilt, but she was gone, and he demands from the murderer something in return. The scene in which two guilty people forgive each other is such a masterpiece of psychological understanding that I cannot restrain myself from describing it in full. Niels thinks that Christian needs the pearls. He throws them on the floor. Christian collects them one by one. He picks them up singly, sliding on his knees over the filth of the floor. What a wonderful symbolization of a human being finding himself again in endless masses of dirt. And while Christian was busy with "the little exercise" Niels had given him, the murderer understood at last what Christian wanted. A trembling hand moved to meet Christian's hand. The hand had no warmth. It was the hand of the deed, the hand of the crime, the hand of guilt. But when Christian touched it for the first time, it began to live and grow warm; a glow streamed into it . . . the glow of the mirror, which did not reflect the old images any more. A glow of insight and renewal. . . . And they knelt before one another. The murderer was saved and free. And Christian, Wassermann says, was likewise free. Christian expiated his own guilt by pardoning the man who had murdered Ruth. Freed from the burden of an intolerable sense of guilt, he rested for the first time. His conscious free, he slept for three and thirty hours.

Wassermann does not tell us what crime Christian has committed, nor have we any right to suspect any such criminal deed. The author, however, feels that he owes us an explanation, however clear the motives are from the whole construction of the book, and he gives us this explanation in the words of Christian to his

father. The mere fact that old Wahnschaffe arrives at Christian's lodgings after the scene with Niels is, in itself, symptomatic. The son could face the father, and for the first time talk to him openly and sincerely, only after being pardoned for his unconscious crime. In a gentle and clear voice, Christian tells his father about the origin of his sense of guilt. "You wanted to fetter me through my inheritance. I could not be your heir. All whom I knew lived in delight and all lived in guilt; yet, though there was so much guilt, no one was guilty. There was in fact, a fundamental mistake in the whole structure of life. I said to myself the guilt that arises from what men do is small and scarcely comparable to the guilt that arises from what they fail to do. Those who are guilty through failure in action and are always secure, and have ready and reasonable excuse, they are the true criminals. All the evil comes from them."

Christian freed himself from his father. He never loved him, but hatred is just as binding as love. He was no longer of his father's world. The fact that Christian achieved this freedom, not after he renounced all he had taken from his father, but only after he received an absolution from the guilt, confirms the psychoanalytical principle of the origin of the original sense of guilt in the *Œdipus complex*, and in the father-son conflict.

"Father and son must begin anew, it seems to me as equals. . . . Every mature consciousness is worthy of respect. You do not truly see me; the father no longer sees the son. The world of the sons must arise up against the world of the fathers, if any change is to be brought about." And the father for the first time understood the son.

But for Wassermann himself this fight has not been settled. He returns to it again even in a more direct

form in "The Mauritzius Case" and in his last novel "Etzel Andergast." I cannot follow up in detail the development and the peculiarities of the father-son conflict in these two masterpieces. Permit me briefly to outline the main feature of it.

Etzel had a lonely childhood; his parents were divorced; he had not seen his mother since he was nine years old. (Is it merely a coincidence that Wassermann lost his mother at the same age?) He did not know whether he loved his father or not. He admired him and feared him. Typical ambivalence (hatred and admiration which normally should be solved in the latency period by identification with the father) was displayed. His upbringing was exemplary and based on strict order and discipline, induced by the dominating and sadistic father. The boy knew what was due to his father. But all the while he was filled with a great secret longing for his unknown mother, a dark, sweet feeling in an awakened mind. The father, by perjury, forces the mother to accept divorce on the most humiliating terms. The image of the mother gradually fades from her son's memory. Only a dark yearning persists in him and in some strange way this yearning becomes mingled with the news of the murdered Mauritzius, "as though from that quarter also innocence had sent out her ghostly messages." Herr von Andergast actually laid the foundation of his successful career in the service of the State by his draconic conduct in that case. Christian, as we have seen, could not fight his father, because he felt he was in the wrong. Old Wahnschaffe did not exist in the life of Christian's mother. But Etzel is free from this guilt. Trismegisto, as he called his father, has robbed him of his mother. Wassermann's own father, by the way, committed in the eyes of the son a similar crime, by remarrying; the

step-mother killed in the young boy the revered image of the dead mother.

Etzel succeeds and fails at the same time. He proves Mauritzius's innocence. The sentence can be annulled. He stands before his father, his whole being aflame with zeal. But Etzel's effort and proofs are no longer relevant. Mauritzius has been pardoned. When Etzel hears these words "the sense of life has turned to nonsense." "Fetch my mother." She comes. At first he clings convulsively to her. But this soon passes. He becomes dead to her and the whole world. Etzel lost. The whole fight with the father was a rescue of the mother. But he failed. He got her back, but could not accept her. The father has betrayed him again. Etzel goes into the wide world. Like Christian, he severs all relationship with his old world. He goes to the underworld, where by the way, Wassermann himself spent several years. Etzel passed a night with his father's mistress immediately after Trismegisto's death. . . . An unconscious proof on the part of Wassermann of the truth of the psychoanalytical concept of the mother-rescue complex, i.e., the unconscious desire to take away the mother from the father. A remarkable illustration, indeed, of an abnormal Oedipus solution, and of its influence on the choice of object love.

Etzel can only love women who belong to someone else, just as the mother belonged to the father. The relationship of Etzel to Dr. Kerkhoven's wife was of the same nature. Dr. Kerkhoven was to Etzel a typical father image; he even called him *Master*. The sudden change which took place in Marie's relation to her husband, Dr. Kerkhoven, coincided with the first appearance of Etzel in the doctor's consulting-room. Dr. Kerkhoven, himself, went through the same phase by taking Marie away from her first husband, Bergman.

In Dr. Kerkhoven the mother fixation was as strong as in Etzel, or even in Christian, or, in other words, in Wassermann himself. The life story of Dr. Kerkhoven is again only a reflection of Wassermann's own life, including even such details as the father's factory, and the incident with Domanek and the scarlet fever.

Kerkhoven was aware of his own attachment to his mother. The mother, he told Irlen, had a decisive influence over his boyhood. Joseph was the apple of her eye, and in him she saw her dreams fulfilled. "At this point Kerkhoven stopped and stared gloomily in front of him. Irlen knew at once of what he was thinking; he guessed it from the hints Kerkhoven had dropped regarding Nina and his married life. At this point Irlen realized, more deeply than ever before, the uncanny repetitions that occur sometimes in a single human life, repetitions of experiences that are essentially the same, and that evidently have their origin in character. Neither of the two men could even guess how tragically consistent this repetition would be in its final development." Nina finished her last days in the asylum, and repeated in this way, indirectly through Kerkhoven's fault, the fate of his mother. Both had the same delusion about Kerkhoven; a repetition compulsion which is so well-known to us.

Wassermann's latest novel is indeed a treasure of psychoanalytical illustrations. Remember, for example, the way Marie explains to her husband the accident as an unconscious wish not to have a child. The dreams told by the strange visitors to Nell Marschall's quarters. But the most striking is the central idea of the novel, which is only another form, another elaboration of the problems raised in "The World's Illusion;" of the fight against the father.

Etzel loves Marie. They are lovers. But he cannot take her away.

"But deeper still lay perhaps the horror of *incest conjured up by this modification of her position*, although in the deepest grounds of his soul the attitude was a real one, though only vaguely guessed.

"All that Marie gave him, all that she was to him, was too little. The dream he lived, boundless as it was in its fulfilment, was a mere nothing to the dream whose fulfilment he desired. With unyielding demands he stood before her, before his fate, before his life, and stretched out open hands for more, for the immense, the impossible."

Etzel breaks Dr. Kerkhoven, the father image. "But Etzel cannot move. He is compelled to watch while the Master sinks to the floor. To see him lay his head on a chair and cry. The Master cries. The Master cries like a wounded animal. The man is broken. The man lies there like a shattered oak. That mighty, wonderful man. The teacher, the friend, the helper, the leader, the man of knowledge and insight, the compassionate, the giver of light. Lies there like an animal, like a child, and cries with his face on a chair. He sees the soles of his shoes, he sees his socks under his updrawn trousers. A cold shudder runs over Etzel Andergast. A shudder as cold as his heart has been. He is cold in his bones, cold in the entrails of his belly. Go, man. Do not show yourself again. Into a hole with you, man. Never lift your eyes to heaven again, man. Heaven, there is nothing in it. Earth, it is empty. Into a hole with you and your stunted mind. Go, man go."

Then only he returns to his mother. "That afternoon it began to snow, and it snowed without cessation for five days. A snowfall on these heights is very different from one in the plains. It is as though thick, heavy white

muslin curtains were sinking down, intensifying the silence of nature to such an extent that the air begins to seethe, and at night one feels that the bell-like covering with which the snow has enveloped the house is beginning to ring. I am at the heart of the world, thought Etzel. I am in my mother's house, he thought. And the word Mother had the mysterious tone of the white bell. The house was a grave in the snow. He had died and been buried in that grave with an outworn reality; with a new reality he would be resurrected from it."

About this I am sure we shall hear in Wassermann's next novel.

CHAPTER XI

I. "HAMLET"*

SHAKESPEARE'S plays have long been the object of psychoanalytical studies. This is not surprising, if we consider that his plays contain psychological material sufficient to illustrate the whole of Freudian psychoanalysis.

"To read Freud on the subject of the unconscious introjection, in its relation to mourning and melancholia alongside with *Hamlet*, is to be impressed again with the majesty of human achievement. Science and art here fit exactly, as though they were completely wedded." (Sharpe).

The problem presented by the tragedy of *Hamlet* is of a great psychological interest. The central mystery in it is Hamlet's character. The chemistry of criticism, as Verity says, has evolved no Hamlet formula. The cause of Hamlet's hesitancy in seeking to obtain revenge for his father's murder has well been called the Sphinx of Literature. It has given rise to a regiment of hypotheses, none of them satisfactory. Three main points of view have been put forward in the most important theories of Hamlet's incapacity to revenge the father's murder.

Some see Hamlet's difficulties in his temperament. Hamlet was, by nature, not fitted for effective action of any kind. These views were elaborated first by Goethe,

[*N.B. This chapter on *Hamlet* is based on Ernest Jones's masterly analysis of this character.

Mackenzie, and Schlegel, who have explained Hamlet's indecisiveness by his over-sensitiveness, reflective deliberation, and lack of decision. Some even speak of a melancholic disposition, of excessive introspection and of too much thinking.

There are several objections to this so called "subjective" view of Hamlet's hesitancy. It is true that too much introspection may lead to inaction. But introspection is itself a neurotic symptom and not an inherent quality. Too much thinking and hesitating are only the external expression of an internal psychic conflict, as one sees it in the every-day life of neurotics. Every student of psychology knows that any weakening in energy is, invariably, due to other causes than intellectual doubt—namely to buried intra-psychical conflicts, to internal inhibitions. Introspection has never proved harmful. It is introspection associated with the sense of failure which is painful.

More convincing evidence against the subjective hypothesis of Hamlet's hesitancy may be found in Hamlet's actions. Hamlet the procrastinator does much, far more than anyone else. He kills Polonius and Claudius; he traps Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern. These are strong actions which witness, as a whole, to Hamlet's extraordinary alertness of mind. These acts are regarded by students of Hamlet as impulsive actions, and they do not, in their opinion, make Hamlet into a man of action. But this is hardly the case. The arranging for the death of Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern, can hardly be regarded as impulsive. It was a deliberate murder. "His biting scorn and mockery towards his enemies, and even towards Ophelia, his lack of remorse after the death of Polonius, and his attitude towards his mother, are hardly signs of a gentle, weak and impulsive man." His mind is resolute and

decisive. When he breaks with Ophelia he shows no hesitation, nor when he stabs the listener behind the curtain. He is not hesitating when he makes the violent onslaught on the pirates, or when he follows his father's spirit. Not once is there any failure of courage, except only in the matter of revenge. As Bradley says: "I venture to affirm that Hamlet was a man, who at any *other* time and in any *other* circumstances than those presented, would have been perfectly equal to the task."

Hamlet does not give the impression of a man who feels himself unequal to the task, but rather that of a man who for some reason fails absolutely in the performance of his plain duty. The impression one gains is that Hamlet is not a gentle soul, crushed beneath a colossal task, as Goethe thought, but rather that he is a strong man tortured by some mysterious inhibition.

Some critics see the causes of Hamlet's failure in the external circumstances, which were so stupendous as to have deterred anyone, however determined. Hamlet could not simply have slain his uncle, the nation would have been against him.

But Shakespeare gives us no indication of such rationalizing on Hamlet's part. Hamlet never doubted that he was the legitimately appointed instrument of punishment, and was never worried about securing evidence of the crime. Besides, the scenes with the ghost discard any possibility of doubt in Hamlet's mind.

The opinion has often been expressed that the play-scene is a proof of Hamlet's doubts of his uncle's guilt. But this is not the case. The play was staged by Hamlet for the purpose of punishing the culprits and not for obtaining evidence.

Compare the difference in the behaviour of Laertes and Hamlet in similar situations. Storfer, the well known Viennese psychoanalyst, sees in this dif-

ference the unconscious motives of both sons, who both avenge a father's murder. Laertes has no inhibitions in his irresistible demand for revenge. Indeed, the whole of the Laertes episode seems almost to have been deliberately woven into the drama, so as to show the world how a son really deals with a father's murder . . . and how just and possible was the vengeance of such a crime.

One cannot escape from the conclusion that Hamlet was by nature capable of action, and that the task was a possible one and was regarded as such by Hamlet. Why, then, does Hamlet not execute it?

It does not lie, we have seen, in his temperament, or even in his ethical and religious views, nor in insurmountable external circumstances.

It was first Freud, and later Jones, who indicated that Hamlet, at heart, does not want to carry out the task. This seems so obvious, Jones says, that it is hard to see how an open-minded reader of the play could avoid coming to such a conclusion. Even in 1839, Ulrici said that Hamlet gravely doubted the moral legitimacy of revenge. Figgis and others elaborated at length their theories of the task being repugnant to Hamlet. Hamlet himself does not give any indication that his task is repugnant to him. On the contrary, he seems always to be quite clear about what he ought to do. The conflict in his mind ranged around the question of why he could not bring himself to do it. There is an aversion and repugnance towards the deed, which cannot be explained by those who are accustomed to think only in terms of consciousness. Hamlet's hesitation is due on the one hand, to an internal conflict between the impulse to fulfil his filial duty, and on the other of some special cause for repugnance towards it. But he himself is not conscious of this special cause of his

repugnance. If we consider the possibility of such an explanation, we shall easily understand why Hamlet's character and hesitancy remained a riddle full of complexity and mystery.

Hamlet is obviously suffering from a conflict the essential nature of which is inaccessible to his introspection. Throughout the play we have the picture of a man who sees his duty before him, but who shirks it at every opportunity and suffers in consequence the most intense remorse. Hamlet, as Jones has diagnosed it, suffers from a specific form of aboulia, a medical term for loss or deficiency of will power. In Hamlet's case it is localized to the one question of killing his uncle. Instances of such specific, localized aboulias in real life, when analysed invariably prove to be due to an unconscious repulsion towards the specific act, which cannot be performed. In other respects also Hamlet behaved like a patient suffering from aboulia. Time and again Hamlet works himself up, points out to himself his obvious duty, which is immediately followed by self reproaches and remorse, and he once more falls into inaction. In the same way as a neurotic, he takes every opportunity to occupy himself with any matter other than the performance of his task. This serves as a pretext for procrastination and self-torture. It is significant that Hamlet invents grounds for his hesitancy which are *de facto* only rationalizations to avoid the repugnant mission. One moment he is too cowardly to perform the deed, then he questions the truthfulness of the ghost, or he thinks the time is unsuited. When a man gives, at different times, different reasons for his conduct, we are safe in concluding that he is unconsciously concealing the true motive. To students of psychoanalysis it must be obvious that this motive, this repressed inhibitory force against the desired act of

revenge, has arisen somewhere in the unconscious mind of Hamlet.

Claudius had murdered Hamlet's father and was guilty of incest with Hamlet's mother. His mother's guilty conduct awakes in him the intensest horror. Before he even knew that his father had been murdered, he was in deepest depression, in a state of hysterical melancholia, a state which is usually caused by severe repression, or, more correctly, whenever there is a danger of the return of the repressed. A hysteromelancholic condition which may develop whenever the current event reveals the operative activity of the repressed.

For some deep-seated reason Hamlet is plunged into anguish and hysteria at the thought of his father being replaced in his mother's affection by someone else. We know from the *Œdipus* situation that a boy does not easily endure the necessity of sharing his love for the mother with his own father. If the death of the father is followed by a second marriage, there is always a revival of the *Œdipus* conflict. A son can hardly share his love with another man, a stranger, if he had originally found difficulty in doing so with his own father. Laforgue has shown such an attitude to the new-comer in a most excellent way in the analysis of Baudelaire, whose life was a continuous fight against the step-father. A second marriage, as a rule, reactivates in the children the forgotten *Œdipus* conflict, the details of which I need not repeat again. As a child Hamlet had gone through the normal affection for his mother, who, by the way, was of a markedly sensual nature and passionately fond of her son. "The Queen, his mother, lives almost by his looks," Claudius says to Laertes.

Hamlet seems to have been unable to wean himself

from his mother until he reached the normal, genital, heterosexual phase. He has fallen in love with Ophelia, but the whole attitude to Ophelia does not impress one as being true love. One has the impression that his attraction to Ophelia has some indirect connexion with his mother. Jones rightly concludes that Hamlet's attitude to Ophelia after she has betrayed him is what he was trying to convey, unconsciously, to his mother, that he can dispense with her favours, and even prefer those of a woman whom he no longer loves. Both women have betrayed him: the mother with his father and uncle, the beloved under the influence of her father. Remember the play scene when Hamlet replies to his mother's request to sit by her with the words: "No, good mother, here's metal more attractive," and proceeds to lie at Ophelia's feet. One gets the general impression that Hamlet, despite the horror of his mother's crime, even still has consciously tender feelings for her. When he reveals himself to his mother (at the end of the third act) his language, his whole attitude are surprisingly mild, at times even loving and full of pity.

We can safely accept that Hamlet never ceased to love his mother. Now came the father's death, and the mother's second marriage. The event endangered the successfully repressed sexual desires for his mother. The long repressed, perhaps successfully repressed, desire to take the father's place in his mother's affection, is stimulated to unconscious activity by the sight of someone usurping this place, exactly as he himself had longed to do. The fact that the new lover was an uncle, the father's brother, made the conflict more acute: the actual incestuous usurpation resembled the imaginary infantile incestuous desires. Without being aware of the fact, Hamlet is thrown into the depths of the old *Œdipus*

conflict. All his mental forces are used for this repression, and this expenditure of energy throws him into a deplorable hysterical state of melancholia and inertia.

Then the gruesome discovery follows that the father was actually murdered by the new-comer. Hamlet's second infantile wish to do away with his father has been realized by his uncle. Thus the uncle has committed two crimes which for many years had existed in Hamlet's unconscious fantasy, and been closely associated. I have repeatedly emphasized the fact that it is dangerous if reality fulfils forbidden desires. And this was the tragic fate of Hamlet. The repressed ideas in a moment forced their way to conscious recognition in spite of all repressing forces, and found spontaneous expression in his hysterical cry: "O my prophetic soul, my uncle." From this moment Hamlet is stunned by the effect of the re-awakened internal conflict which from now on never ceases, and the essential nature of which Hamlet never penetrates. The theme of madness feigned by Hamlet is symptomatic. Psychoanalytical experience teaches us that madness is frequently a mode of dealing with the danger of the return of the repressed. He develops an aversion towards women, or rather an intense sexual aversion which manifests itself in Hamlet's relation to Ophelia, who is unconsciously identified with his mother. From psychoanalytical experience, we can conclude that the intensity of Hamlet's repulsion towards women in general and Ophelia in particular, is a measure of the powerful repressions to which his sexual feelings are being subjected by the revival of the Œdipus situation. Hamlet's almost physical disgust for the sexual is but a reaction formation against repressed infantile desires.

Hamlet's attitude to his father remains obscure. The idealized love he shows after his father's tragic death is

certainly no measure of the real affection for his father during life. Symons sees certain trends of hostility towards his father in Hamlet's flippant and disrespectful allusion to his father's ghost as "Truepenny," "this fellow in the cellarage," "old mole." These words contrast strangely with the lofty expressions of filial devotion and admiration which he uses elsewhere. Hamlet's references to Polonius as a rat, an old mole, suggested to some psychoanalysts an unconscious identification of Polonius with Hamlet's father. He is, so to say, in Hamlet's unconscious the image of the "bad" father, that side of a father whom everybody hates, or despises for his spying and all seeing. This may be the real reason why Hamlet killed him, strangely enough in the mother's bedroom. A suggestion offers itself that Hamlet is able to kill Polonius because the latter represented that part of his father which he alone hated. Polonius's interference with Hamlet's love for Ophelia confirms this suggestion.

In other words, the original father, as so often happens in the fantasy of the child, is split into two fathers, one good the other bad, corresponding with the division in the son's feelings. In Hamlet's unconscious, Polonius was identified with the tyrant aspect of Cæsar, the Cæsar who had to be killed by a revolutionary. Those who accept the basic mechanism of psychological determinism will understand the curious identification of Polonius with Cæsar: Polonius, when asked what part he had played answered: "I did enact Julius Cæsar. I was killed in the Capitol; Brutus killed me." In this respect may I remind you of the generally negative attitude of Shakespeare to Cæsar, and the idealization of Brutus?

Hamlet's attitude towards his "uncle"-*"father"* is complicated. It is not an ordinary hatred; it is a

jealous detestation, as Jones says, of one evil-doer for his successful fellow. Hamlet cannot denounce Claudius for the simple reason that it would mean self-denunciation; for the more vigorously he denounces his uncle, the more he has to condemn himself. His uncle, by fulfilling his, Hamlet's, own unconscious wishes, incorporates the deepest and most buried and forbidden part of his own personality. Hamlet actually introjected that part of Claudius. He cannot therefore kill his uncle without killing himself (secondary identification). Hamlet doubly identifies himself with Claudius: he is his father who again robbed him of his mother, and at the same time he is a part of Hamlet himself, the rascal and the villain, whom he might have become. Hamlet's moral fate is therefore bound up with his uncle's, for good and for evil. And, indeed, only when he has himself made the final sacrifice and brought himself to the door of death is he free to fulfil his duty, to avenge his father. Both Hamlet and his other guilty self—Claudius—perish simultaneously.

Hamlet feels that he is prompted to his revenge "by Heaven and Hell." Two opposing moral forces, which he cannot obey simultaneously. The uncle is the mother's husband, but the father was also the mother's husband. The unconscious wish of the phallic phase to take the father's place, the absolute repression of this former impulse, involves the inner prohibition of the removal of the present husband. Thus we see that the internal conflict of which Hamlet is the victim, consists in a struggle of the repressed mental processes to become conscious. This cannot be permitted. The conscious morality, which is very strong in Hamlet, makes these inner conflicts still more complicated. Hamlet belongs to the type which, according to Freud's classification, could be called compulsive and obses-

sional. These are people in whom the super-ego, the unconscious morality, is very strongly developed. His over-sensitiveness, his doubt, which is absolutely genuine, his seeking for proofs, is typical of an obsessional neurotic, who is always susceptible to what may be right or wrong, what he should or should not do, and who is therefore always hesitating. The unconscious super-ego, which is the agent of the sense of guilt, has in the extreme forms of its development a paralysing and destructive effect on the individual. The call of duty automatically arouses to activity the unconscious processes, so necessitating their even stronger repression. To save himself Hamlet ignores the real situation.

Turning away from reality is one of the means of avoiding the return of the repressed. One sees it very clearly in the insane. Hamlet's feigned madness was, indeed, on the border-line of psychotic behaviour. The fear of the return of the repressed paralyses action at its very inception, and there is thus produced the picture of an apparently causeless inhibition, which only a psychoanalytical study is able to explain. A similar inhibition was operating in Hamlet, an inhibition which was not only inexplicable to Hamlet but also to Shakespeare and to the readers of the play. The paralysis of action does not arise from cowardice, inherent qualities of character or weak will, but from a natural reluctance to see old conflicts revived. It is thus a defence mechanism in the service of the pleasure principle, which seeks avoidance of pain. A defence against a guilty conscience, which Hamlet shares with the rest of humanity, and of which he was only dimly aware himself: "Thus conscience doth make cowards of us all."

The attitude of Hamlet to the performance of his duty shows another characteristic which has hitherto escaped notice. The tragedy of Hamlet is not only the

tragedy of procrastination, but also that of impatience. This seems paradoxical in the case of Hamlet, "for the play is a long drawn out delay in doing a deed for which the stage has been set from the beginning." Yet blind, impetuous action betrays Hamlet. Hamlet was considered, by all critics to be an impulsive man.

But, psychologically, even impatience and hesitancy are not contradictory to each other, in Hamlet's case especially. When anyone acts under the continuous and heavy burden of duty which he dare not perform, he will show impatience and restlessness, and be impulsive in any other act but the one which is avoided. Neurotics of this type are constantly on the go, continuously busy with everything else but the real task. This rests primarily on the conflict between the ego and the super-ego tendencies.

An attempt will be made now to analyse Hamlet's tragedy from this angle of psychoanalytical research. Hamlet suffers, as elucidated earlier, from a state of melancholia. He is in a state of natural mourning resulting from the loss of his father, followed by the loss of his mother and Ophelia. Mourning needs the factor of time. Melancholia needs longer still. But Hamlet could not tolerate this waiting time. His withdrawal from reality is not real insanity. In melancholia, after a loss of a loved object, there is always an unconscious identification with this object. By identifying oneself with the lost object of one's love, one avoids the pains of the unbearable loss and pangs of conscience. But, at the same time, one is in danger of treating oneself as the lost object identified with the ego. The ego thus becomes the object of revenge or destruction, and peace will only come when the introjection is killed. This, unfortunately, may coincide with the killing of the self. The mental process which leads the melan-

cholic to self-destruction, to suicide, is of this very nature. As shown already, Hamlet could not kill Claudius because his uncle was, at the same time, his father image, and with both of them, Hamlet had identified himself, unconsciously, in relation to his mother. He cannot fulfil the act dictated by conscious and what appears to be a just punishment, for it must lead to self-punishment. Punishment falls at last on Hamlet. He recognizes his guilt, and voices it as being the desert of every man. "Use every man after his desert, and who will escape whipping?" At this moment Hamlet disentangles himself from the introduced object and kills Claudius.

The same motive of self-destruction and, in miniature, the same problem is encountered in Ophelia. In Ophelia there is no artistic splitting as is found in Hamlet. Her father is killed; she goes mad; she drowns herself. There is a clear withdrawal from the outer world after the father's death, the incorporation of the lost object, the reproaches against the self, and the swift Nemesis brought about by self-destruction. The theme of madness, which is only indicated in Hamlet, is worked out completely in Ophelia.

I cannot possibly deal with all the problems presented in *Hamlet*. Think of the wonderful symbolization in the scene of the churchyard, the relation of Horatio to Hamlet, of the Polonius, Laertes and Ophelia group, compared with Hamlet, Claudius and Gertrude.

I cannot, however, conclude without referring to the creator of Hamlet's tragedy, to Shakespeare himself. It is generally agreed that Hamlet's conflict is an echo of a similar one in Shakespeare. To quote again, from Verity's introduction to the Cambridge edition of *Hamlet*: "I think, too, that a strong reason why, for many readers, *Hamlet* means so much, is the feeling that

here we get near to Shakespeare himself: that the tragedy contains a measure of self-revelation. I confess that the theory of impersonality, of the creator's absolute self detachment from what he creates, is beyond my comprehension, nor can I sympathize with the view that even if Shakespeare did project himself into his plays, we have no means at all of determining when he did so. To me," Verity continues, "his plays are documents which tell us a good deal about Shakespeare, the general complexion of his sympathies, his prevailing mood at different periods of his career, his outlook on life."

Brandes says that with such piercing vision has Shakespeare searched the depths of his own, and at the same time, of all human nature, and so boldly and surely depicted the outward semblance of what he saw, that centuries later men of every country, and of every race, have their own being moulded like wax in his hand, and have seen themselves in his poetry as in a mirror. For instance Bradley, in his Oxford lecture on Poetry, writes: "Hamlet is the most fascinating character, and the most inexhaustible in all imaginative literature. What else could he be but the world's greatest poet, who was able to give almost the reality of nature to creations totally unlike himself, put his own soul straight into his creation, and, when he wrote Hamlet's speeches, wrote down his own heart?" Figgi calls *Hamlet* Shakespeare's completest declaration of himself. It does not interest us, and it is much beside the point, to inquire into Shakespeare's conscious intention in the play, as it is with most works of genius. The play is the form in which his deepest unconscious feelings find their spontaneous expression, without Shakespeare himself being able to state the essential nature, or the source of those feelings.

A few facts from Shakespeare's life may be of interest in this connexion. He wrote *Hamlet* soon after the death of his father (1601). The name of his only son, who died in 1596, was Hamlet. Frank Harris expressed the view that Shakespeare wrote *Hamlet* as a reaction against his deep disappointment at being betrayed by his friend Herbert, who took away from him Mary Fitton.

Appropriate estimates disclose the curious facts, first pointed out by Craik, that Shakespeare made more frequent allusion to Cæsar than to any other man of all past time. I have mentioned already the significance of this factor in connexion with Shakespeare's own *Œdipus*. It has been acknowledged that the noble characters of Hamlet and Brutus have a great deal in common. The interplay of the conflicts in Hamlet's mind is really a reflection of Shakespeare's own conflicts. The whole drama of *Hamlet* is a projection of the author's conflict. It becomes clear only if one reads the tragedy as a creation of Shakespeare's mind. One must, therefore, for a deeper understanding, think in terms of the author and not in terms of Hamlet. For Shakespeare dramatized in *Hamlet* his own regression after his father's death. According to Harris he lost Mary Fitton at the same time. In externalizing the introjected objects in a dramatic form, he delivered himself from something in his soul. He freed himself, through a sublimation, of the necessity of solving the conflicts in Hamlet's way. Shakespeare is not Hamlet as we know him from the play. Hamlet is what Shakespeare might have been if he had not written the play. The fantastic creation is a sublimated solution of the internal conflict. Not only Hamlet, but also the other characters, are symbols and introjections thrown out from Shakespeare's mind. By writing the play, Shakespeare symbolically satisfied the demands of his super-ego and the

impulses of the id. Hamlet, if he had existed in reality, would have had to repeat the fate of Hamlet in the play, who killed people round him and then killed himself. Shakespeare escaped it by writing the play.

II. "MARY GLEN"

Psychoanalysis regards art as the psychological projection of the artist's unconscious in the form of imagery. A psychoanalytical study of literature consequently aims at finding the deeper, unconscious motives of the author's creative works. The question has often been raised as to whether knowledge of the intimate life of the author is required for an analytical study of his work. Such knowledge is certainly very valuable, because it may verify the correctness of the psychoanalytical deductions, and because it gives an opportunity for effecting a synthesis between the life and character of the author and his art.

The analytical study of literature can accordingly be carried out in two ways: a synthetic approach and an ordinary analytical interpretation. The synthetic method is the ideal method of study, but, unfortunately, cannot be applied to works of contemporary writers, whose life is usually little known and cannot be discussed in its intimate details. In our series, the synthetic method has been applied to the analysis of Dostoeffsky, and partly of Shakespeare and Wassermann. In this section the method involving only the analysis of speculations will be used as to the character of the author, whose personal life is not known to me.

"Mary Glen" by S. G. Millin, although a comparatively short novel, contains a number of interesting psychological problems. I will however restrict myself to two problems which are of interest from a psycho-

analytical standpoint: the inferiority complex and the meaning of sacrifice. Both problems are represented in the life and character of Mary Glen.

Let me remind you of the essence and origin of the inferiority complex. In the phallic phase of the sexual development, the child turns his interests to his genital organs and shows marked incestuous desires. The early genital practices are usually discovered and prohibited by the parents. The fear of punishment and the fear of loss of love lead the child to a desire to give up his phallic practices. They lead to the first sexual inhibition, to the first thwarting of the sexual desire. This frustration, if excessive, becomes the kernel of the future inferiority complex.

The feeling of inferiority is the opposite of the positive self feeling, which is one of virility and possession. If an impulse is continuously and excessively inhibited by the fear of the parents, or later the super-ego, the negative self feeling, better known as the inferiority complex, develops. (See *Œdipus Complex*). The inferiority complex, as a rule, is more pronounced in women than in men. The causes of it were discussed in detail in connexion with the *Œdipus complex*. The *Œdipus*, and with it the castration and the inferiority complexes, find in the girl their normal solution through identification with the mother and sublimated love for the father. If this is not attained the girl remains with a marked inferiority feeling throughout life. Such was the tragic fate of Mary Glen.

Mary Glen was an only child and thus started life with a handicap, because, in infancy, the attachment to the parent is stronger in an only child than in children of a large family. For the ambivalent conflict with the parents (see *Œdipus*) is in such cases excessively strong. A strong fixation to a parent is always abnormal, but

more so where there is a later disappointment in them. In the normal solution of the Œdipus, a girl identifies herself with the mother, takes the mother as an ideal and a model of future development. If this normal idealization of the mother during the latency period does not take place, internal conflicts develop in the girl. The conflicts are rooted in the ambivalence, the double relationship to the mother: love and infantile attachment on the one hand, disappointment, hatred and hostility on the other. No child can afford to hate his parents, because it necessarily leads to extreme conflict of ambivalence, sense of guilt and need for punishment. As the super-ego is the mental inheritor of the parental influences, the non-acceptance of parents also leads to a disharmony within the personality. We have seen it in the case of Christian Wahnschaffe and Etzel Andergast. We find the same tragedy in Mary Glen.

Mary shows definite ambivalence to her mother. Although we are asked to believe in the strong emotional love of Mary for her mother, the mere fact that the author continuously emphasizes this point shows that the author herself is not quite sure of this love. Continuous affirmation, just like constant negation, proves the contrary. To quote from the book: "It was not that Mary did not love her mother. She did love her. She treated her with conscientious respect. It was not pre-natal, but post-natal love." An excellent expression of an ambivalent relation. Post-natal love describes the strong anaclytic mother fixation, which the author describes in the following way: ". . . Not because she had brought her into the world. She resented her, indeed, as the vehicle of her being . . . but because she had with all her flesh and soul maintained her . . . because she exulted in her joys, and grieved over her sorrows, and soothed her pains and

encouraged her hopes. . . . Mary loved her mother, not because she wanted to, but because she could not help it." At the same time Mary could not take her mother for granted, some bitterness was mixed with her love. A mild description of the well known hostility and hatred against the mother, which is so well known to us in the first stage of the development of the Œdipus complex.

Mary had no respect for her mother, and therefore could not take her as her ideal, and could not solve the Œdipus by identification with her. Mary respected her mother, and felt at home with her, when the latter revolted against life . . . "When she was gloriously defiant and gloriously angry." This revolt against society, authority, and life in general remained Mary's outstanding characteristic.

Mary loved and respected still less her father. She loved and admired him when she was small, when she considered him very clever and omnipotent. As she grew up, she could not help being disappointed in her father ideal, who turned out to be so "hollow inside that his very voice and laugh seemed to have a cavernous sound, as if they were reverberating with his emptiness." The ambivalent attitude of Mary to her parents, especially to her mother, where love and hostility were equally strong, was the cause of her strong inferiority complex. It was not the only cause, for the thwarting of the sexual instinct certainly must have played its rôle. But the author gives us no information on this point, and we have no right to make any speculations.

Mary had no inward assurance, the author tells us. It was the social inferiority from which Mary suffered mostly. . . . She did not possess calm confidence in her own personality, and was, therefore, susceptible to her

social superiors. It is not as one would think at first, the humble social position of a market master's daughter which was responsible for her inferiority feeling, but the other way round: the primary inferiority was responsible for her abnormal susceptibility to social superiors. Children of the most humble origin do not suffer from social inferiority if they have overcome the primary negative feeling of unworthiness and incompetence.

The various sides of the inferiority complex are excellently represented in Mary: the negative self-feeling, with the sense of failure of a typical masochistic colouring, the fantastic craving for over-compensation with the extreme over-valuation of self that is commonly known as the superiority complex, and, finally, the loss of sense of reality, coupled with a masochistic self-humiliation, and, simultaneously, a sadistic craving for destruction. "Mary despised anyone who did not despise her. Whoever met her on a level footing, was, in her eyes, lowered by the association. . . . On the other hand, she made a practice of being friendly with her obvious superiors. . . . She was always especially charming to them, very kind, very solicitous."

An illusionary way of satisfying the feeling of superiority, and of masking the feeling of inferiority. But the craving for over-compensation of the narcissistic wound found its real avenues in fantasy formations, and day dreams of a typical megalomaniac nature. Not only would the world of Lebanon accept her, but it would come down to her, lie at her feet, and she would then show them the cold shoulder. She had enough reasoning power to understand that this would not happen, but nevertheless her force, care and determination were directed to this one aim. She made one concrete attempt in this direction (the incident with the violinist) which proved abortive. She made another (her

marriage), which proved tragic. Mary hated the world, and then the people round her; she despised them, because she thought they did not appreciate her personality. A typical unconscious projection. In reality, it was Mary who despised herself. It was she who could not look at herself as Mary Adams. Mary's desire to associate with people of standing was necessary to enable her to overcome the feeling of inferiority. It is wrong to conclude that if she had succeeded in finding a way into the society of the magistrate's wife and daughter she would no longer have suffered from the inferiority complex. Psychoanalytical experience shows that people who suffer from inferiority will invent causes for suffering even if the external reality does not provide them with sufficient material in that direction. Besides, no human being is perfect, and there is plenty of scope for self-depreciation in every one of us.

Mary's megalomaniac desires, (she wanted it to be generally recognized that there was no door through which she could not enter if she chose), were prompted by her feeling of inferiority. Mary was a snob, but snobbery is itself a symptom of an unconscious inferiority feeling. A man with self-confidence does not crave to live in the reflected glory of someone else. On the contrary, a really cultured and educated man is not afraid to be in the society of ignoramuses (not that he likes it), but pseudo-cultured, superficially educated people, who are not sure of themselves, are afraid to associate with people of lower standard, lest they be regarded as one of them.

Mary, torn between all these conflicts, lost the sense of reality. The internal struggle absorbed her strength, and depleted her resources. "She was like a country which cannot build itself up from within, because its treasure and blood are abandoned by war." Unfor-

tunately Mary was a predominantly narcissistic type of personality, and this factor augmented the evils of the inferiority complex.

According to Freud's latest classification there are three types of personality. The erotics, who are dominated by the id, give freely, are able to love and be loved; the compulsives, who are dominated by the super-ego, by what is right and wrong, and the narcissistics in whom the ego is the strong and predominant element. The narcissistic people are known in life as egotists; they have a craving for leadership. Mary was, indeed, a strong personality. Her self-love and the ego feeling were excessively developed to the detriment of the id and the super-ego. "Her own qualifications were simply personal. She had nothing to give," says Mrs. Millin. She did not love anybody profoundly, neither her parents, nor her husband, nor Brand, nor Emma. Such people, Freud says, are born to be leaders. "The people Mary could not bear were those who thought themselves her own equals."

Mary's narcissism, coupled with the normal arrogance, and aggression, and the strong sense of inferiority, were responsible for her tragic fate. Her marriage was a bluff. We need not go into the details of her conscious reasons for marrying Elliot, with his English accent and manners, but one need not ignore the unconscious reasons. Elliot was a submissive simple nonentity. Mary's basic feeling for him was contempt. Her marriage, according to psychoanalytical experience, can be explained only as an unconscious gratification of the sadistic and masochistic impulses, a need for destruction and self-torture. One cannot deny that by marrying Elliot, the nonentity, she also gratified her craving for domineering, but this cannot be the only cause for her marriage because she could have achieved

the same by marrying Brand, who was also a passive man.

Anyone suffering from a severe inferiority feeling and all the conflicts arising out of it, is at war with the whole world round him, seemingly with the one unconscious aim of self-torture and self-humiliation. His wounded narcissism cannot stand any normal associations with people round him. He sooner or later stands alone in this world, spending the whole of his psychic energy and abilities in a senseless, and destructive fight. Mary, indeed, stood alone in this world. Even Jackie was not fully hers. He was at last something, Emma thought, which Mary could unreservedly love. But the innermost love of Jackie did not belong to his mother. He was not free with her, nor did he really absorb her fully. Back from London, Mary, after all her misfortunes and disappointments, suffered from social vanity in the same measure as before. Think only of evening-dress ceremony in her mother's boarding-house, and the "gentlemanly" atmosphere, which gradually ruined Mrs. Adams's boarding-house, and the basis of existence of the whole family. In these days Mary grew thinner, and there was a lump in her throat that would not go away. But she went on talking with her new English accent, and laughing her unnatural little laugh, and she held herself, very, very, proudly towards the people of Lebanon.

Two minor incidents are very symptomatic of the attitude of Jackie to his mother. It was Emma to whom he explained the origin of the name given by him to his dog, and Mary was justly jealous of it. When Jackie, anxious to go hunting with his father, was asked by his mother: "And who will take care of Mother?" "Oh, yes," he recalled himself to his duty. But the light on his face died out. It was a less amusing form of man-

liness to guard one's mother than to go hunting with one's father. A reasonable explanation, but one which nevertheless shows that Jackie was already drifting away from his mother. It was a dull life for him to be taught by his mother, and to be anxiously guarded by her. She let Jackie go. It was her old pride, says the author. She did not wish to be placed in the position of a debtor. Hers after all was the toll of sacrifice. A remarkable psychological insight into the essence and meaning of sacrifice, which is one of the most interesting and difficult problems in psychoanalysis.

When a psychoanalyst talks about the meaning of a symptom or phenomenon, he refers to the unconscious purpose which has provoked it. Psychoanalysts regard sacrifice as a neurotic symptom, and seek to disclose the unconscious purpose that it expresses. I cannot go into the problem of sacrifice from an anthropological standpoint and its rôle in the development of religion, nor am I competent to do so. I will confine myself to the purely psychological and clinical aspect of this problem.

Guilt and fear, love and hate, all played their part as motives in the earliest sacrificial rites and remained the genetic elements of every form of sacrifice. The unconscious is a receptacle for all the forgotten and repudiated ideas and desires of our lives, and therefore any given current event has a whole hierarchy of different meanings. All these meanings are symbolically represented in the current event. Thus the same event has many interpretations at different levels. The event is the symbol of repressed tendencies, which are both desired and feared. Sacrifice accordingly symbolizes the unconscious desire for the killing of the superior, God, king and father, and the masochistic, or sadistic expiation, by killing the self. . . . These two acts may be fused into one, so that the victim of sacrifice is at once

a symbol of the ideal, the authority, and the rebellious self. . . . Even the pure act of self-destructive expiation may be a symbolic destruction of the parent. Remember the children's fantasies of killing themselves to punish their parents. . . . Mark Twain described it in the fantasy of Tom Sawyer, when Tom imagined himself dead and everyone was sorry and in despair.

The motives of sacrifice may undergo further distortion in their passage from the unconscious to the conscious, from fantastic desires to actual doing. For that reason one seeks in analysis the hidden meaning of the symbolic act of sacrifice. Although a symbolic action can be accounted for rationally, there is nevertheless an unconscious irrational basis. The unconscious fantasies are very deceptive. In the unconscious fantasies of killing the father, the object or the subject, or both, may be changed. The destructive impulse which finds its expression in sacrifice may remain direct, (a fantasy of killing father, mother, or self), it may be projected, father killing himself, mother killing father, the child being killed by father or mother. However different all these fantasies may seem at the first glance, analysis proves that they are self-same expressions of the fantasied destruction of the object of hatred and self-destruction as an expiation. These fantasies, distorted, condensed, or displaced, may be dramatized symbolically in action.

Sarah Millin made use of such a symbolic dramatization in the further development of the central idea of her book. The mother unconsciously fantasies the killing of the child by the father. The hostility is expressed in the fantasy of the child's death at the hands of the father. The child symbolizes a part of herself, and her hostility to herself is projected on to her husband. In other words, by killing Jackie, the father, Elliot, unconsciously

killed Mary. You may argue that Jackie's death was accidental. But in the novel it is the author's fantasy, and, therefore, cannot be treated as an accidental occurrence in real life. . . . We are entitled to regard it as a symbolic dramatization of the idea of sacrifice. The whole description of the events which preceded the tragedy, the scene of the departure of the father and son, Mary's premonitions, all are silent witnesses of Mary's guilt.

The meaning of sacrifice may be one thing to the sacrificer, and another to the victim, and the spectator (Mary in our case), can identify himself with either rôle, or be both at once. . . . Thus, in the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham, there is a parricidal and suicidal meaning. Parricidal, because the son is to the unconscious a reincarnation of the father, suicidal because the son is a part of the self. . . . The spectator, the creator of the fantasy, can identify himself with either rôle; if he is sadistic he will play the part of the father, and if masochistic, that of the son. "The fantastic idea," says Sarah Millin, "came to Mary that it was with them as if God had determined to test, not the father, but the mother of Isaac, when he sent Abraham into the desert to sacrifice his son. Nor had the sacrifice been interrupted. It had been executed to the utmost." An excellent example of how the artist's intuition can grasp psychological truths.

Mary's craving for self-destruction was only satisfied by the actual destruction of a part of her own self. This was her real trial . . . a terrible form of masochistic compensation. But this form of self-punishment is merely an inevitable development of the more innocent self-torture, in the form of the inferiority complex, from which Mary had suffered from her early childhood. The sense of guilt is the fear of an inverted destructive impulse. It may be satisfied by punishment inflicted

by others. And for that reason punishment is often desired. The demand for punishment is a common occurrence, especially among Eastern people. It is often a source of a great embarrassment to the magistrates, who are inundated with false confessions. It is a prominent feature of the Russians, and sufferings are therefore eulogized to an extreme degree in Russian literature. . . . Remember the painter in "Crime and Punishment," who insisted on his having murdered the old woman.

Mary's whole life was a seeking for punishment. The quarrels with life, God and people were only rationalized excuses for destroying her chances in life, to which her intelligence, looks and personality entitled her.

Emma wondered if, crushed under the weight of suffering such as that caused by the death of Jackie, such a passion to live for the sake of others would die for ever. "If Jackie were lost, would Mary spend the rest of existence as his bereaved mother, or would the new Mary and the old Mary merge?" Emma believed that they would, and she was right. The destruction of the child was the symbolic expression of the highest form of sacrifice and suffering, and a symbolic destruction of her own self.

And with it the new Mary was born.

Mary destroyed the free will of Elliot, and made it impossible for him to come out with the truth and in this way spare her the agony of uncertainty, doubt and illusory hopes. The process of her rebirth was thus made extremely painful. But new life has already come to the world. A wonderful symbolization—the death of Jackie and of the old Mary, the birth of the new child and the new Mary.

And we see, indeed, in real life that the destruction of one being is expiated by the birth of another.

CHAPTER XII

DOSTOIEFFSKY: "THE CRIME AND PUNISHMENT:"
"THE BROTHERS KARAMASOV:" "THE IDIOT"

DOOSTOIEFFSKY, with a scanty handful of other creative artists, possesses a quality which the critics call universal. His genius has a wide range of appeal, and his place in this respect "is not far behind Shakespeare and Goethe."

In one respect, however, he stands alone in the world of literature. He is the poet of the abnormal. None of his heroes belongs to the normal. All of them are dissociated, ill co-ordinated characters, neurotics, psychotics, perverts, criminals or saints. None of his heroes is mentally healthy. None of them leads the life of an average man. Uncontrolled cravings, wild passions, impulsive actions, dominate their behaviour towards themselves, people, God and nature.

It seems as if Dostoevsky knew of the existence of the unconscious long before Freud and was able to make use of it freely. In Dostoevsky "the unconscious motives were discernible and utilizable, his potential psyche, his powerful criminal id caused him to react sympathetically to social impulses in others, and permitted him to set down acts with their true motives laid bare. His strong hypermoral conscience was the driving force behind his ideals of superman, it also lay behind his unattainable ideals of morals, of religion and his seeking the redemption of the world through the fantasy of Christ." On

the other hand, his conscious understanding was as wide as human experience, and he could therefore understand the problem of the crushed masses and the refined philosophical problems of the thinker. He knew intuitively the psychological truths and laws governing the human mind. He understood the principle of the unconscious mechanism which the science of psychoanalysis discovered only half a century later. Freud once said that everyone who is able to accept the existence of, and grasp the essence of the unconscious and repression, deserves to be called a psychoanalyst. Dostoieffsky would have deserved this name.

In his works one finds amazing descriptions of the working of the unconscious and repression. To quote two examples: In the novel "Eternal Husband" in the chapter called "Analysis" (a remarkable title) the lover, who is in danger of being killed by the husband, argues in the following manner: "Pavel Pavlovitch wanted to kill me, but the thought of murder has never crossed the mind of the future murderer. Briefly, Pavel Pavlovitch wanted to kill me, but did not know that he wanted to kill. This is absurd, but it is so." Later on in the same chapter he continues: "He came to Petersburg to embrace and to weep with me, in other words to kill me; he believed however himself that he came to embrace and to cry." One can hardly find in fiction better examples of the working of the unconscious mind.

Dostoieffsky himself suffered from a severe ambivalence, and was able, accordingly, to describe the duality of human emotion in most vivid forms. All his heroes love and hate simultaneously, and with equal intensity. Therefore his heroes appear to the reader incoherent and ill co-ordinated. Ivan Karamasov loves

and hates Katia, the latter oscillates in her love between the two brothers Ivan and Mytia.

Gruschenka does not know till the last moment if she hates and despises Dmitri, or loves him with such an intensity that she is prepared to follow him into exile. Mastasia Philippovna (from the novel "The Idiot") adores Mishkin, but runs away from him to Rogoszin. Rogoszin loves her with such a passion that he kills her, so as to possess her eternally and fully. A remarkable illustration of what is called, in psychoanalysis, an introjection, an oral (cannibalistic) incorporation of a loved object! Aglaia, from the same novel "The Idiot," loves Mishkin, she even worships him, but at the same time ridicules him, makes fun of him at every opportunity. Alioscha Karamasov, the follower of the holy staretz Sosima, is going to give up the world's illusions and become a monk, while at the same time he confesses to a friend that he really does not know if he believes in God. Marmeladova, in "Crime and Punishment," sells up the whole household to satisfy his cravings for alcohol, and, at the same time, is the most tender and loving father; his wife sends Sonia into the streets, and kisses her feet on her return home.

Dostoieffsky knew about infantile sexuality, and described its abnormal forms. He gave two studies of sexual precocity in "Nastasia Nezvanova," and in "A Little Hero." In the autobiographical novel, "The Raw Youth," he gives such an excellent description of the ambivalent relation of a boy to his father, and the homosexual components of it, that nobody should miss reading it.

Dostoieffsky not only used dreams for expressing the fantasies of his heroes, but seems to have understood the meaning of symbols, the regressive character, and the wish-fulfilment element of dreams.

On the night before the murder, Raskolnikov dreamt that he was a little boy again, and witnessed the cruelty of a peasant who killed his helpless little horse. He tried to save her but in vain. When he woke up Raskolnikov asked himself: "Will I really kill the old woman?"

Mytia Karamasov has a similar dream in the tavern where he rested for a few hours when on his way to his beloved before the contemplated murder of the father.

Dostoieffsky's descriptions of the insane, of the turning away from reality (Lebediakina in "The Devils" or the paranoid mania of persecution of Goliadkin in "The Double") are so true to life that they have been an object of study by many psychiatrists.

No wonder that the reader is at loss to find himself in the chaos of the abnormal world of Dostoieffsky's imagery. The lack of psychological insight has led to much shrugging of critical shoulders. Some critics, even of outstanding intellect, found refuge in such meaningless clichés as "peculiarly Russian" or "typical expression of an abnormal Slavic soul." It is to be deplored that critics and biographers indulge in generalizations of the Russian mind and character, which often sound, as Mirsky says, as if they actually believed in the existence of such a thing as an abstract Russian, divorced from circumstances of time and environment. The psychological problems with which Dostoieffsky confronts us are of a universal and general application, and the morbid phenomena with which he presents us are not peculiar to his countrymen. They do, however, reflect the characteristic features of Dostoieffsky's mind, for Dostoieffsky was the most exquisitely subjective of all the great writers. He was at the same time an individual whom we are entitled to classify as definitely abnormal. The other extreme view must, however, be repudiated, namely that Dostoieffsky owed all his qualities, as a man,

and as a creative artist, to his epilepsy, and that his life, and the lives of his heroes, were passed under the cloud of a sort of epileptic insanity.

In my previous analysis of literature nothing or little was said about the author himself, for reasons which I explained. Here, however, I shall attempt to make a synthetic study of Dostoieffsky's character and his works.

The most outstanding characteristic of his personality is the strong sense of guilt, and the concomitant need for punishment. "He was the great moralist, but still greater sinner." Freud remarked correctly, that it is difficult to place him high as a moralist on Dostoieffsky's own plea, that only a man who has gone through the depths of sin can reach the highest heights of morality. He alternatively sinned, and, in his remorse, made high moral demands. But Dostoieffsky has not achieved the most important thing in morality-renunciation. "Penitence, therefore, remained his goal in life, and need for punishment the form of its attainment. Hence the sense of unworthiness, which caused him to subject himself to continuous humiliations and punishments. He committed many acts to supply a rational basis for his need for suffering." He behaved as a man who suffered from a compulsion neurosis, as an obsessional, in whom the sense of guilt calls for most elaborate ritualistic cleansing, such as Lady Macbeth's symbolic washing of her hands after the murder. All the biographers have noticed the extreme masochistic trends in Dostoieffsky which are conditioned by his unconscious sense of guilt and need for punishment. Carr says: "Sexual love with Dostoieffsky is invariably associated with suffering rather than with happiness. In the world of Dostoieffsky's fiction, sexual love has more in common with hate than with pity."

While in Siberia he became the lover of a friend's wife, and when the friend died he married the relict. "But the dead man's horns were not buried with him, and Dostoevsky soon put them on himself." He described this in his novel, "The Eternal Husband," from which we can see that Dostoevsky was quite aware of his own horns. In relation to his wife's lover he performed one of his many pathological acts of self-abasement. Wherever he went, he took his wife's lover with him at his own expense, and, when in need himself begged his friends to do something for this "excellent young man" till the matter became an open scandal.

His short-lived affair with Paulina Suslova, whom he pursued to Paris, where he caught her on the rebound from a faithless French lover, is another illustration of his self-abasement in love. One must read, in detail, this story to appreciate Dostoevsky's masochism.

Dostoevsky had a genius for extracting guilt and pain from any situation. For instance, he joined the Petrashevzevs, the revolutionary and anarchistic group, although he differed with every member of it. The only thing he had in common with them at that period of his life was the antipathy against the "little father," the Tsar. When he was arrested and exiled for ten years, he almost welcomed the punishment. In his letter to his brother Andrey, he said quite frankly that the arrest and imprisonment probably saved his sanity. Dostoevsky wrote only one happy, lyric piece, "A Little Hero," and this he wrote soon after his imprisonment.

Dostoevsky was a gambler. He did not gamble to win but to lose. He never left the roulette table until he had lost his last penny. Then, penniless and stranded, he used to go on his knees and beg his wife's forgiveness

A series of letters were written by him to his friends in which he described himself as the most unworthy man on this earth, as a criminal. He even applied for money to Turgenev, his bitterest enemy. It was at this time that he made the famous confession of his seduction of a ten-year old girl. The episode of the seduction will be dealt with in detail as it illustrates in most excellent manner Dostoieffsky's sense of guilt. I had an opportunity to refresh my mind of the whole story of the confession while reading the biography of Dostoieffsky by Edward Carr.

After Tolstoy's death in 1910, a letter was published, which Strachow, the official biographer of Dostoieffsky, and a very prominent figure in Russian literary circles of the second half of the last century, wrote to Tolstoy in November, 1883. The following are some extracts. (The full letter was published in "Criterion" 1925).

You have doubtless received by now my Biography of Dostoieffsky; please give it your indulgent notice and tell me what you think of it. In this matter, I want to confess myself to you. All the time I was writing I was engaged in a struggle with my own rising disgust, and was trying to suppress this evil feeling in myself . . . I cannot regard Dostoieffsky as either a good or a happy man (the two really go together). He was malicious, envious and dissolute, and spent his whole life in states of nervous excitement which made him pitiable and would have made him ridiculous if he had not been so malicious and so clever. He had a penchant for filthinesses and was proud of them. Viskovatov began to tell me how he boasted that he had fornicated at the baths with a little girl who was brought to him by her governess. Note that for all this, for all his animal sensuality he had no taste, no feeling for feminine beauty and charm. This can be seen in his novels. The character most resembling him are the hero of "Memoirs from Underground,"

Svadrigailov in "Crime and Punishment," and Stavrogin in "The Devils."

There was another variant of the same story, according to which Dostoieffsky confessed his guilt to Turgenyev, his bitterest enemy. I had the opportunity of reading the diaries of Dostoieffsky's second wife, who died only a few years ago, in which she refers to the same incident and emphatically denies it. The English biographer, Carr, is at pains to ridicule the whole story. The charge must, at least, he says, be regarded as not proven. It is psychologically interesting that Carr is rather afraid to pursue an inquiry on the spot, and brings other evidence for and against Dostoieffsky, in a special note at the end of the chapter. One feels, in his discussion, a burning question—yes or no? Did Dostoieffsky really commit the crime or not? He behaves like a judge who has to pass a sentence. One feels that, for Carr, proof of guilt might mean the spiritual death of Dostoieffsky, and therefore he gives him the benefit of the doubt.

Such an approach to the episode shows an ignorance of the psychological truth, which by the way, is manifest in the whole book. Carr says: "Even if Strachow's statement is correct, it is only third hand; Strachow may have misunderstood Dostoieffsky, and if there were no such misunderstandings, Dostoieffsky who told such a thing to an acquaintance and a comparative stranger, must have been in a pathological state of mind." Did Dostoieffsky in this pathological state of mind, confess to a disgraceful act which he had committed, or was it only a fantasy? But from a psychological point of view, there may be little difference between the two. Let us, however, hear some further factors in connexion with this episode: evidence of a more illuminating kind.

Early in 1865 Dostoevsky was a frequent visitor at the house of a certain Madame Korvin Krukovskaia, and a suitor for the hand of her elder daughter, Anna, aged twenty. He used to relate to Anna and her sister scenes from projected novels, and on one occasion he described how one of his heroes, a respectable, middle-aged land proprietor, was troubled by the memory, that once, twenty years before, "egged on by drunken companions, he had violated a little girl of ten." Apropos of this incident, Carr remarks naïvely: "It is perhaps shocking to conventional taste that Dostoevsky should have described such an incident from a projected novel in the presence of two young girls, and it is not merely shocking, but almost incredible that the incident so described should have been one from his own life."

Dostoevsky actually made use of this motive twice in his novels. It first appeared in "Crime and Punishment," written in 1868. In one of the nightmares of his last night in the hotel, Svadrigailov dreams of a little girl of five whom he puts to sleep in his bed, and whose looks and gestures are already those of seduction and lust. But the character in whom he eventually develops the motive is Stavrogin, the hero of "The Devils" ("Possessed"). Not in the published version of "Devils," for the chapters in which Stavrogin confesses the offence were rejected by Katkov, the editor of the *Russki Vestnik*, where the novel was first published. They remained unpublished until 1922. Stavrogin's victim was in her twelfth year.

I cannot go into a detailed discussion of the whole episode, but I would like to draw your attention to the problem of the sense of guilt. It is of importance to the critics, friends and enemies of Dostoevsky to know definitely if he were guilty or not, as this is the criterion by which they are prepared to judge him. But to

Dostoevsky himself this was irrelevant, because psychologically a pious man feels equally guilty in both instances: whether the crime was actually committed, or whether there was only an intention or a desire to commit it. The sense of guilt was present in him, and it is for that reason that Dostoevsky committed so many foolish acts, which, in Carr's opinion, could have been carried out only in a pathological state of mind. All his actions in relation to the unfortunate incidents, were dictated by the so-called "*Geständniszwang*" (confession-compulsion) so wonderfully described by Dr. Th. Reik. Confession-compulsion is the unconscious urge, under the pressure of a sense of guilt, to confess in words or actions to crimes actually committed or only thought of. We may reasonably believe, therefore, that the story about the confession to his bitterest enemy, Turgenev, and to the comparative stranger, Viskovatov, is true. The discussion of the incident with the girl of twenty has also the character of confession-compulsion, and of self-punishment. We must also bear in mind that Dostoevsky was what we generally call an exhibitionist and a masochist. Haunted by the sense of guilt, he was seeking for expiation. He found finally a substitute solution of the problem in his writings, in his novels, whereas an ordinary human being would have developed a neurosis. Not satisfied with continuous self-punishment, Dostoevsky carries the punishment to a logical conclusion in his fantasy by destroying Svadrigailov and Stavrogin. Both committed suicide, Svadrigailov soon after the desire to commit the offence (intention and no deed), and Stavrogin years after the actual crime. Although both perished, only one was actually guilty of the deed. Must one regard all these facts as incidental? Certainly not. The sense of guilt under the pressure of the hypermoral super-ego, which

was very severe in Dostoieffsky, demanded the expiation of the crime; whether it was fantastic or real, made no difference.

To show you that my explanation of the whole episode is not mere theory, I will bring in conclusion the following detail from the novel "The Devils." The narrator of the terrible crime committed by Stavrogin, prefaces the story of the confession with a suggestion that it may have been a piece of mere bravado on the part of Stavrogin. Here is the actual text: "I bring forward no proof, nor do I assert that the confession is untrue, that is to say, entirely invented and fabricated. In all probability the truth may lie somewhere between." Let me add that the "somewhere between," means somewhere between fantasy and reality which proves that it might have been only a desire, which was repressed at the last moment, but which was nevertheless treated by Dostoieffsky, unconsciously, as a reality.

Dostoieffsky was a sadist. This sadism expressed itself in his irritability, love of tormenting and his intolerance, even towards persons whom he loved; his general intolerance in questions of religion, politics, his chauvinism and hatred of other nationalities. His sadism also finds expression in the way he treats his readers. He always keeps something back, is always doubting, questioning. "If," "maybe," "possibly," "it is so, and not so"—all these introjections make Dostoieffsky's style distressingly confused. His Russian, by the way, is very bad, the style as well as the grammar. It always gives me the impression that the author is teasing his reader, and teasing is indeed a classical form of sadism.

Masochism is, however, stronger in Dostoieffsky than sadism. "In little things he was a sadist to others, in

bigger things a sadist to himself, that is a masochist." (Freud).

Dostoevsky was an impulsive character with some anal features. He suffered also from epileptic attacks.

The origin of the sado-masochism, the sense of guilt, the need for punishment, and his hystero-epilepsy is to be sought in Dostoevsky's childhood, and, in the first place, in his relation to his father. Again the *Œdipus* you may justly protest. Yes, and in its most classical form. It is not the fault of the psychoanalyst that the *Œdipus* is universal, and is the kernel of every neurosis.

Dostoevsky's mother was a middle-class woman, a quiet, submissive, patient and loving human being. Feodor, the writer, was the second child in the family of six (four brothers) and, as a child, was very jealous of his eldest brother, Michael, who was the mother's darling. Mme. Dostoevsky idealized her husband, and the young Feodor had, therefore, to share his love for his mother with two more successful rivals, his father and his brother, Michael.

His father was a physician, holding an official position in a poorhouse. The child's earliest companions were the sick and the poor. He saw nothing but misery in these formative days. His earliest reading was the Book of Job, and this great prophet of masochism was to remain a favourite throughout his life. His father was a typical anal character—excitable, bad tempered, orderly, parsimonious and avaricious. It is generally agreed that Dostoevsky portrayed his father in old Karamasov.

The father, however, took a great interest in the education of his children. He was himself at times their teacher. An unfortunate occurrence, as in this way Dostoevsky shared the general fate of children whose fathers were their teachers.

The authority of the father, is, in such cases, excessively increased and accentuates the ambivalence in the later periods of the boy's life. Dostoevsky was fixated to his father ideal, and, at the same time, his hatred and hostility against his father were out of all proportion. His sister, Aimee, relates that her brother could not bear the name of his father to be mentioned.

The most illustrative account of the ambivalent relation to the father one finds in the autobiographical novel, "The Raw Youth." This novel is really an account of the adolescent Dostoevsky's struggle with the Oedipus situation. It incorporates the classical challenging fantasy of not belonging to one's family, or of having an illustrious sire. The character of Versilov, which is moulded after Herzen, the famous Russian writer and politician, is a common fantasy situation in neurotics with a strong father antagonism. A fantasy of having the ideal man as a father.

We have direct evidence of Dostoevsky's attitude towards his father in a letter written from the Free Military Academy, where he was being educated. The letter was a reply to one from the father, refusing money for necessary books and clothing. Dostoevsky was sixteen at the time. It runs:

My dear Father: Can you really believe that your son wants something extravagant when he asks you for a remittance? God is my witness I would not inconvenience you from selfishness. How bitter it is to take from relations when you know they begrudge it to you. I still have my head and a good pair of hands. If I were only free to make my own living, I would never ask you for a kopeck, even though I were in extremis. I would be ashamed to let drop a word about supporting me. Now I can only promise to repay you in the future, and that future is not far distant, as you will soon see.

But now, dearest Father, I am in want. In the real sense of the word, I need 40 roubles a year, which are necessary for a student, and that is not for tea or sugar. I realize your need, and have given up drinking tea, but I must have shoes, clothes and books, send me 25 roubles by June 1st and help your son in his frightful need. I want but little and my thanks will be endless.

Affectionately,
Feodor.

(He did not get the money).

It may be said that Dostoieffsky never freed himself from the remorse aroused by his desire to kill the father. This determined his attitude to the Tsar, the State and religion; it found its direct expression in his neurosis. Even as a boy of ten, he suffered from wolf-phobia, which developed in the country place, Tscheramaschnaia, and such a phobia is always associated with the fear of the father. (Compare with the wolf-man of Freud). Tscheramaschnaia, is, by the way, the place where Ivan Karamasov went to facilitate the murder of the father by his absence.

When Dostoieffsky was sixteen years of age he suffered from hysterical aphonia, a disturbance of speech. Those who read Freud's case of Dora, will realize the significance of this neurotic symptom, as a defence against saying something forbidden. Later in life, before the onset of the real epileptic attacks, he developed a peculiar melancholia, associated with fear of death. His brother Andrey tells us that in his childhood, Feodor used to leave notes about before he went to sleep; he was afraid that he would fall into a deathlike sleep during the night, and begged that his burial should be postponed for five days. . . . Soloviev, the famous Russian philosopher, confirmed this excessive fear of death in Dostoieffsky.

Then came his epilepsy. The real nature of the disease and the exact date of its origin are still in dispute. It can, however, be safely accepted that it was of the so-called psychic as opposed to the organic type, and it began soon after the death of his father, who was murdered by his serfs for his brutality.

Under the severe burden of the enormous sense of guilt, Dostoevsky oscillated all his life between two extremes, sin and expiation, evil and good, sexual perversions and sexual chastity (his heroes are either asexual or highly perverted), parricide and submission to the father ideal—the “little father,” the Tsar—between atheism and faith, between soul and intellect, between Hell and Heaven. And this dualism of his mental make-up was due to the universal filial guilt, from which even his great mind could not free him.

Dostoevsky's sympathy for the murderer is boundless; it goes far beyond pity for the unhappy wretch. It is of the same nature as the attitude of Christian to the murderer of Ruth, in “The World's Illusion” by Wassermann. In Dostoevsky there is an identification with the criminal on the basis of the same murderous impulses. This identification with the criminal is a decisive factor in Dostoevsky's choice of material. He dealt first with the egoistic criminal—Raskolnikov; the sadistic criminal—Svadrigailov, Rogoschin and Rakitin; then with the political and religious criminal—Stavrogin and Kirillov in “The Devils” and, finally, at the end of his life, with the parricidal criminal in “The Brothers Karamasov.” In all these criminals Dostoevsky made his poetic confession and sought to find redemption. (Freud).

Dostoevsky's “Crime and Punishment” shows clearly the power of his sense of guilt. The identification of the

author with Raskolnikov is obvious. The old 'woman-pawnbroker is an indirect father image (indirect because the murdered was copied from his father's sister). In the dream previously cited the pawnbroker's father image is symbolized by the horse. Sonia is the mother image—Raskolnikov addresses her as "little mother" and the punishment was the same as Dostoevsky's—exile to Siberia.

In Raskolnikov, Dostoevsky attempted to illustrate the influence of the extreme forms of individualism and egotism, the influence of intellect on the soul. Raskolnikov develops a compulsion, based on the delusion of grandeur. The compulsion consisted in the obsessional idea that a crime must be committed; Napoleon is above the moral code. Raskolnikov toys with the superman idea, but the author actually reduces him to the state of a "louse"—as Dostoevsky expresses it. The whole crime, the circumstances, the condition of the murderer, have the structure of a pure compulsion. The crime is mysterious. But the veil of mystery is lifted when we follow the murderer's behaviour after the crime. Raskolnikov begins a most remarkable series of unconsciously motivated acts to attract attention to his guilt. In the police station his behaviour is such as to arouse suspicion, he revisits the scene of the crime, he makes a circumstantial confession to the police officer, he unconsciously wanders to the same tavern, where he knew he would find the potential accuser. A miracle he thought, but he had forgotten that the man had told him where and when he could find him.

Raskolnikov finally confesses his crime publicly, and, happy and contented, goes to Siberia. In Raskolnikov, Dostoevsky has described the neurotic structure of a crime; first the sense of guilt, which calls for punish-

ment. This leads to the criminal act to bring about the penalty.

The conscious motive is a mere rationalization, as is shown by Raskolnikov's frantic efforts to attract attention to his guilt. In the same novel we find also the purely sadistic criminal, who cannot expiate the lust of his eyes. Such a criminal was Svadrigailov, who committed suicide after his nightmare in the hotel about a little girl of five whom he puts to sleep in his bed, and, "whose looks and gestures were already those of seduction and lust."

The next novel by Dostoevsky was "The Idiot." Here we find a more or less successful repression of the Oedipus conflict: the hatred and the destructive impulses are replaced by the excessive submission, and endless goodness. The Christman Mishkin is the author's ideal ego. But the evil is still too strong in the world round Mishkin, and he is yet unable to prevent crime. In other words Dostoevsky feels himself still powerless against his criminal desires and forbidden passions, and, indeed, they come through again in the highest degree in "The Devils."

In the persons of Stavrogin, Stepan, Trophimovitch, and Kirillov the author ruthlessly destroys the nihilistic tendencies of his own character, and, in Shatov, of the same novel, he brings the Christ-superman ideal a step further. Shatov is active, is more real than Mishkin, is capable of doing good in this world. Stavrogin is the perverted atheist, who does evil for the sake of evil, because he is uprooted, has no bonds with Russia, father, house and family. Kirillov, who is an epileptic, is the acme of atheism. Stavrogin is the one who commits the crime which Dostoevsky confessed to Turgenyev: he seduces a girl of twelve, and then commits suicide.

In "Crime and Punishment," "The Idiot" and "The Devils" the Œdipus situation is represented in a fight between nihilism, (denial of Tsar, nation and religion) abstract individualism and extreme egoism, (Raskolnikov,) on the one hand, and endless self-abasement, goodness, and devotion to humanity and Russia, on the other.

In the novel which Dostoieffsky wrote soon after "The Devils," the Œdipus complex is presented in a more direct form. It is indeed an autobiographical novel, and deals directly with the double relation of the son to a father. I refer to "Raw Youth" which is, by the way from the literary standpoint, a very weak work of art.

Perverted parental love provided Dostoieffsky with a mysterious, and engrossing example of dualism—of human emotion and ambivalence in father-son relationship. The conflict between father and son found its classical expression in the last novel Dostoieffsky wrote, "The Brothers Karamasov." This is justly considered the most magnificent novel ever written; the episode of the Grand Inquisitor is justly looked upon as one of the peaks of world literature (Freud). This novel is, indeed, Dostoieffsky's highest achievement. In it he deals with the same situation as in the other novels, but with all its psychological nuances and niceties. The characters are a brutal, sensuous, alcoholic father, and four sons (the same number of sons as in Dostoieffsky's family). The four sons are of distinct characters and temperaments. Each figure stands alone as an artistic creation and yet they are mutually dependent. It deals with a father's murder. As in *Hamlet*, the murder is committed by another, but differing from Shakespeare's play, the murderer is one who stands to the murdered man in the same filial relationship as the hero, Dmitri. This other was the bastard Smerdiakov, and in him the motive of

sexual rivalry is openly admitted. To the actual murderer Dostoeffsky most remarkably attributed his own disease—epilepsy, as if he were trying to confess that the epileptic and neurotic in him, Dostoeffsky, was a criminal. Smerdiakov is also a sadist. He amuses himself by hanging cats and burying them with great pomp. He despises his father, and is a servile lackey in his presence. He has no conscience, he kills the old man by crushing his skull, in the same way that Dostoeffsky's father was murdered by his serfs. Smerdiakov feels no regret.

But he is not the only criminal. All the brothers were guilty. In the speech for the defence, the famous mockery of psychology is uttered, that it is a double-edged weapon; (the literary translation is "a stick with two ends.") But it is not psychology at which the mockery was directed by Dostoeffsky, but at the procedure of judicial examination. "It is a matter of indifference who actually committed the crime: psychology is interested in discovering who desired it, or welcomed it when it was done. For that reason all the brothers were guilty: Smerdiakov merely carried out the wish of the Karamasovtetrad, the mystic quaternity of four in one, *and the one was Dostoeffsky himself.*"

In psychoanalytical terminology, Smerdiakov is the lowest level of the four in one, the pure id, the purely instinctive level, the sensual and criminal character.

The second person in this quaternity is Dmitri, the neurotic character who still possesses a powerful id, but this is already coupled with a strong ego and super-ego. Dmitri, is the neurotic character *par excellence*. In Dmitri every conceivable combination of the opposites, evil and good, sadism and masochism, mawkish sentimentality and arrogant licentiousness, heroism and indecisiveness, forceful energy and dead inertia, find

wildly unco-ordinated expression. Mytia confesses to his brother, Alioscha, the dual nature of his character in the following words: "Man is planned on too lavish a scale. I would cut him down. An offence to the intellect may be a thing of beauty to the heart. There the devil wrestles with God, and the battlefield is the human heart." The fate of Dmitri is typical of that of the neurotic character. He never committed the crime, though he had tottered on the brink of it. Not the Russian judges only, but any judge who views the circumstantial evidence exclusively on the basis of the psychology of conscious, would believe him guilty. Only a psychology of the depths could save the numerous fellow sufferers of Dmitri from a miscarriage of justice. But Dmitri, the guilty and not guilty murderer, recognizes his essential sinfulness and is willing to pay for what he would have probably done against his father. And this we know is Dostoevsky's unconscious attitude. There are indeed, many external features in common between Dmitri and Dostoevsky. Both were soldiers at the time of their father's death; both had grievances against their father in connexion with money; both were at the same time reckless spenders of money (there are many anecdotes told about Dostoevsky's extravagance.) A curious coincidence: Plotnikov is the man from whom Dmitri bought all the *delicatessen* in such an extravagant way and is also the name of the merchant with whom Dostoevsky used to spend his money in a similar manner.

The third person of the Karamasov quaternity is Ivan, the sceptical cynic, the philosopher who intellectualizes, rationalizes and projects his problems on the outer world. The love instincts are completely suppressed. Dry intellect, no heart, no soul. It is

Raskolnikov in his extreme and abnormal development. His ironic intellect has so completely overwhelmed his soul that it brought him to insanity. Ivan is conscious of parricide. Before the court he says: "Who of us men is it, who could not have killed his father"—which when interpreted really means "I could kill him."

Ivan is more guilty than Dmitri. He is really the guilty one, for it was at his suggestion that Smerdiakov committed the crime. He, the ego of Dostoieffsky, has suggested the crime to Smerdiakov the lowest level of Dostoieffsky, and suppressed this fact in the clouded state of accusatory hallucinations, which are recognizable as an epileptic equivalent of Dostoieffsky's state after the attacks. Appolon Maikov, the famous Russian poet, talks about similar psychotic states of Dostoieffsky's mind after severe epileptic attacks. That Ivan is again autobiographical is evidenced not only by the psychological construction but also from some external details. As I have already pointed out, Ivan goes to the town Tscheramaschnaia in order to be absent at the time of the crime, and this was precisely the place where Dostoieffsky's father was murdered.

Ivan goes through an hallucinatory episode, in which he is confronted by his own desires and doings, and confesses that he is alone to blame. Read Dostoieffsky's letters, his biography, and you will not doubt for a moment that Ivan's hallucinatory self-accusation is but the author's self-torturing confession of sinfulness and guilt.

The fourth member of the quaternity is Alioscha, the Christman. Mishkin symbolized passive goodness, and was therefore not perfect yet to help the world in its fight with evil, in other words to help Dostoieffsky in his internal fights. Shatov went a step further, but even

he is not yet perfect; he was killed, Alioscha is the perfection of Dostoieffsky's ideal. Alioscha was the man into whom Dostoieffsky hoped to be transferred after his endless sufferings. Alioscha represses his lust, his passion, his guilt, he understands all and pardons all.

Alioscha is the ideal superman of Dostoieffsky in whom all the three elements of the individual are in harmony. He is the ideal narcissistic-compulsive-erotic personality, in whom the id, ego and super-ego are balanced and co-ordinated.

We know already from psychoanalytical experience that such people do not exist. But Alioscha is real. In spite of all the super-human qualities and efforts of Alioscha, he is, nevertheless a Karamasov. In his blood there is the microbe of lust and crime, even he knows the impulse of father-murder. Even he is not free from the feelings of guilt.

In the novel we find a very significant scene. The staretz Sosima, the holy of the holiest, the teacher of Alioscha, in his conversation with Dmitri has discovered that Dmitri bears, in himself, a readiness to murder his father; the staretz throws himself at the feet of the potential murderer. It is not admiration for Dmitri. It signifies that the holy man is rejecting the temptation to despise or shrink from the murderer, and therefore humiliates himself before him. This is the keynote of Dostoieffsky's religious philosophy, and is of significance in the evolution of his attitude towards his own sense of guilt. It is the evolution from the primitive concept of original sin and fear of the vengeful God to the doctrine of Christ, (Mishkin, Alioscha, the staretz Sosima) with the admission of guilt, and the hope of pardon for all. An evolution for the egotistic individualism to universal and all forgiving love.

Finally, Dostoieffsky has evolved a mystic religious

concept of his own . . . the universal sinfulness of mankind, and the participation of all in the redemption of guilt. He found forgiveness for all and in this way forgiveness for himself.

And, indeed, during the last ten years of his life his gambling frenzy subsided, his epileptic attacks became less and less frequent, and he entered a decade of comparative calm. He became a freer man. It was as though he had atoned for his sins and had been granted absolution. And this is exactly the sequence of events in the "The Life of a Great Sinner," which was his great projected novel, of which only rough sketches have reached us. In 1881 he died of a hemptosis, tranquil and at peace.

In the analysis of *Hamlet* I said that Hamlet was what Shakespeare would have been if he had not written the play. The fate of Dostoieffsky was more tragic. His neurosis was deeper, his Œdipus more conflicting, his sense of guilt excessively severe. He had to go through endless sufferings till finally through his art he was able to find a solution to his conflicts. A man without the creative genius of Dostoieffsky would have ended his days in insanity.

